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INTRODUCTION

In October 1958, the influential American magazine Foreign Affairs featured an essay by
the leader of a newly independent West African nation in which he graciously and humbly asked
the United States for financial support in the form of investment. President Kwame Nkrumah of
Ghana, which had achieved independence the previous year, explained that African nations’
desire for non-alignment was simply a matter of not getting involved in a conflict that was
beyond their ability to affect militarily.
But this attitude of non-alignment does not imply indifference to the great issues of our
day. It does not imply isolationism. It is in no way anti-Western; nor is it anti-Eastern …
On this great issue of war and peace, therefore, the people and government of Ghana put
all their weight behind the peaceful settlement of disputes and seek conditions in which
disputes do not become embittered to the point of violence.1
After several pages of friendly words, though taking care to hint that Ghana did have the
ability to affect the balance of power through its alliances, Nkrumah closed with the bold
statement, “Africa has no choice. We have to modernize. Either we shall do so in the interest and
support of the West or we shall be compelled to turn elsewhere. This is not a warning or a threat,
but a straight statement of political reality.”2
A decade later in the same publication, journalist Russell Warren Howe lamented the
independence-era rewriting of African history that attempted to give black Africa a pre-colonial
value.
Indeed, before the pan-Africanizing experience of colonialism, each tribe was ignorant of
almost all African lands except its own, and those of its neighbors and present or past
enemies. A female continent, Black Africa was to be "discovered," penetrated and
dominated by others. There were few exceptions to this image of passivity.3
Howe described the cultural and political awakening of Africa of 1968, not as a
“Renaissance but an Enlightenment."4 Having determined that any sort of glorious African past
was mere myth, Howe turned to reviewing several of the continent’s national leaders, beginning
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with Nkrumah. “Some men have carved their own mythology. Probably none has been so adept
at this as Kwame Nkrumah" who “built an image of himself as a left-wing leader dedicated to a
large African union and opposed to all that regionalized or balkanized the continent.”5 However,
according to Howe, Nkrumah "opposed all movements which he could not hope to lead,” and
“he inevitably opposed every union in Africa of any size, and even many small ones."6 The preindependence image of Nkrumah lingered even as he changed, and his admirers refused to
acknowledge actions that contradicted that image, but “little if anything in Nkrumah's postindependence policy suggests that he had any ideology except the desire to retain both his wealth
and power … The battle against colonialism was the only battle Nkrumah honorably won.”7
Between Nkrumah's own 1958 description of newly independent Ghana full of promise
and exercising some degree of power and Howe's demeaning and disappointed image of black
Africa in 1968, U.S. media coverage of African events and leaders varied as greatly as these two
pictures. While Nkrumah had access to the international discursive space at the dawn of Ghana’s
independence, by 1968, he had lost the privilege to speak for himself in Foreign Affairs.
Deposed, Nkrumah could only be defined by the Western journalist.
The Problem of Covering Africa
Myths about leaders are certainly one way that media stereotypes have been applied to
Africa. During the independence era, which coincided with the first decades of the Cold War,
African leaders were often viewed in relation to the binary conflict, something Nkrumah, who
favored non-alignment in his Foreign Affairs essay, claimed was not appropriate in his case.
Other times, African leaders were depicted in the U.S. press as strongmen, liars, primitive and
traditional, or out of control, characteristics that could too easily be equated with partiality for
the East, as they were clearly undemocratic and unreasonable. Further, African leaders often
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served as metonyms for their countries and even Africa as a whole, presenting a continent that
was chaotic, not modern, and probably incapable of self-government. In addition to Cold War
stereotypes, U.S. media coverage leaned on readily understood colonial tropes to explain African
news to American readers. Stories about death, war, and famine earned headlines, often with no
other news about Africa to provide a balance of coverage. While many Americans stood
ideologically against formal colonialism, ideas about Africans would intersect with continuing
racism in the United States as the independence era coincided with the Civil Rights Movement.
In these ways, U.S. print media coverage during the long global Sixties served more often than
not to replicate existing pre-colonial and colonial representations of Africa and Africans.
At the same time, within stories of death, some writers incorporated messages of hope.
African leaders might be “tyrants” in many publications, but in others, they were instead called
“capable.” While African masses were often faceless within U.S. news, feature stories allowed
names and personalities to appear. The continent and its newly independent nations were not
always important only in relation to the Cold War. Less likely to circulate within mainstream
print media, these more positive or complex representations appeared in a variety of outlets
being published: African American newspapers, socialist and communist publications, writerdriven essays in liberal magazines, and radical local and national media. Recovering these stories
has important implications for how we study U.S. media coverage of Africa today, particularly in
an age when availability of media sources has not just expanded but exploded thanks to online
and social media. How the media described newly independent Africa also matters because
“news shapes our assumptions about one another, prescribes the symbols with which we analyse
events, informs international investment, and guides policy discussion.”8 In other words, media
discourses about Africa created real world consequences. Negative content and imagery have
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“important implications for global flows of finance, trade, tourism,” inform intercultural
relations, and generate Afro-pessimism, which encourages outside intervention.9
For many Americans during the era of African independence, print media defined
independent Africa. While the discursive space of books and films certainly worked to form
images in American minds, news reporting holds a special space of authority because news
stories have the benefit of being considered accurate, objective, and true. News is believed in a
way that fiction and other forms of narrative are not. “By the 1950s, leaders of American
journalism had become committed to objectivity. The American Society of Newspaper Editors in
1923 had adopted the first national code of ethics; objectivity and impartiality had become part
of the profession.”10 During the time of African independence, roughly 1957 to 1975, Africa held
a significant place in American consciousness, and it was through news reporting that Americans
learned about African nations and their leaders. The importance of the messaging cannot be
overstated. These representations have political consequences, and the discourse surrounding the
situations “shapes the possibility of action” and legitimizes “certain political actions.”11
Several scholars have previously researched Africa’s image in Western popular media,
imagination, and literature. Mistaking Africa: Curiosities and Inventions of the American Mind
by historian and political scientist Curtis Keim points out the many inaccurate portrayals,
stereotypes, and myths about Africa and Africans. Literature scholar Daniel M. Mengara’s
Images of Africa: Stereotypes and Realities describes the replacement of African identities with a
monolithic African identity created by Europeans. Similarly, Paul Landau and Deborah Kaspin’s
Images and Empires: Visuality in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa includes studies that
exemplify how “images have both underwritten and undermined the hierarchies that governed
colonial Africa.”12 A volume edited by Jan Nederveen Pieterse takes the broader topic of race to
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explore stereotypes of diasporic Africans by the West based on oversimplification and
generalization and determines that stereotypes make a significant impact. “Obviously, what is at
stake in these representations is not just the images themselves but also their social
ramifications.”13
Additionally, several scholars have already shown that U.S. media coverage of Africa
tends to narrowly highlight death, disease, and destruction. In a 1976 article, Aaron Segal stated,
“Africa and Africans do not get along well within the United States press, radio and television –
and vice versa.”14 He reviewed the context that leads to detrimental coverage of Africa, including
a lack of local and long-term correspondents; economic constraints, both the expense of sending
reporters to Africa and the perceived lack of audience interest in most African stories; narrow
considerations of what is newsworthy; logistical issues; censorship and lack of welcome from
some African governments; oversimplification; and lack of context. However, apart from more
academic and policy journals about Africa, which would typically only attract a readership
already interested in Africa, Segal limits his discussion to mainstream and business media. He
makes only a nod to African American press by mentioning Ebony magazine.
Until recently, the only available edited volume dedicated to the topic of U.S. media
coverage of Africa has been Africa’s Media Image, which was published in 1992. Editor Beverly
G. Hawk sought to pull together Africanists of various disciplines as well as journalists to show
how the colonial image has remained the media image. This imagery relies on metaphors rather
than providing the necessary context, which has had ramifications for public opinion and foreign
policy. “The metaphors justify intervention, and they legitimate certain leaders and modes of
change while delegitimating others. Taken together, the metaphors condemn armed resistance as
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dysfunctional and primitive.”15 The discussion in Africa’s Media Image reflects the concerns and
issues of the 1980s.
In a new book considering sub-Saharan Africa’s media image in the twenty-first century,
scholars follow Hawk’s work and respond to the question of how international media coverage
of Africa has changed in the twenty years since it was last examined in her pioneering book even
though
[h]istorically much of the international reporting of Africa has been through the focus of
aid and development. Just as the tropes for framing Africa have frequently been through
disaster coverage – stories of war, famine, and crisis – so what has followed from that is
the emphasis in reporting upon how Western actors are responding and reacting, usually
through some kind of aid or related intervention.16
The essays in Africa’s Media Image in the 21st Century strive to move beyond traditional
critiques of media coverage to look at the scope of representations existing in an age of digital
media and African correspondents. They also consider the response of the media to decades of
critique while still problematizing what is reported and the new messages conveyed in this
coverage.
I argue that prefigurations of some of the non-colonialist representations available today
were already present in certain U.S. print media sources during the Sixties, precisely the period
scholars have determined provided mostly negative coverage of Africa. While many mainstream
outlets offered only narrow images of Africa, broadening the scope of publications under review
paints a much more nuanced picture. Despite the Cold War, some writers and editors were able
to imagine African struggles outside the East-West conflict, and others at times threw off
colonial imagery and racism to depict Africans as intellectuals and advocates who offered
models of hope rather than despair. As the New Left expanded and liberalism dominated, images
of non-aligned African leaders could sometimes break out of the limited Cold War framework.
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Likewise, as the war in Vietnam unfolded, colonialism and interventionism earned increasing
contempt. In some cases, Africans – leaders and occasionally ordinary people – gained the
opportunity for self-representation within U.S. media outlets. Even if this type of Africa
reporting was not the most prevalent, it is important to remember that these stories were
published, working against the grain of Cold War dichotomies and colonial stereotypes.

Theoretical Framework: Agenda Setting, Framing, and Discourse Analysis
The 1978 edited volume Women and the News stemmed from a conference based on the
“general, and presumably unarguable, premise that there is a relationship between what is
reported as news and what individuals and groups think of as socially and politically
important.”17 The essays examine the concepts of agenda setting, in which media establish what
are matters of concern, and audiences make the items covered in the news part of their personal
agendas; access to the media, which determines whose voices are heard; and definitions of the
news, which determine what is important enough to cover. Agenda setting gained prominence
with Bernard Cohen’s Press and Foreign Policy, which made the claim in 1963, that while the
media cannot tell people what to think, it can tell people what to think about. Women and the
News editor Laurily Keir Epstein reinforced this point by citing a 1976 study that determined
newspapers were the media type with the largest agenda-setting impact.18 Thus, media decide
what we think about, and during the long global Sixties, print media still held sway. What
constitutes “news” can be determined by something as unrelated to newsworthiness as the
organizational structure of the outlet. In other words, what fits where; for example, “the quality
of the picture is far more important to a television news story than is the actual content of the
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story.”19 Events are sometimes considered “news” only when they have been carried on AP or
UPI or covered in the New York Times or Washington Post.
What follows agenda setting, which can be thought of as choosing the story that will earn
coverage, is framing. Framing determines how that story will be told and explained to the
audience. Attention to framing “shares with agenda-setting research a focus on the public policy
issues in the news ... However, it expands beyond what people talk or think about by examining
how they think and talk.”20 Or more simply, "News frames are the windows in which the news
is presented … In considering the framing of a story, scholars analyze the cultural and social
norms that are embedded and communicated within a specific news item."21 To tell a story,
journalists rely on symbols they expect will be understood by their readers so that “framing is a
social process, conditioned by the personal beliefs of the journalists and the organizational and
professional constraints imposed upon them.”22 Moreover, initial frames can often be replicated
as journalists rely on previously published material when researching their stories and might
even interview the same sources. We will see this happen with coverage in Nigeria, when writer
Renata Adler describes gleaning background information from journalist Frederick Forsyth’s
book, The Biafra Story.
Hand-in-hand with framing, discourse analysis can illuminate the powerful structural
meanings contained in news coverage. Cultural studies scholar Sara Mills explained that,
according to post-colonial discourse theory, the struggle over representation has had “had farreaching effects, in that it informed racist knowledge and practices, constructing the grounds
within which debates about race were largely conducted and the typologies within which
indigenous people and their descendants were forced to be categorised and to categorise
themselves.” Not simply ideological in nature, it had material consequences.23 Discourse can be
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defined as “the way a subject is talked about,” including the way nations are talked about,
according to Giovanna Dell’Orto.24 “In international mass communication, the media are a part
of the negotiation of power across national and cultural borders because they serve to integrate
discourses that convey and help fix identities of other nations, thereby delimiting policy
options.”25
According to Dell’Orto, the first goal of discourse analysis is to identify the major themes
and prevalent linguistic choices in the texts.26 To identify themes in a diverse range of media that
does not necessarily rely on a common set of social and political beliefs, I will borrow from the
constant comparative method as described by Marian Meyers as a way to look for “patterns and
themes” of representation.27 This is a deductive approach through which texts are compared, and
as categories emerge, they are compared with additional texts. In this way, the categories are
defined “by the texts rather than being predetermined, as is generally the case in quantitative
content analysis.”28 Due to the fact that my research covers a range of states and leaders, over a
fifteen-year time period, not beginning with predetermined categories will allow for the texts to
speak for themselves.
While media play an agenda-setting role, influencing what the public thinks about, and
through framing and discourse can guide audiences in how to think, the debate over media’s
ability to cause or affect political action continues. Journalist Asgede Hagos examined the
relationship between media and foreign policy and found neglect in coverage was coupled with
neglect in foreign interest. When such events were covered by the U.S. press, abundant distortion
existed. Hagos argues that the press coverage follows the government foreign policy line unless a
foreign issue becomes domestic.29
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In the 2010 edited volume Public Policy and Mass Media: The Interplay of Mass
Communication and Political Decision Making, Katrin Voltmer and Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten
turned from examining mass media’s role in shaping public opinion to its potential for affecting
political decision making. While it seems that the media should not have a significant effect on
policy making, many studies have shown an important link. “The most obvious link between
mass communication and policy making is public opinion … Adapting to the priorities of the
media is therefore a strategy to respond to what are believed to be the demands and preferences
of the electorate.”30 According to the authors, public policy makers use the media to monitor
public opinion. However, rather than media shaping policy, news is more often a “joint product”
created through interactions between media and politicians. "Hence, policymakers and
journalists, especially at the top level of each elite group, can be seen as interpretive
communities with each part having an impact in the formation of policy."31 At other times, media
can be found to have no noticeable impact on policy makers or their decisions. Despite being
only sometimes effective at affecting policy outcomes, the media do have an important role in
determining what the public pays attention to – agenda setting. "This body of research has shown
that the salience of issues on the media agenda not only affects which problem citizens consider
most important, but also their policy preferences and how they evaluate political officials.”32 A
study with a long timeframe showed that “most of the time the media follow the cues provided
by political elites, [but] they also play an important role in detecting new problems and elevating
them to the attention of the policymakers.33 In the end, the question is not whether the media are
powerful, but which conditions allow the media to sway policy. By controlling the discourse,
media constitute rather than reflect reality by ignoring topics deemed un-newsworthy. "Finally,
access to discursive power can affect the ability of political actors to assert their interests. At the
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same time, the public perspective on the content of a topic may shift, as has been seen in many
policy fields, including economic policy, the environment, foreign-policy and immigration."34

Scholarship: The Global Sixties and the Cold War
The age of African independence was concurrent with the era of unrest and upheaval
across the globe known as “the Sixties.” Historians increasingly favor the notion of a “long
global Sixties” from the 1950s to the 1970s. In the 2013 edited volume New World Coming, the
contributors call for a shift of scholarship “away from the main centres and major events that
have thus far dominated representations of the period.”35 This means both shifting the gaze away
from the United States as well as widening the timeframe. While Jeremi Suri’s The Global
Revolutions of 1968 temporally expands by beginning with events leading up to 1968 (“the
origins of the global revolutions”), he limits the players to the West, including Europe, and the
East, comprising the Soviet Union and China. Although he mentions that protestors in Latin
American and Africa overthrew leaders and challenged foreign sponsors, there is slight
recognition, apart from Vietnam, that the Third World existed as a site of conflict for the
superpowers. It served as a peripheral place where superpowers could use force if necessary “in
pursuit of global order and an image of strength at home.”36 Nevertheless, Suri draws from
thinkers like Frantz Fanon and shows that First World and Second World leaders reacted by
trying to promote a Cold War détente that enabled “cooperative arrangements among former
adversaries to counteract common disorders at home.”37 Suri argues for the global nature of the
1960s, yet he fails to truly draw the non-aligned Third World into the narrative when he claims
that the “Cold War, more than anything else, created a remarkable conjuncture among societies
in the 1960s.”38
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In Mark Kurlansky’s 1968: The Year that Rocked the World, “people were rebelling over
disparate issues and had in common only that desire to rebel, ideas about how to do it, a sense of
alienation from the established order, and a profound distaste for authoritarianism in any form.”
One common issue was the Vietnam War.39 U.S. intervention in Vietnam earned animosity at a
moment when “colonies were struggling to re-create themselves as nations, when the
‘anticolonial struggle’ had touched the idealism of people all over the world.”40 Dubinsky and
her fellow contributors to New World Coming recommend moving away from using categories
like “youth revolt” and “middle-class alienation” to study the Sixties because they refer narrowly
to unrest in the United States. Africa, too, was rocked by 1968; for example, a state of
emergency was declared in Senegal when the Association of Senegalese Students and the Dakar
Association of Students called for a strike on May 27, 1968, and the trade unions joined them.
Andy Stafford is one of only a few scholars to write about May ’68 in Senegal, finding that it
was both linked to struggles in France and based on “domestic” tensions reaching back to the
early 1960s. “Despite the internal causes of Senegal’s revolt, we can now see that the links with
France and its own uprising were undeniable.”41
Given that the Sixties have been studied in Westerncentric ways, we need instead to look
at “how transnational ideas and culture interacted with particular local conditions, generating
diverse meanings.”42 In this way, many more voices can be inserted into the narrative, allowing it
to become truly global. In fact, the Sixties were a time when a “nascent global consciousness
emerged.”43 As people around the world challenged dominant power structures, they did so with
a feeling that they were acting concurrently with others in a global sphere. “The local and the
everyday were read through a larger transnational lens, and resistance was forged at least in part
through the interaction of daily experience with an understanding of global developments.”44
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With this scope in mind, the editors of New World Coming include studies of protest and
politics in Palestine, music in Tanzania, and Canadian media coverage of the Congo. This
approach allows the experience of the Sixties in the Third World to become central to the
explanation of the Zeitgeist of a period that could be extended from Bandung in 1955 to the
independence of Angola in 1975.
How can political upheaval in Africa be seen in a global context, rather than simply
constructed as indicative of modernity instead of backwardness? West African politics can be
inserted into the long global Sixties and connected with the rest of the world by resituating
independence as part of a global and transnational phenomenon or process. In this way, West
Africans, too, can be imagined as part of the movement fueled by a desire to challenge
authority.45
One of the obstacles in the way of including African political projects in the the global
Sixties is that they are usually considered only in light of the Cold War. In The Global Cold
War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Odd Arne Westad brings to the
fore the importance of the Third World and describes decolonization and superpower
confrontation as linked, yet he envisions the Third World as a geopolitical space acted upon by
the United States and the Soviet Union. He does not raise the voices from within the Third
World. In contrast to Westad’s First- and Second-World focus, Vijay Prashad takes the Third
World as his stage in The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World. Prashad
begins by explaining that the Third World was a “project,” one intended to create a new world,
without colonial powers, where the nations of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean
could unite around an agenda and wield influence in forums like the United Nations: “[T]he
Third World project included a demand for the redistribution of the world’s resources, a more
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dignified rate of return for the labor power of their people, and a shared acknowledgement of the
heritage of science, technology, and culture.”46 Prashad explores a variety of sites and moments
when various actors – mostly Third World leaders, but occasionally the doubly disenfranchised,
like women – met, debated, and planned. For all its diversity, the Third World maintained an
overarching interest in anti-colonialism, peaceful coexistence, and non-alignment. In 1958, the
Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru explained the main points of the Third World platform: “political
independence, nonviolent international relations, and the cultivation of the United Nations as the
principle institution for planetary justice.”47 As such, according to Prashad, the Third World held
a political agenda.
Prashad’s Third World project spanned the long global Sixties and can be seen as
indicative of the initiatives of the decolonizing peoples in that historical context. Thus Third
World actors were agents of change who saw the United Nations as a crucial arena and strove to
democratize the organization. In 1961, leaders met in Belgrade to form the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM). Although they opposed the violence of the arms race (wars of the powerful),
violence to throw off colonialism (wars of the weak) was acceptable. As a result, they backed the
liberation organizations leading the struggles in the Portuguese colonies as well as apartheid
South Africa.
By recognizing Third World agency, we can reimagine regions like West Africa as
integral participants in the global Sixties rather than a side story to the Cold War. This takes the
Third World from an object of policy to a subject of history:
Between the 1950s and 1970s, the Third World formed a unique political force outside
the atomic face-off between the United States-United Kingdom-France and the USSR.
Filled with tactical and strategic disagreements on how to deal with colonialism and
imperialism, the Third World nonetheless had a core political program around the value
of disarmament, national sovereignty, economic integrity, and cultural diversity.48
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Scholarship: U.S.-Africa Relations
As African nations gained independence, American scholars quickly developed interest
in analyzing U.S. foreign relations with Africa. The trajectory typically starts with the Atlantic
slave trade and moves on to the work of missionaries and the Africa Colonization Society in the
early nineteenth century. U.S. relations were mediated by European empires during colonial rule,
but independence brought new opportunities for American involvement in Africa. Of course, this
new phase of U.S.-Africa relations opened during the Cold War. The continent had to fit into this
binary strategic framework, and specific countries received priority depending on their value in
the “great game” between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Although many scholars of U.S.–Africa foreign relations would agree with political
scientist Edmond J. Keller that “Africa has never been central to US foreign policy,” an
increased interest in Africa characterized President John F. Kennedy’s administration.49 Philip E.
Muehlenbeck’s Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist
Leaders argues that while Kennedy was an “ardent Cold Warrior” in his policies toward Europe,
Latin America, and Asia, he saw the “courting of Third World nationalism – and African
nationalism in particular – as a policy that transcended the Cold War.”50 Muehlenbeck contends
that Kennedy realized there was an economic divide between the global North and South and did
not want the new states of the South to turn against their trading partners in the North. Kennedy
relied on personal diplomacy with African leaders. In fact, he probably developed relationships
with even “radical” African leaders like Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré because there was more
ground to be gained with them than with already pro-Western African heads of state. Historian
Robert B. Rakove agrees with Muehlenbeck’s argument that Kennedy developed important new
connections with Third World leaders, who appreciated his efforts. “Kennedy’s policies, as
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understood by the peoples of the developing world, made them receptive to his image.”51
Receptivity proved short-lived, however. Following Kennedy’s death, President Lyndon Johnson
declined to continue his policies. The Johnson administration was uninterested in aid to nations
that criticized his policies or chose non-alignment.
Turning from viewing U.S.-Africa relations principally in relation to the Cold War,
George White Jr. has highlighted the racist underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa
and argued that racism rather than East-West rivalry drove policy decisions and discouraged
American investment in the development of Africa. “The Cold War provided the perfect
environment for the preservation of whiteness. The Eisenhower administration’s objective was to
‘hold the line’ during the tumultuous transformation of the 1950s so that the global stream of
benefits and burdens would not change.”52 Racism in foreign relations was linked to the Civil
Rights upheaval at home. In The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the
Global Arena, Thomas Borstelmann has shown how U.S. foreign policy decisions were made
within a balancing act of welcoming African dignitaries and pleasing Dixiecrats in the South.53
However, for White, the decision about whose interests mattered most in the balance of power
was clear: the normalcy and superiority of whiteness was upheld unilaterally. The “only
plausible explanations for African radicalism were Black incompetence, insatiability, and blind
hatred of Whites, fed by Communist propaganda.”54
Widening the scope of foreign affairs studies, Brenda Gayle Plummer examines the
involvement of African American leaders and activists in the issue of independence struggles in
Africa. As “partially successful modifications” were achieved for blacks in the United States, the
link between civil rights and global radicalism was broken, and the movement for racial justice
was subordinated to the moderate liberal establishment in the United States. Plummer follows the
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work of Penny Von Eschen and Carol Anderson, but what is new here is that she aims to
resituate the civil rights and black power movements as terms of global decolonization rather
than American desegregation. This means that the struggles of black peoples around the world
spoke to, answered, and affected each other, and that these multiple struggles had consequences
for the avenues opened and closed to black Americans. Rather than simply demanding the
recognition of interchanges between African American and African freedom fighters, Plummer
pushes for the inclusion of a multiplicity of black and other voices from the United States,
Africa, and the wider diaspora. She explains that historians of Black Power have made
“sweeping assertions for the sameness of black activism,” but “nuanced views of black political
and cultural activity in the 1960s and 1970s are moving to the fore.”55 Plummer includes an
exceptionally broad range of activists from conservative to radical and accommodationist to
separatist. Their voices as well as the voices of mainstream journalists will be part of this
dissertation.

Sources
In order to move beyond historical and media studies that consider only mainstream or
elite media representations of newly independent Africa for American consumers of news during
the Cold War and the global Sixties, this study engages with publications with large and small
audiences; liberal as well as radical perspectives; and experts on Africa and journalists without a
background in the continent. Through the inclusion of publications of the African American
press, my dissertation seeks to add to the conversation begun by Plummer, James Meriwether,
Von Eschen, and other scholars who examine the stake African American print media claimed in
the discourse about Africa.56 Likewise, the inclusion of New Left and other radical publications
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points not only to the broadening of Africa coverage but also to the emergence of critical stances
toward U.S. Africa policy in the turbulent Sixties.

Argument
Through news reporting and human-interest stories, popular media, images, and
literature, the American public, including those who would seek to influence U.S. foreign policy,
came to know independent Africa. Depictions, particularly in print news media, have been
shown to have social and political consequences.57 For Africa, from the time of the Atlantic slave
trade through the twentieth century, these depictions have most often come from Western
journalists, expats, advocates, and writers rather than from African sources. This lack of access
to global discursive space has enabled American interventions in Africa to be more palatable and
even seemingly necessary. For example, following his June 30, 1960 independence speech, no
international publication printed an interview with Patrice Lumumba, Congo’s first Prime
Minister. He was silenced outside his country, which limited the range of possibilities for U.S.
policy toward the Congo.58 As has been established by several media scholars, the relationship
between the media and public policy as well foreign affairs can have profound effects on the
course of history.59
Although several scholars have explored U.S. foreign reporting, coverage of Africa is
almost completely omitted from the story. Additionally, media studies have tended to rely on a
narrow range of sources. The large volume Journalism’s Roving Eye: A History of American
Foreign Reporting by John Maxwell Hamilton criticizes previous studies of foreign
correspondence for their reliance on elite media. “Scholarly article after scholarly article carries a
title along the lines of ‘New York Times and Network TV News Coverage of Foreign Disasters’
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and ‘Foreign News in Four U.S. Elite Dailies: Some Comparisons.’”60 He admits that while elite
media typically have the best foreign news coverage, the approach has limitations if we are
interested in learning what the broad public could ascertain from the press about the wider world.
After all, few Americans read The New York Times.
Previous Africa-centered analyses of U.S. media coverage, such as Hawk’s Africa’s
Media Image, display an overwhelming interest in South Africa, or confine themselves to elite
media sources. While the new volume Africa’s Media Image in the 21st Century examines
contemporary coverage, it does not recover voices from the historical past. Nevertheless,
American writers who considered Africa outside of the typical narrative of mainstream and elite
media were active during the independence era, and they broadened the discussion of the
possibilities of policy. It was these reporters and editors who worked to crack open the discursive
space to make new representations imaginable.
A historical project, this study listens to the disparate voices in U.S. print media outlets
during the long global Sixties and reintegrates them into the narrative of independence in West
Africa and the American response to this dramatic change in the global order.

Plan of Dissertation
Chapter One, “Votez ‘Non,’” focuses on the independence of Guinea, which was
achieved when Charles de Gaulle reentered French political life to create a new constitution and
granted territories throughout the French Union the choice of closer association or outright
independence. Otherwise an overwhelming success, de Gaulle’s 1958 constitution and offer of
membership in the new French Community did not pass muster in Guinea, where the nationalist
leader Ahmed Sékou Touré compared the proposed “new” relationship to a horse and rider and

20

predicted Guinea would be the horse. In the months leading up to and following the referendum
vote, U.S. media featured coverage of both Touré and de Gaulle, typically depicting these figures
in contrasting ways. The mainstream news magazine TIME used Touré to represent independent
Africa’s potential for failure by characterizing him as dictatorial, backward, naïve, and prone to
communism. An accusation of communism was a simple and oft-used way to demonize an
African leader during the Cold War. However, the images of Touré in an African American
media outlet such as Chicago Daily Defender reveal hope for Africa’s future that is couched in
civil rights language and ideas of freedom. The French general and war hero de Gaulle might
have been considered a savior of France in the mainstream TIME magazine, but by contrast, he
served as a symbol of colonialism and oppression in the Defender.
In Chapter Two, the “danse macabre” of the Congo crisis is examined through reportage
of the death of the country’s first Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, which occurred in January
1961, just six months after the Congo’s independence. While U.S. print media coverage of the
crisis often employed a reductionist view of actors and events and viewed this African struggle
through the lens of the Cold War, examining media professing a range political orientations
creates a kaleidoscope of images. Moving politically from right to left, this chapter reviews
articles from Foreign Affairs, The New Republic, Monthly Review, and Political Affairs. Even as
Lumumba’s death was met with relief in coverage that focused on non-aligned nations in the
Cold War battle, the Congo’s struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism came to the fore
when the East-West dichotomy ceased to be the determining factor. In that case, Lumumba’s
death became the assassination of a legitimate leader of a sovereign nation.
Chapter Three’s stories of “African Success, Failure, and Famine” recount the Biafra War
or Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970. Resulting from two coups, pogroms, and the secession
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of the Eastern Region known as Biafra, the war led to a significant humanitarian crisis. As
Biafrans, particularly children, starved from food shortages when the Nigerian federal
government blockaded what its leader Yakubu Gowon saw as rebel territory, U.S. media outlets
conveyed images of malnourished babies, reports of suffering Biafrans, and stories of heroic,
often Catholic, aid workers. While political and military reportage earned column inches, the
Biafran famine secured more. The U.S. government’s refusal to intervene in an “internal crisis,”
in reality a show of support for the British government’s backing of the Nigerian government,
opened a rift between humanitarian and political concerns. Americans could send food and
medical supplies to the starving masses without advocating independence for Biafra. In order to
track the simultaneous circulation of political and the humanitarian coverage about the NigeriaBiafra War, I will discuss essays from Foreign Affairs and The New Yorker, a magazine of
“reporting and commentary.”
Chapter Four takes the liberation of Guinea-Bissau as its subject, as told through media
coverage of the “Gentle Rebel,” Amilcar Cabral. He was the founder of the PAIGC, the
organization that fought for the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde from Portugal.
From 1963 until 1974, the PAIGC engaged in guerrilla warfare, winning popular support and
taking territory step by step from a colonial army that refused to negotiate a settlement to a war it
could not win. While Guinea-Bissau was poor and underdeveloped, Portugal’s southern African
colonies Angola and Mozambique possessed significant natural resources. Portugal was
unwilling to leave Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde for fear of the domino effect on its richer
colonies. The PAIGC’s fight, taking place during the Vietnam War, led the U.S. media to draw
parallels, but the U.S. government refused to abandon its NATO ally. Nevertheless, even
mainstream U.S. media coverage depicted Cabral in a positive manner and conceded the justness
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of his cause. For Cabral, independence was not the final goal; colonial society had to be remade
in a revolution as well. Drawing from Marxist theory, but always insisting on localizing
revolution, he proposed a truly democratic society and equal representation for women. Radical
U.S. media outlets, the number of which had risen considerably by the end of the Sixties, treated
seriously Cabral’s innovative ideas. Assassinated in January 1973, Cabral did not live to see
independence. This final chapter closes my study with a look at Cabral’s character and politics,
which were celebrated in the New Left magazine Ramparts, the African American journal
Freedomways, and the Atlanta underground newspaper The Great Speckled Bird. Even though
U.S. coverage continued to focus on leaders, the attention to Cabral, an intellectual and a
revolutionary of Africa and the Third World, suggests how much America and Africa had
changed over the course of the turbulent Sixties.
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2

“VOTEZ ‘NON’” – HOW THE MEDIA PORTRAYED A FACE OFF BETWEEN
THE GENERAL AND THE ELEPHANT OVER GUINEA’S VOTE IN THE
FRENCH COMMUNITY, 1958
Future texts will hardly be able to ignore the man of whom the jigging, clapping Guineans
sing: Everybody loves Sékou Touré. Independence is sweet; Nothing is more beautiful than
to be independent chez soi. Sékou Touré! Vive Sékou Touré, our clairvoyant chief!61

The year following Ghana’s independence brought an important vote to the French
Union. In an attempt to resuscitate France’s imperial glory and rescue a country in crisis, Prime
Minister Charles de Gaulle developed a new constitution that would inaugurate France’s Fifth
Republic. Included in this constitution was the stipulation that overseas territories could become
members in the new French Community of free states, or by voting against the September
Referendum, would gain immediate independence. When voters went to the polls on September
28, 1958, Guinea stood alone throughout the Union with a “No” vote. The drama that unfolded
leading up to the vote as well as the clash between de Gaulle and Guinean leader Ahmed Sékou
Touré provided fascinating copy for American readers. With de Gaulle earning TIME
magazine’s cover as “Man of the Year” on January 5, 1959, and Sékou Touré taking the cover
just one month later, impressions of these leaders reached into the homes and minds of American
readers.62 This chapter will illustrate how the US print media used dichotomous reportage of
these leaders to show the divergences between the two countries, as each leader’s personality
became a stand-in for the spirit of his people and nation, and in Touré’s case, for Africa in
general. This chapter will provide an in-depth comparison of coverage of Sékou Touré and de
Gaulle in TIME and the Chicago Defender during 1958 and 1959. Examining inclusions from
both a mainstream and an African-American publication offers an impression of the competing
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narratives surrounding the character of Sékou Touré, which elucidates ideas about independent
Africa’s potential for success and failure.
2.1

Dueling Myths
Maverick, dictator, hero, tyrant, Guinea’s first leader after independence, Sékou Touré

has often been characterized as having made in isolation Guinea’s decision to reject the French
Community. Guinea’s popular decision has been depicted as Sékou Touré’s “no” vote. However,
more recent scholarship has shown that Sékou Touré followed the will of the Guinean people,
who through mass mobilization, convinced him to stand firmly against Charles de Gaulle’s offer
of association and choose complete independence.63 In order to accurately examine the media
coverage of Sékou Touré at the time of Guinea’s independence, it is necessary to forget the 26
years that followed that led Charles Sorry to compare him to Hitler and compare his pretended
love for the people was like that of a paranoid tyrant for his prisoner.64 As Moustapha Diop
advises, “il importe de distinguer deux périodes principales: l’avant et l’après 1958.”65
Born in 1922 in Faranah in central Guinea to a butcher father and a mother whose lineage
connected to Samori Touré, the 19th-century leader of resistance to French colonialism, Sékou
Touré attended koranic and primary school there. Following the regional school in nearby
Kissidougou, he earned a primary certificate in Conakry. He was later expelled from the Georges
Poiret technical school, but completed correspondence courses to finally become an accountant.
By 1945, Sékou Touré began to emerge politically when he created the first union in Guinea; he
later became the secretary general of l’Union des syndicats confédérés. In 1946, Sékou Touré
participated in the Congrès Constitutif du RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, the
founding event of the inter-territorial alliance of political parties, which had been organized by
Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire and Modibo Keïta of Mali) in Bamako. The early
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RDA had links to the French Communist Party, which was the only political party present in
Bamako during the conference, but it broke those ties five years later. In 1950, the Guinean RDA
took the name Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), and Sékou Touré became its second
secretary general.
Even before his appointment to the PDG, Sékou Touré organized strikes in Guinea, one
of which landed him in prison. In 1953, he spearheaded a two-month general strike to enact a
labor code for the French territories. The mounting importance of the PDG led to Sékou Touré’s
election as territorial advisor in 1953 and mayor of Conakry in 1955, titles he held concurrently
with several others.66 Within the Afrique-Occidentale Française, he continued to grow in fame.
In 1956, on his third attempt, Sékou Touré was elected a deputy to the National Assembly. As a
deputy, he pushed for equality within the French Union, for example, on March 22, 1956 he
proposed equal pay for functionaries in the territories and those in the metropole. He took part in
the debates over the loi-cadre colonial reform in 1957, which he condemned for attempting to
prevent African unity through the breakup of the federations and reorganization of the French
West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. However, it was the passing of the loi-cadre, which
necessitated new elections and saw Sékou Touré secure the position of vice-president of the
government council of Guinea; at this time, the PDG, Sékou Touré’s party, earned the clear
majority of seats.67
Interestingly, Sékou Touré voted in favor of the proposition to revise the French
Constitution on May 27, 1958 but abstained from the June 1 vote to approve Charles de Gaulle
and his new cabinet.68 Nevertheless, de Gaulle won the election of June 1 with 329 votes in favor
and 224 against.69
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Concerning the future of French West Africa’s status and relationship with France, Sékou
Touré clashed with Houphouët-Boigny, leader of the RDA, who favored federation. On the other
side were proponents of confederation including Senegal’s Léopold Senghor. According to
Saloum Dakté, Sékou Touré was so sure of his national popularity in Guinea that he was willing
to oppose someone as powerful as Houphouët-Boigny.70 However, according to Elizabeth
Schmidt, in addition to conflict between Sékou Touré and Houphouët-Boigny, there was internal
conflict between Guinean party leaders and the Guinean people leading to “fissures in the
nationalist movement.”71 Thus, despite his post-independence myth, in early 1958, Sékou Touré
was not yet the all-powerful leader he would become. Furthermore, Sékou Touré came late to the
push for independence (and the “no” vote, as we will see), focusing instead on the idea of
compromise with the colonial government. Abdoulaye Diallo has attempted to deconstruct the
myth of Sékou Touré and found that in a January 5, 1956 speech congratulating his party
followers on the recent successful elections, he spoke to an audience of 15,000 about his desire
to collaborate sincerely with the French whom he stated loved Africans and understood the
interests of Africa.72
Sékou Touré catapulted to international fame during de Gaulle’s visit to Guinea. As part
of his Africa campaign to promote his new Constitution on which the full electorate could vote in
the form of a referendum, de Gaulle visited Conakry on August 25, which proved to be a
defining moment for Sékou Touré. The two speeches by two charismatic figures presented two
different conceptions of nationalism and history. While dialogue could have been possible, the
character of each man came into play to prevent agreement on either side. The myth of Sékou
Touré as the champion of the African cause was born on that day.73 “Depuis le 25 août à
l’Assemblée territoriale des Conakry, l’animosité entre ces deux fortes personnalités déteint sur
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les relations franco-guinéennes.”74 Although de Gaulle made overtures to the Guinean people,
Sékou Touré spoke strongly against joining a French Community where Guinea would be the
horse and France the rider. On this day, Sékou Touré made his famous statement: Nous préférons
la liberté dans la pauvreté à la richesse dans l’esclavage (We prefer poverty in freedom to riches
in slavery).
The general against whom Sékou Touré railed boasted a much greater international status
than did the Guinean leader. Timelines of Charles de Gaulle, tend to highlight specific, pivotal
events, only strengthening his mythological stature. De Gaulle’s image in the public mind has
been defined by his war heroism as a captain in World War I; his June 18, 1940 radio broadcast
urging French resistance to Germany; the triumphal re-entering of Paris in 1944; abdication in
1946 when the Fourth Republic constitution would not be written according to his design;
another re-entry, this time to politics when France-in-crisis begged him to assume the helm in
1958; and finally, the massive strike of May 1968, which led to his eventual second abdication
the following year. His policy of grandeur and belief in French importance and singularity is
well known. Thus, by the time of the 1958 referendum vote, de Gaulle would have been
recognized among U.S. print media audiences, and most readers would have already formed
some type of opinion about him, particularly in regard to his World War II leadership and
frequent contention with American leaders. De Gaulle was a “providential figure” who would
appear and reappear “at moments of despair in national history.”75
Born in Paris in 1890 to a family of six children, de Gaulle demanded to act as King of
France during play even as a child.76 With a lineage that included royalty by way of noblesse de
robe, by de Gaulle’s generation, the family had fallen on harder financial times. His
schoolteacher father taught him history, and even in early writings, the future general showed a

28

penchant for military strategy, leadership, and fervent ambition. As did Napoléon, de Gaulle
“undertook to transcend his own origins … he sought to create his own elite.”77 Embarking on
this path wholeheartedly, de Gaulle attended St. Cyr, a French military academy, and later began
World War I as a captain. His capture during combat earned him the Legion of Honor, and he
published his first book in 1924, La discorde chez l’ennemi (The Enemy’s Dissensions).
Marrying a traditional French wife in 1922, de Gaulle presided over a family of three children.
He served under Marshal Philippe Pétain, who then held the highest position in the French
military.78 Under the direction of Pétain, de Gaulle began the book that became France and Its
Army, and although Pétain aspired to take credit for the book, de Gaulle opposed him, later
publishing the book with a reference to Pétain’s assistance in the forward. “The affair of the
book foreshadowed the cataclysmic dispute that was to erupt between the two in June 1940.”79
Throughout the 1930s, de Gaulle proposed military strategy, advising that France develop a
professional army and mechanized force. Although French military leaders lacked interest in his
ideas – even finding them anti-republican – he saw that precisely these strategies were being
implemented by Germany.
During the interwar period and World War II, de Gaulle strove to make his ideas heard
and accepted. He had “earned a reputation in military circles as a maverick with a tinge of
insubordination … If de Gaulle did not see himself as the key player, he saw himself as one of
the key players in the momentous events to come.”80 Following the German invasion of France
and the institution of the Vichy government led by Pétain, de Gaulle established the Free France
movement from London, gained the trust of Winston Churchill and led the Resistance, altering
his status from maverick to France’s savior, a position he had seen himself occupying all along.
Although little known outside military circles before 1940, de Gaulle became recognized by the
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Allies as the “legitimate representative of the French people” as his “Free French movement
gradually established its leadership over the French Resistance.”81 At this time, De Gaulle
identified himself with France itself “as a way of constituting a new legitimacy for his weakened
and demoralized people. This legitimacy, which de Gaulle claimed to represent, was based on
honor, duty, and a greatness (grandeur), and not on legal norms, which at the time were deficient
and had to be changed.”82 From London, he claimed leadership of France beginning June 18,
1940 when he made his celebrated radio announcement urging France not to capitulate. In
retaliation, the Vichy government found his claim illegitimate, and he was ordered to return to
France, which he did not, leading him to be sentenced in absentia to prison and later death.
Returning to France in August 1944, after liberation, de Gaulle, and therefore France,
was triumphant. “[On] August 26, 1944, in another symbolic gesture of great meaning at the
time and in the future, de Gaulle was able to create an ‘irresistible national movement’ in his
favor, symbolized by a procession down the avenue des Champs-Elysées with himself at the
head.”83 Staying a short time at the helm of the provisional post-war regime, de Gaulle resigned
on January 20, 1946 due to the move of the nation toward a government with a Parliament
stronger than the executive branch. “It was only in May 1958, in the wake of the crisis provoked
by the brutal and fratricidal colonial war in Algeria, that the General was able to return to power
to implement his vision of a presidential republic.”84
De Gaulle had retired to Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises to work on his three-volume War
Memoirs when he was called back into service as the Algerian War of Independence threatened
to tear France apart. The National Assembly elected him 329-224, and in addition to gaining full
head of state power for six months, de Gaulle was authorized to draft a new constitution that
would be ratified by referendum. In order for this power to be put in de Gaulle’s hands, Article
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90 of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic had to be amended. De Gaulle’s drafted
constitution “was presented to and approved by the voters in a referendum on September 28,
1958, without having been discussed and voted by the National Assembly.85
Historian Sudhir Hazareesingh seeks to analyze the legend of de Gaulle, who in one
person became “liberator, founding father, educator, protector and martyr.”86 Although de Gaulle
was unquestionably “one of the towering figures of twentieth-century world politics,” he “did not
have many admirers in the United States.”87 In fact, according to Hazareesingh, FDR accused de
Gaulle of having a Joan of Arc complex. Certainly, he had imagined himself as the savior of
France from his early days.
“During the first quarter of a century after World War II, no West European political
leader – not even Konrad Adenauer – could rival the international stature of Charles de
Gaulle.”88 Upon returning to power in 1958, the General’s main aim was to return France to a
position of importance on the world stage through a policy of grandeur. Mark Kramer explains
that de Gaulle was “synonymous not only with the policy of grandeur but with the French state
itself.”89 His desire for French “power status” notwithstanding, de Gaulle secured the presidency
at a moment of crisis in France, indeed that was the reason the French coaxed him back. One of
the issues facing de Gaulle, according to Kramer was “the debilitating impact of World War II
on European colonial empires and the growing pressure for decolonization.”90 In the same way
that the Algerian War had been raging for several years when de Gaulle took office in 1958, the
wave of decolonization had begun in Sub-Saharan Africa, and he would be forced to work
through the movement.
Guia Migani explains, “When Charles de Gaulle returned to power in June 1958, French
authority in the colonies was in crisis.”91 By that time, France had withdrawn from Indochina,
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the Algerian War had begun, Tunisia and Morocco had become independent, and the former
British colony Gold Coast had gained independence in 1957. Although Migani, like Frederick
Cooper, notes that many Sub-Saharan African leaders were interested in equal status more than
independence during the 1950s, it had become obvious that Paris needed to “take initiatives in
order to increase the power of the African leaders.”92 Nevertheless, maintaining the hope of
preserving l’Algérie Française, “the French government could not negotiate independence with
the African territories and, in the same, fight to preserve Algeria as a French department.” This
situation affected how de Gaulle would deal with the overseas territories in the new constitution,
as the French Community enabled Paris to reaffirm its authority, while preparing the African
territories to run their own territory in the future.”93 In the end, the potential for future
independence did not prove sufficient for Guinea, the only territory to reject de Gaulle’s
constitution.
Though history witnessed Sékou Touré’s reign lasting for nearly 30 years, in 1958, he was
something of an upstart. American readers of TIME or even the Chicago Defender would likely
have been unfamiliar with the Guinean leader, and the coverage at that time served in part to
introduce him to the American public.94 By contrast, Charles de Gaulle would have been well
known or recognized by most readers. His World War II fame, America’s friendship with and
interest in France, and de Gaulle’s exciting return to power in May 1958 to solve the Algerian
crisis would have made him a household name.95 It is vital to review U.S. print media coverage
of these two figures through the lens of 1958: de Gaulle’s myth had already been established,
while Sékou Touré’s lay in the future.
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2.2

The Politics of French West Africa
When the Fourth French Republic came to power in 1946, it revised the status of the

French colonies, creating the Union Française and setting up Federations of Territoires
d’outremer (TOM). The two Federations comprised Mauritania, Senegal, Sudan, Guinea, Ivory
Coast, Upper Volta and Dahomey as the West African Federation and Congo, Gabon, Chad, and
Central African Republic as the Equatorial Federation. While Madagascar did not belong to
either Federation, Togo and Cameroon were U.N. mandated territories.96 Additional power was
given to the territorial governments with the passing of the Loi-cadre Deffere in 1956, which
implemented universal suffrage in the territories and transferred certain capacities to the
territorial governments. Saloum Dakté describes the loi-cadre as working as a “political bunker”
that responded imperfectly to the desire for independence and equality in the overseas
territories.97 At the time, most French West African leaders opposed the law, and Senegal’s
Senghor claimed it Balkanized the territories because it restructured the previously larger
territorial regions into smaller units.
With de Gaulle’s return to power in June 1958 and his National Assembly-given ability
to draft a new constitution for France, events moved quickly throughout the summer. While it
did not demand immediate independence, the RDA presented to de Gaulle a document seeking
the ability of territories to choose independence by electoral vote in the future.98 Although this
document was presented by Sékou Touré on behalf of the RDA on August 5, it showed the
incontestable political supremacy of Côte d’Ivoire’s Houphouët-Boigny. On August 19, de
Gaulle added an amendment to the Constitution to give the territories the possibility of reaching
independent State status in the future. Nevertheless, he warned committee “‘Mais on ne peut
concevoir une territoire indépendant et une France qui continuerait de l’aider. Le Gouvernement
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tirera les conséquences, économiques ou autres, qui comporterait la manifestation, d’une telle
volonté.’”99 By August 20, de Gaulle embarked on a tour of the African territories in order to
rally support for his constitution and the French Community, arriving in Guinea on August 25.100
De Gaulle intended the French Community to serve as a solution to the Algerian
problem, as he promoted the concept of “association,” according to Michel Winock.101 In a
footnote, Winock mentions that de Gaulle’s August 25 speech at Conakry showed that inclusion
in the in the French Community would be voluntary, in part because this was how he already
imagined the future relationship between France and Algeria.102 The new constitution was
presented to the French people, including those in the territories, on September 4. Although it
would be rejected by Guinea, the Constitution earned nearly 80 percent approval from the French
electorate and led to de Gaulle’s election as president on December 21, 1958.103
During the first half of September, Sékou Touré, as a leader in Guinea, had not yet come
out with a definitive answer for France, however, pressure from grassroots organizations in
Guinea fully leaned toward rejecting de Gaulle’s offer of Community. At this time, Sékou Touré
met with university students in Paris who were critical of de Gaulle’s constitution, and the
student organization FEANF sent representatives to sway Sékou Touré toward the “no” vote. In
early September, the Guinean PRA (Parti de Regroupement Africain) and women and youth
wings of the RDA asked for Sékou Touré to oppose the constitution. In fact, the UGTAN (Union
Générale des Travailleurs d’Afrique Noire) board of directors had advocated a “no” vote on
August 27.
By mid-month, all RDA branches other than Guinea and Senegal had sanctioned the
constitution. Sékou Touré had awaited the final version of the constitution before deciding. On
September 14, 680 Guinean RDA delegates met to determine through a vote, the party’s final
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decision. According to Schmidt, Sékou Touré had not yet taken a final stance, but he worried
that if he voted in favor of the constitution, his party would remove him and replace him with
Koumandian Kéïta. “Thus, it was not until September 14, two weeks before the referendum, that
Sékou Touré came out definitively for a ‘No’ vote.”104
During a speech that day covered by Agence France-Presse, Sékou Touré publicly and
emphatically stated that he would not join a community that would be French instead of
multinational. The Guinean RDA officially broke from the larger organization, and by
September 16, the Guinean RDA and PRA united behind the “no” vote, however, expecting
collaboration with France as an independent country.
In response to the September 14 announcement, France almost immediately began
treating Guinea “like a hostile territory.”105 Vacationing teachers were not allowed to return to
Guinea and the governor planned for evacuation. The referendum vote on September 28 heavily
favored independence with 1,136,324 votes (95.22%) against the Constitution and only 56,981
votes (4.78%) in favor. With the referendum results in on September 29, Guinea stood alone
among French territories in its refusal of de Gaulle’s offer of community, and de Gaulle made
good on his August 25 threat of consequences should Guinea choose independence. French
technical and administrative personnel were commanded to destroy archival material and leave
the country. France suspended aid to Guinea and canceled the Konkouré River dam project.
France pulled out its infrastructure so completely that phone lines, medicines, and even plates
were destroyed or removed. The actions of France stimulated “chaos in the economic and
administrative sectors of Guinea.”106
On October 2, 1958, Guinea held its official independence day ceremony. Not a single
representative of France attended. Although Sékou Touré continued to make overtures toward de
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Gaulle and the French government, he remained unsuccessful in brokering friendship. While
Ghana and Liberia quickly recognized Guinea, the United States hesitated, instead following
France’s lead. Then de Gualle’s government went further than rejection. As Schmidt asserted,
“Determined to destroy the man he could not seduce, de Gaulle ordered the French secret
services to bring down Sékou Touré’s government,” and thus began twenty years of plots to
overthrow it.107
Sékou Touré did not falter and looked elsewhere for support. With a November visit to
Ghana, he and Nkrumah formed the Union of Guinea-Ghana. By December 9, Iraq and Japan
presented Guinea’s candidacy for the United Nations, to which it was admitted on December 13.
It was not until January 2, 1960 that France finally conferred diplomatic recognition on Guinea,
and by that time, it had become apparent that the remainder of former French West Africa would
soon follow in Guinea’s independence footsteps.
Although the story of Guinea’s “No” vote has often been told as one of a faceoff between
Charles de Gaulle and Sékou Touré, the situation was more complex, and followed many years
of events leading up to the Sept. 28 referendum vote. Scholars fall into three camps from which
to view the political situation in Guinea in 1958. Some, particularly those writing from Guinea
during Sékou Touré’s rule, tout him as the “Man of 1958” who it might seem was the only
Guinean voting on September 28. Much U.S. media coverage follows this pattern, focusing
solely on Touré. Another line of scholarship from historians including work from Sikhe Camara
and El Hadj Saloum Diakite, assert that Sékou Touré led his people toward the “no” vote, but the
masses did follow him on the journey toward independence. More recent studies, such as those
by Elizabeth Schmidt and Abdoulaye Diallo, put forth the idea that the desire to break from
France spouted from the people of Guinea who moved a hesitant, undecided, and sometimes
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accommodationist Sékou Touré to take up their cause. According to Abdoulaye Diallo, the first
historigraphic work of 1958 was Sidiki Kobélé Keita’s Ahmed Sékou Touré: L’homme du 28
septembre 1958. This exculpatory work was published in 1977, while Sékou Touré held office,
by a professor at the Institut Polytechnique de Conakry. This work poses Sékou Touré and the
PDG as the only authors of the “No” vote. Admirers Lasiné Kabe and Sylvain Soriba Camara
offer the same interpretation. These African scholars who clearly disapprove of Sékou Touré
nonetheless cite him as the driving factor of the “no” vote and Guinean independence. Likewise,
many Western scholars have followed the same pattern.108
Charles Sorry’s work from 2000 details the evolution of Sékou Touré from a hero of his
people – an angel – to a demon. Despite his acrimony towards the leader, Sorry does not hesitate
to view him as all-powerful, even stating, Sékou Touré “s’élevait aussi au pouvoir, tel ce soleillà, avec toute las force de la confiance du people investie en sa personne.”109 Rather than noting
the cohesion between Sékou Touré and the people’s movements, Sorry traces the disappearance
of the JRDA, CNTG, and URFG (youth, workers and women’s movements), which were
subsumed by the larger political organization, the PDG. Even while claiming for Sékou Touré
such intense authority, Sorry diminishes his value at independence by stating that Sékou Touré
was able to unify diverging trends, although those trends only differed in their claims, but not in
their opposition to colonialism. In fact, the people of Guinea had already felt the injustice of
colonialism by the time Sékou Touré rose to notoriety. Nevertheless, he holds the honor of
bringing the naturally revolutionary people to independence. For Sorry, Sékou Touré’s success
stemmed from his charm, elegance, and abilities as an orator. Propelled by events, he became a
celebrated man and a model of the African political man. “En Afrique et ailleurs, Sékou Touré
était un symbole de la lutte anticolonialiste.”110
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While Ibrahima Baba Kaké’s Sékou Touré: le héros et le tyran was published a few years
after Touré’s death and seeks to offer a complete biography of the leader, for better or worse, the
author nonetheless states grandly, “Sékou Touré ayant fait voter ‘non’ au référendum du 28
spetembre, il ne reste plus qu’à proclamer la République. »111 In this statement, we see Sékou
Touré acting alone, first voting against de Gaulle’s constitution, then proclaiming the nation. He
is George Washington, both freedom fighter and father of the country.
Maurice Jeanjean’s Sékou Touré: un totalitarisme africain places full authority with the
figure of Sékou Touré, beginning as early as August 29 when Jeanjean states the leader felt it
necessary to justify his choice to vote against the referendum to the PDG activists, Guinean
citizens, and the French economic leaders. Thus, Sékou Touré developed language delineating
France and de Gaulle’s government. Sékou Touré explained that Guinea would always say “yes”
to France, but would have to say “no” to a constitution that made slaves of the people.112
Jeanjean seems to blame Sékou Touré for losing the friendship of France, and states that even
before August 25, the Guinean leader had already decided to vote “no,” but he wanted to shift
the responsibility to de Gaulle for provoking him.
Even Guia Migani simplifies Guinea’s no vote thus:
Apart from Guinea, all the African territories voted for the new Constitution. For reasons
of political prestige, Sekou Touré, the leader of Guinea, chose independence. As a member
of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, an African party, he wanted to assert
himself as the advocate of independence against the party chairman, Felix HouphouëtBoigny, the leader of Ivory Coast, who supported the Community. Furthermore, Touré
thought that de Gaulle’s threat to cut aid was a bluff.113
In Migani’s account, Sékou Touré stands up not to de Gaulle, but to Houphouët-Boigny, and was
prompted by his ego rather than the will of the people.
For El Hadji Saloum Diakité, the story of the September 28 vote began on June 3 when
de Gaulle presented the first iteration of the new constitution. What followed was a period of
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negotiation during which Sékou Touré opposed the constitution as written and saw the shift as
leading to eventual independence, but was not forcefully declining participation or campaigning
in Guinea for his people to vote against it. There was a period of diplomacy during which
leaders, mostly led by either Senghor or Houphouët-Boigny sought adjustments to the
constitution inline with their overarching goals. De Gaulle engineered to keep the territories
happy by allowing for various types of alliances in the new constitution. Thus, most leaders,
other than Sékou Touré and Bakary Djibo of Niger worked to bring their citizens to a positive
vote. Disappointed by the provisions of the constitution, Sékou Touré did not support it, stating,
“‘Une communauté qui n’est que l’Union française rebaptisée, c’est à dire las vielle marchandise
dont on a changé l’étiquette. Nous voterons « non » à l’inégalité, nous voterons « non » à
l’irresponsabilité.’”114 During de Gaulle’s August 25 visit, just a month prior to the referendum
vote, Sékou Touré continued trying to convince France to modify the proposed constitution;
otherwise Guinea would vote “no.”115
Diakité, too describes the August through September situation in Guinea as one in which
Sékou Touré influenced the people, not the other way around. He asserts that during the August
25 visit, de Gaulle underestimated the situation in Guinea, and his words proved too mild to
ameliorate the public opinion, and it seemed that de Gaulle’s advisors expected the population to
vote in favor of the referendum despite the strong words presented by Sékou Touré, demanding
adjustments. Thus, de Gaulle understood too late, the political influence of the Guinean leader.116
Diakité describes the PDG and Guineans as being “married” to Sékou Touré. The “no” vote was
a political victory that was the result of both a long-term policy that strengthened the unity of
action and the cohesion of Guineans. Diakité does mention that outside the PDG, other political
organizations including the Bloc africain de guinée (BAG) and the Démocratie socialiste de

39

guinée (DSG) also favored the “no” vote, but their audience was limited. Despite the fact that
some moderate RDA members tried to convince Sékou Touré against the “no” vote, with
“discipline” and “fervor,” 95% of the population of Guinea rejected the submitted constitution,
and with their massive “no,” ended 60 years of colonialism.117 Through the inclusion of the word
“discipline,” Diakité shows that the people followed the authority of Sékou Touré, who led them
to reject the constitution. At the same time, by explaining that they voted against the constitution
that was submitted to them (“le projet constitutionnel qui leur est soumis”), Diakité puts the fault
squarely on de Gaulle who refused to amend the constitution in the manner demanded by Sékou
Touré.
The citizenry of Guinea figure into the Guinean independence retelling in teleological
works written during the years of Sékou Touré’s administration, but they are simply the
background to the march led by the Guinean RDA. In Alpha Diawara’s Guinée: la marche du
people, the RDA’s purpose since its formation was to form a unified front. In Guinea, the PDG
took up this cause, and included active participation from trade unions, youth, and grassroots
activists. If Sékou Touré does not receive all of the credit, the party does. When France presented
the referendum, only Guinea escaped this latest colonial plot, and it was thanks to the PDG,
which had a genuine influence over the population.118
Likewise, Sikhe Camara’s La Guinée vers le socialisme details the straight path Guinea
toward socialism, here more directly under the guidance of Sékou Touré. According to Camara,
the separation from France was actually definite as early as June 1, 1958, and it was the leader of
the RDA, Sékou Touré, who would be the bearer for not only the activists of the RDA, but for
the masses of Guinea who were all onboard for the journey with the PDG.119 Once the
referendum had been presented,
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le Camarade Ahmed Sékou Touré, avait tout naturellement et bien vite compris que la
meilleure méthode était en fait de conditionner et mobiliser ses populations déjà
conscientes … Dès lors, il anima intensément toutes plateforms politiques des
organisations de travailleurs, des femmes et des jeunes sur les plans africain, français et
international, car sa force maîtresse véritable était celle de son Peuple déjà unanime
derrière lui.120
When Guineans voted on September 28, they were carried by Sékou Touré’s influence, and he
had spared no effort in working to convince his peers to vote “no” as well.
More recently, scholars including Elizabeth Schmidt have taken a holistic approach to the
independence of Guinea. In Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, Schmidt introduces the
topic of Guinea’s independence coming “through popular referendum” and does not mention
Sékou Touré until page three.121 For Schmidt, the real story is the years of political mobilization
by grassroots militants.122 She explains that rather than asserting his will on the people to whom
he was charismatic and all-powerful, “Sékou Touré was pushed to the Left by grassroots
militants, particularly trade unionists, students, women, and youth – not the other way
around.”123 Throughout September 1958, university students in Paris, women and youth, the
Guinean PRA and UGTAN came out in favor of a “no” vote and put pressure on Sékou Touré
and the Guinean RDA to do the same. Meanwhile, the Guinean RDA waited for the final
version of the constitution before passing judgment, and on September 14, Sékou Touré publicly
stated he would reject de Gaulle’s offer. For the next two weeks, Sékou Touré threw his
influence behind the no vote. For Sékou Touré as well as the various Guinean associations, at no
point, did the break from the community mean a break from relations with France, and both
looked forward to “frank and loyal collaboration between the two countries.”124
Abdoulaye Diallo has also focused on deconstructing the aura surrounding Sékou Touré’s
role in the “no” vote. In his Sékou Touré : 1957-1961 : Mythes et réalités d'un héros, Diallo
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explains that the entire Guinean population played a vital role in Guinea’s rebuff of France’s
offer, particularly the students and teachers.125 While Sékou Touré and the PDG maintained
ambiguous positions, only coming late to espousing the rejection of the constitution, it was the
participation of students and teachers, coupled with socio-economic factors that led Guinea to
independence. Previous scholarship has created a myth around the personality of Sékou Touré as
the sole or at least main cause of Guinea’s independence vote, but Diallo strives to highlight a
different image of Sékou Touré, that of a man who collaborated with the colonial administration,
thinking that it was too soon to question their domination, and of a leader hesitant to assert the
“no” vote even after students, teachers, and other political actors had done so without hesitation
long before.126 In fact, Sékou Touré’s turn to the “no” vote had much to do with de Gaulle’s
stubbornness and the gaullien and sékoutouréen egos.127
L’ambiguïté de son discours appelant à améliorer ce qui existe et non à l’indépendance
immédiate et sa prise de position tardive alors que la campagne estudiantine et de ses
adversaires politiques pour le ‘non’ battait son plein ne concourent pas à valider la thèse
selon laquelle Sékou Touré est l’homme du 28 septembre. Par contre, la portée mondiale
de certains passages de son discours prononcé lors du passage improvisé de De Gaulle à
Conakry laisse plutôt penser qu’il est ‘ l’homme du 25 août 1958.’128
An earlier work by Lasiné Kaba, which was part of a contemporary African history
collection aimed toward a general audience, depicts the September 28 vote as the culmination of
“diverse aspirations and thoughts, the result of a profound realization to which social, religious
and cultural forces largely contributed.”129 For Kaba it is vital that the opposition to the PDG not
be omitted from the story. “Le succès du référendum n’incombe pas seulement au PDG-RDA
dont le rôle est incontestable, mais aussi, dans une grande mesure, aux organisations syndicales
et estudiantines et aux autres formations politiques. Les dirigeants de l’opposition et du BAG en
particulier ont su se comporter en opposants loyaux. »130 In fact, the honor of independence
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belongs to all of the people of Guinea, not just l’homme de 28 septembre. It was the unity of the
parties and the social forces that obliged the PDG to adopt a more radical attitude.131 Despite the
reference to opposition and the role of unions and students, Kaba turns to focus on “le grandeur
de ces personnages tient à leur capacité d’exprimer les aspirations profondes de leurs peuples, de
s’identifier avec eux et de s’en faire la conscience vivant.” Thus, Sékou Touré and Charles de
Gaulle, whom Kaba calls a larger than life figure, the man of June 18 and « le symbole vivant de
l’espérance de la France,» became the emphasis of the Guinean independence story as told by the
U.S. press. 132
2.3

Coverage in TIME
Founded Founded by Henry R. Luce in 1923, TIME is a weekly news magazine with a

significant mainstream readership, and during the early years of decolonization remained under
the watchful eye of Luce. Known as the originator of the term the “American Century” for his
1941 article in Life, another of his publications, Luce encouraged the United States to forgo
isolationism and exert its political and economic influence globally.
Consider the 20th Century. It is not only in the sense that we happen to live in it but ours
also because it is America’s first century as a dominant power in the world … No narrow
definition can be given to American internationalism of the 20th Century… As America
enters dynamically upon the world scene, we need most of all to seek and to bring forth a
vision of America as a world power which is authentically American and which can
inspire us to live and work and fight with vigor and enthusiasm.133
Each week, TIME offered its readers a quick summary of news events at home and
around the world, but without the “myth” of objectivity, as mandated by Luce. “Asked once
why TIME did not present ‘two sides to a story,’ Luce replied: ‘Are there not more likely to be
three sides or 30 sides?’”134 The week before Luce’s death in 1967, Time, Inc.’s four major
publications – TIME, Life, Fortune, and Sports Illustrated – including international editions,
boasted a combined total of 14,331,458 copies.135 Luce’s obituary in TIME quoted Lyndon
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Johnson who stated that Luce’s magazines “‘are an authentic part of life in America.’”136 Led
during Luce’s lifetime by his personal zealous political agenda defined in the American Century,
and questions about how well TIME represented the whole of America notwithstanding, the
magazine’s circulation alone allows it to be considered as a paradigm of mainstream U.S. print
media in the mid-twentieth century.
With the ascent of Charles de Gaulle to the office of Prime Minister on June 1, 1958,
TIME provided almost weekly coverage of France and its foreign affairs, giving particular
attention to the Algerian War of Independence. In the August 11 “New Look for Government?,”
TIME announced that de Gaulle had given his drafted constitution to “a 39-man Constitutional
Consultative Committee137, and, in a characteristic touch, gave them precisely 20 days to consider
it.”138 The article concentrates on the changes to government structure provided by the new
constitution, which showed “a profound determination to clip the wings of the negative and
vacillating National Assembly” and a double-headed executive featuring a “President elected for
seven years, and with powers greater in some respects than those of the President of the U.S.”139
Alluding to de Gaulle’s arrogance again in the next issue, “Take it or Leave It” describes de
Gaulle’s presentation of the constitution “with his customary lofty dignity,” but in this case
explains that with the constitution, de Gaulle needed to solve two problems – “the chaos of a
supreme but irresponsible Parliament, and the long struggle to find some permanent policy for
France’s colonies.”140 De Gaulle confidently assumed the overseas territories would approve his
plan, otherwise, “they must secede and suffer all the ‘risks and perils.’”141
Following the discussion, “the Premier strode out of the Palais Royal, announced that he
would visit French West Africa and Madagascar to sell his program in person before the people
troop to the polls to vote yes or no next month.”142 The image of de Gaulle presented in the two
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articles is one of a kingly, arrogant leader, but also of a disciplining father figure who will make
the nation and territories swallow what is good for them.
As likely ratification of de Gaulle’s new constitution approached, TIME turned from
coverage of France’s conflict with Algeria and the proposed layout of the Fifth Republic
government to focus on the future of French West Africa. With the referendum vote just over a
month away, the August 18, 1958 article “French West Africa” offered a preview of the tour de
Gaulle would embark on two days later. Attention turned to de Gaulle’s constitution and the
question of the successes, failures, modifications, and continuation of colonialism arose. Guinea
and Sékou Touré figured highly in the article, Sékou Touré’s voice representing the danger of
France’s secession offer as opposed to the sensible Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast who was
quoted stating, “We don’t want independence. My neighbor Nkrumah in Ghana is independent,
and as a result must support an army which is very expensive. Who is really independent,
anyway?”143
In this article’s appraisal of French colonial efforts, the white man’s burden has been
more successful in some regards than others – healthcare has improved, while illiteracy was “still
enormous.” Infrastructure could be called spotty, for example the Office du Niger constructed a
$21 million dam across the Niger River, but tracks from a still nonexistent railroad sit atop it. And
the article reminds that a lot of French money has been spent on development since 1948.
It is important to situate Sékou Touré and Guinea within this larger context of West
Africa and U.S. portrayal of colonialism. One main point made by the TIME coverage is that
despite colonial efforts, Africa remains a land where tradition has not been fully eradicated by
modernity. An opening vignette describes a ceremony in the capital of Upper Volta that “has
changed not one jot in centuries” and is “in a way symbolic of the whole region’s inheritance of
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paradox and anachronism.”144 Africa is portrayed as: illiterate (Africans voting on the
constitutional referendum will simply choose a white or green card to signify their vote), barbaric
(“Just outside the teeming modern city of Abidjan, villagers still slaughter small children and toss
their disemboweled bodies into the river to make sure of a good year’s fishing”), impoverished
(Mauritania “felt itself too poor to have a capital of its own” and Senegal’s economy depends on
peanuts), confused about its gender roles (“among the Tuareg tribes of the Niger, it is the men,
not the women, who wear veils”), and rural (Mauritania has only four towns with populations
greater than 3,000 people, and Upper Volta boasts as many livestock as people). In keeping with
the notion of France’s civilizing mission, colonialism has been more of an obligation than a
benefit for France (a Mauritanian emir stated, “‘No one can say that France has exploited
Mauritania. On the contrary, it has been for her a burden.’”).145
Nevertheless, the French have made “isolated but highly promising efforts at
development” of “these destitute lands.” The Ivory Coast “is rich by comparison” and Guinea
“has plunged into the most ambitious industrial program in French West Africa” as Sékou Touré
receives applause for ending the system of canton chiefs, while North American and European
funds have begun backing a $200 million bauxite program. 146 Without explicitly stating it, the
article implies that these strides forward would be lost were precipitous independence to come to
West Africa.
While Houphouët-Boigny provides the image of an ideal African – educated and content,
a man who was able to stave off the influence of French Communists on the RDA – as “French
West Africa’s most noted political leader,” he contrasts starkly with Sékou Touré who already
inspires concern even if the French “regard him benignly as one of the ablest administrators in the
whole territory.”147 Sékou Touré is described as “a onetime Marxist and incorrigible troublemaker
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for France,” a “ruthless man who used to burn the houses of his enemies” and one who sees the
“loi-cadre as only one step toward autonomy.”148 Although Sékou Touré claims, “I am no
socialist,” he admits to having studied the principles of many economic programs, which he
would like to adapt to the needs of Africa. Most importantly, Sékou Touré hopes to attract
investment capital. At this point, Sékou Touré does not rally publicly for independence, but
neither does he inspire the American confidence that Houphouët-Boigny does.
The article closes with a reminder that 1958 was not the moment to break from France,
and Sékou Touré at this point, offers an ambiguous request for interdependence within a FrancoAfrican community.
Though some young hotheads cry for independence, what the present generation of
leaders want is something a good deal more mystical and at the same time more realistic
– a kind of proud brotherhood, not only with all of Africa, but also with France. “Our
fundamental choice,” Touré has said, “resides in the entire decolonization of Africa – its
men, its economy, its administrative organization, in order to build a solid FrancoAfrican community. Our heart, our reason, even more than our most evident self-interest,
makes us choose, without hesitation, interdependence and liberty in this union, rather
than a definition of ourselves without France and against France.”149
TIME continued to follow the saga of de Gaulle’s African constitutional campaign tour
with articles on August 25, September 8, September 15, September 22, and September 29.150
Throughout the coverage, de Gaulle is one great man, acting alone. We can imagine him sitting in
an office, penning the constitution, then piloting his own aircraft around Africa.151 He might have
had the weight of the world – or at least the francophone world – on his shoulders, but he was the
man who could carry it. Any flaws were in his haughty personality, but not in his actions or
decisions. Coverage of de Gaulle is also consistent in reiterating that he is not a communist.
Whether it is reference to his lack of support from the French Communist Party or communism,
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de Gaulle wages a “battle for votes” that can be inferred to also be a battle against communism. In
this way, he would be on the right side in the Cold War.152
Once he had presented the new constitution, de Gaulle began a campaign to sell it – to the
Constitutional Council, to French citizens in the hexagon, to African territories, to overseas
departments, and even to people in Algeria. Throughout the TIME coverage of de Gaulle’s
constitutional campaign, he is depicted as having made a magnanimous offer to the territories,
and since he did not have the full backing of the current government, it was only de Gaulle who
could be called liberal-minded enough to consider a plan so progressive.
The parliamentary commission also thought too harsh De Gaulle’s implied ruling that any
overseas territory casting a majority vote against the new constitution in next month’s
referendum would be considered to have voted itself clean out of the French Union.
Instead, they proposed that, in such a case, the territorial assembly be allowed to decide
whether or not to hold a second, local referendum on the specific issue of
independence.153
History depicts the results of the Sept. 28 referendum as an enormous success, and
indeed, 79.3% of metropolitan votes were cast in favor of it, and throughout most of Africa, the
votes for it were in the ninetieth percentile.154 The referendum achieved 82.6% of the votes
overall. Voter turnout also ran high, with an average of 80.48% of voters casting a ballot.
Although the metropole showed the highest voter turnout at 84.94%, most African territories
topped 70% in participation. Lower turnout in Chad (66.19%), Mali (45.38%), Niger (37.42%),
and Dahomey (55.65%) was bolstered by high figures in Ivory Coast (97.56%) and Mauritania
(84.22%).155 In Guinea, 85.5% of voters participated in the referendum vote.156 During de
Gaulle’s campaign, the race had seemed much closer, with “experts in Paris” expecting the
constitution to pull in only 60 to 65% of the vote.157 Despite the fact that millions around the
world would vote, it was de Gaulle who was personally responsible for getting votes. In Algeria,
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a directive to “create a De Gaulle myth” meant “the picture of the general must appear
everywhere.” And in France, a takeover of media platforms by Information Minister Jacques
Soustelle became “sycophantic in praise of De Gaulle.”158
While Sékou Touré has been presented as “Guinea” and characteristic of the qualities
Africans more generally, de Gaulle typically stands apart from and above his people. De Gaulle
has earned his place through leadership qualities, his intellectualism, and his willingness to move
his country forward whether or not all of the French are ready. By contrast, Sékou Touré has
achieved his position through mysticism and force.
TIME provided two articles about de Gaulle’s tour of France’s African territories, and the
first, published in the September 8 issue, takes a different overall tone in its coverage by
emphasizing some of colonialism’s more violent episodes such as the 55,000 to 80,000 Malagasy
lives lost during the 1947 revolt in Madagascar. This article is less complimentary to de Gaulle
and details more of the challenges encountered on his campaign trail: sporadic applause in
Madagascar, reservations expressed by politicians in Brazzaville, “ominous mutterings from
native political bosses in the 13 territories of French Africa,” jeering demonstrators in Senegal,
and necessarily secret meetings with local Algerian dignitaries.159 Nevertheless, de Gaulle
displays “political savvy,” and “despite occasional catcalls, De Gaulle’s trip was a political
triumph.”160 “Free to Choose Freedom,” published the day after the referendum vote, but
obviously written earlier due to TIME’s weekly publication schedule, reviews the expectations
about votes that will come from the African territories, but gives about half of the word count to
the personality clash between de Gaulle and Sékou Touré. Here, the ability to vote for the
constitution or gain independence is again touted as benevolent, “Never before in history has an
imperial nation made such an offer.”161 Yet, Africans are confused: “For two days De Gaulle was
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subjected to the curious experience of hearing irate Africans loudly demand something he had
already offered them.”162 De Gaulle’s personality in the TIME coverage from presentation of the
constitution to the results of the campaign (July through September 1958), can be summed up
with this statement in “Selling the Constitution,” “But the No. 1 statesman of the new way is the
general himself – proud, dedicated, remote, positive, full of paternal silences and prestigious
mysteries.”163
Sékou Touré also features in the articles from September 8 and 29. In “The Campaigner,”
he is called a “firebrand” who annoyed de Gaulle by shouting his famous quote about preferring
poverty in independence to richness in slavery. The article (incorrectly) notes that Sékou Touré
“also promised to vote yes to the constitution.”164 In “Free to Choose Freedom,” the clash
between Sékou Touré and de Gaulle earns more copy, as by the time of its writing, it had become
apparent that Sékou Touré did not support the constitution. In fact, he “thundered” and “cried”
that Guinea would vote no to a rebaptized French Union.165 Sékou Touré’s comments are called
an “outburst.” Rather than talking calmly in a civilized and mature manner, Sékou Touré
consistently is described as using the communication methods of a child. Even worse, his refusal
of the French constitution could stem more from a “personality clash” with de Gaulle than from
shrewd political decision making. In this article, he is already a tyrant: “In French Guinea what
Sekou Touré (sic) says goes. His political control is so tight and his followers so quick to violence
and intimidation that even French observers gloomily expect Guinea to vote no by more than
90%.”166 There is no evidence of the nuanced situation involving the unions, students, teachers,
and grassroots activists unearthed by Diallo, Kaba, and Schmidt.
Even worse, while in the August 18 article “French West Africa,” Sékou Touré had
explained that he was not a socialist, here he is called, “A Marxist-trained unionist himself, Sekou
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Touré [sic], 36, envisions a Guinean government in which labor unions will be the prime
instruments of administrative power.” Again, he is contrasted with Houphouët-Boigny who “has
come a long way since the days when he was an admirer of Communism.”167 In fact, communism
is the real enemy to the French Union, and potential votes against the constitution, may stem from
leftist leanings more than anything else: “Djibo Bakary, another Marxist-trained unionist who
heads the government of French Niger, announced that he and his followers were voting no …
and Senegal, with its potent Communist minority, may go either way.”168 The conflict between
communism and the referendum further underlines the fact that de Gaulle is not a communist.
Only Guinea declined the French Community and gained independence, and de Gaulle’s
constitution was regarded as an overwhelming success.
In 1959, TIME magazine devoted its January 5 “Man of the Year” cover to Charles de
Gaulle, but Sékou Touré earned his place next month, taking the February 16 issue cover.169
While de Gaulle’s image announced that he had earned the title “Man of the Year,” Touré’s cover
included the text “Black Africa: The Dawn of Self Rule.” De Gaulle’s image is a commissioned
portrait painted by artist Bernard Buffet, and he gazes toward the right, into the future.170 The
background is a steely blue, and de Gaulle is neatly attired in a suit with tie, ready for business.
By contrast, Sékou Touré gazes, or almost leers, over his shoulder to the left, toward the past.
With a colorful background and a casual open-collar shirt, he could be a conga player more easily
than a national leader. Despite these differences, both figures display qualities of masculinity and
strength. If Sékou Touré does not wear modern business attire, he does boast a powerful
countenance in the photo.
Each cover announced the name of its subject, listing “Guinea’s Sékou Touré” and
simply “De Gaulle.” This denotes an important difference between the two leaders. One the one
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hand, most readers would have been familiar with de Gaulle prior to picking up a copy of TIME.
On the other hand, many will meet Sékou Touré for the first time during press coverage of 1958
and 1959.
Continuing divergences appear in the Letter from Publisher, who was James A. Linen for
both issues. In the letter introducing de Gaulle, Linen begins by explaining the significance of
TIME’s Man of the Year, which could be a hero or a villain. “But always, he has met one
criterion: who during the year, did most to change the news, for better or for worse.”
Interestingly, Linen mentions that readers can submit ideas for Man of the Year – although that
has no bearing on the ultimate choice of editors – and in this case, 47% of readers had suggested
de Gaulle to earn the title. Linen summarizes the main point of what is to come in the full article
by writing, “De Gaulle is by no means the world’s greatest statesman. But to a degree unmatched
by any other world figure, he gave the year’s news the flavor of his own complex, often
misunderstood personality.” The de Gaulle feature that follows rescues his image from the
arrogant wartime figure H.G. Wells called “‘ an utterly sincere megalomaniac’” to France’s
benefactor whose “solemn hauteur” serves the intended purpose of allowing his people to revere
him. He is a family man and an intellectual who has benefited from a dozen years’ retirement,
which allowed him to reflect and improve.171
The publisher’s letter opening the issue featuring Sékou Touré begins by tracing the
“awakening” of Africa, which can be viewed on a series of TIME covers beginning with the one
dedicated to Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie, the 1936 Man of the Year. Jumping to 1952,
TIME featured Daniel Malan, the Afrikaner Prime Minister of the apartheid Union of South
Africa who wanted to the maintain the subjection of the black majority. The next year, Ghana’s
Kwame Nkrumah represented “the face of Black Africa nationalism.” Both King Mohammed V
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of Morocco and Ferhat Abbas, head of the Algerian rebel government-in-exile, graced covers in
1956. Paternalistic language represents Sékou Touré, Guinea, and Africa’s current political
situation. “Now comes young, vigorous Sékou Touré of Guinea, the man who said ‘No’ to De
Gaulle and who has become one of the most powerful figures in the reversed ‘Scramble for
Africa’ – that of the Africans themselves,” Linen writes. The article to follow will not only
introduce Sékou Touré, it will report on “the first unsteady steps of an infant nation and the
growing pains of a continent.”172 Within the article, those “unsteady steps” display the disorder of
Conakry: “For lack of help, ministers had to do the secretarial work while visitors clogged their
waiting rooms. Telephones did not work, clerks scuttered about looking for the only copy of the
diplomatic list. Messages were sent in to the Minister of Health while he was performing surgical
operations.”173
Drastic divergence in representation continues in the articles. The piece on de Gaulle
begins with symbols of modernity: events of 1958 such as voice recording, radiation readings,
and a mention of the previous year’s Sputnik launch. The article explains that during 1958, many
new leaders came to power as discontent raged from “Caracas to Khartoum.” Most of these
leaders rose through military overthrow and had little real plan beyond seizing power. However,
one leader did achieve positive ends, the 1958 Man of the Year, Charles de Gaulle. By contrast,
the Sékou Touré article begins by resorting to familiar colonial tropes to situate the American
reader in Africa. The writer describes the dancing of “graceful, black-skinned Guinea women,”
xylophones that reach a “fever pitch,” and wailing griots. American readers would easily
recognize that this was not a Western political celebration. Elsewhere, the article describes the
inauguration of Sékou Touré’s infrastructure campaign with the “wild beating of the tom
toms.”174
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De Gaulle is quickly distanced from any relationship with communism when the author
describes that he has proved “once again the fundamental Christian proposition that history is
shaped by individuals, not by blind faith or inexorable Marxist laws.”175 This claim reminds
readers that de Gaulle is a Christian. By contrast, the article on Sékou Touré notes his “Marxism”
several times. His role in the Guinean trade unions gained the notice of French communists who
brought him to Warsaw and Prague from whence he “came back spouting Marxism.” Later, it was
Sékou Touré who reorganized Guinea’s RDA along communist lines. Further, the article not only
mentions Sékou Touré’s Koranic education, but the introduction, with the description of dancing
women at the independence celebration, alludes to a primitive form of paganism, allowing readers
to easily take away the idea that Sékou Touré is not Christian. Whether he holds firm religious
beliefs remains unclear, and irrelevant since his true faith is shown to be communism. The
discourse works to remove Guinea and Sékou Touré from any claim on Western modernity. Even
though he wore a “European business suit” to the ceremony, his voice reached “close to frenzy,”
a description that could call to mind a lack of civilized manners or radicalization.176
De Gaulle earns monikers including soldier, scholar, and writer. He is a man who has
bequeathed his gifts on the country of France. “Charles de Gaulle … has restored the supremacy
of internal law and given France a new constitution … has all but destroyed the Communist Party
as an active factor in French government, has laid the groundwork for a fruitful new relationship
between France and her onetime African colonies, and has immensely strengthened France’s
moral and psychological position in revolt-torn Algeria.”177 These laudatory sentences impart the
idea that de Gaulle has acted alone in rescuing France. In this, his coverage converges with the
feature about Sékou Touré, and he and de Gaulle can be imagined as mirror images. Often
discussed as the only person of note in Guinea – any other humans there are the naked, shrieking
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masses, “Sékou Touré decided to say no to De Gaulle…”178 and in his leadership role, Sékou
Touré’s behavior is representative of West African leaders as a whole: “The black men, mainly in
the West of Africa, who are leading their illiterate millions to freedom talk mystically of an
eventual United States of Africa and of something called African Personality.”179
While each man speaks for his country, de Gaulle earned his leadership role through his
“solemn hauteur” and “the year’s most impressive display of political mastery,” while Sékou
Touré had a “singularly unmajestic” childhood, was “always making trouble” as a civil servant,
and after founding Guinea’s first labor union “began to take on that mystical aura so valuable to
African leaders.”180 The notion that African leaders earn their power through some sort of
witchcraft supports notions that democracy belongs to the West and implies that political reason
is a Western quality. For readers unfamiliar with the political history of Sékou Touré, the article
outlines his rise to power under the loi-cadre. Having “stomped out all opposition at home,”
when the loi-cadre was passed in 1956, he was “ready” to take charge and became the vice
president, second in command under the territorial governor. The article describes Sékou Touré’s
sweeping changes during which he removed village chiefs and set up village councils, elected by
universal suffrage “grass-roots democracy” that was “something new to French Africa.”181
However, the reader is soon reminded of Sékou Touré’s Marxism, as well as the late benefits of
French imperialism in the territory, which meant roads and malaria control. The following text
revisits Sékou Touré’s unstable nature – he “snapped” a reply at the French and met de Gaulle’s
“dramatic” offer of Community with the “thundered,” now famous remark, “We prefer poverty
in liberty to riches in slavery.”182
Although de Gaulle figures heavily into the article about the referendum vote, Sékou
Touré and Guinea are absent from the article on de Gaulle, suggesting that France was more
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important to Guinea’s future than was Guinea to France’s. Despite Guinea’s “no” vote, France’s
constitutional referendum is depicted as a complete success as well as a magnanimous gesture on
the part of de Gaulle, who “By tying the vote on autonomy for France’s Black African territories
to the vote on his proposed constitution, he obliged right-wingers to swallow his liberal colonial
policy, at the same time picked up 9,000,000 African votes to swell his majority in the
constitutional referendum.”183 Incorporating Guinea’s “no” would complicate the historical
narrative offered in the article. Even as the TIME article recognizes the challenges ahead for de
Gaulle, particularly in the situation with Algeria, which has drained the French economy, it ends
on a hopeful note explaining that problems “provide a kind of elation to a man of De Gaulle’s
temperament,” and closes with, “In 1958, obedient to his maxim, glory gave herself to Charles
de Gaulle.”184
Most of the de Gaulle cover story concentrates on his long public history as a young
officer in the First World War, an accomplished author and military strategist between the wars,
the leader of the Free France movement, and head of France’s postwar provisional government.
Yet this larger than life figure can also be seen as human – he is a churchgoing family man,
remains polite and formal with his Cabinet ministers, and is classically trained and intellectual in
outlook. Apparently unlike Sékou Touré, who grasped at and seized power, de Gaulle returned to
liberated Paris a hero in 1944 with “only his own character” blocking him from “a dictator’s
power.” He chose to restore democracy in France rather than take “drastic action that might have
eased France’s grievous economic problems.”185
In contrast to the laudatory image of de Gaulle, the leadership character imposed on
Sékou Touré in the February TIME article suggests “black insatiability,” historian George White,
Jr.’s critique of the way that black expectations are seen as unreasonable, regardless of how
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reasonable they may be. In the contrast between TIME’s coverage of de Gaulle and Sékou Touré,
it is apparent that the normalcy and superiority of whiteness was upheld unilaterally. The “only
plausible explanations for African radicalism were Black incompetence, insatiability, and blind
hatred of Whites, fed by Communist propaganda.”186 The constant references to Sékou Touré’s
Marxism show that this progressive African leader already in early 1959 had begun to earn a
negative reputation in the United States. In de Gaulle, megalomania was forgivable thanks to his
wartime heroism and (cultural/racial) superiority. When Sékou Touré is described as only
neededing three to four hours of sleep a night and a leader “driving his countrymen as hard as
himself,” this has nothing to do with individual self-discipline. Instead it “bears a disturbing
resemblance to the communes of Communist China” or even the forced road labor of the ancien
régime. A more compelling comparison might have been forced labor during European
colonialism, but the writer makes no disparaging remarks about France’s modern history.
TIME states of Touré that he “combines the Marxist genius for organizing with an almost
mystical view of himself as the father of his people.”187 In the case of de Gaulle, it is the French
people who see him as the father and indeed the savior of his people. While the idea does not
become evident in the TIME article, at home, Sékou Touré was imagined in a similar way,
according to Kaba, Alpha Diawara, and Sikhe Camara. Further, the TIME article explains that
Guinean administration runs “not through government but through a single party” and that Sékou
Touré claims the Party functions democratically because all of the representatives are elected at
the local level. Even worse, Sékou Touré seeks to trade with his “old Communist friends,” and
has begun working with East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union, inspiring
fear that he will try to run private trade through government agencies. Touting Sékou Touré’s
Marxism served as a straightforward method of allowing readers to dislike him, modifying his
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African alterity through a linkage to the more familiar alter-West of communism, and
encapsulating him within a known negative boundary. Nevertheless, the article features plenty of
additional reasons not to admire him.
A brief mention of Sékou Touré’s meeting with Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, who pledged
$28 million to assist the country following France’s cold shoulder, explains that nothing has
come of the offer from Nkrumah. Ghana’s role has little importance anyway, because France has
“swallowed its indignation over the man who said no” and recent agreements “place the country
squarely back in the French Community.” It has not taken long for Guinea to understand that
“independence is a relative thing.”188 In fact, the article does not fully recommend independence
for African nations. Guinea, just after the “no” vote, was “on its own,” while other countries
fared better: the British left Ghana in good shape economically, Liberia had investment from
Firestone Tire & Rubber, and Ethiopia was fortunate to have Swedes training its air force and
Americans running its airline.189 The idea is that African countries could not survive alone. “It
will not be easy for Africa to be completely itself, for no other continent has been so swept by
foreign influence.”190 Even worse, Africans have more to fear from each other than whites, the
article purports, mentioning riots against immigrants from Togoland and Dahomey in Côte
d’Ivoire. Even Nkrumah has already begun to fall out of favor with other Africans; as evidence
there is a quote from Mamadou Dia of Senegal who states, “‘Ghanocracy … does not interest
us.’” Thus, the dream of a United States of Africa may be yearned for, but it is “impractical.” 191
Overall, with its reliance on colonial tropes and fear of communist leanings, the article on
Sékou Touré represents American conceptions and fears of new African leaders and independent
Africa more generally even as the United States and the American public assumed their roles as
world leaders at a time when decoloniation and Cold War transformed the once Eurocentric
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world order. The Guinean president serves as a stand-in for West Africa or Black Africa at the
dawn of self rule.192 He is “brash” like a child and is married to a second wife – it remains
unclear whether he is divorced or practices polygamy. The Touré couple’s move into the palace
rings of farce when the article mentions that there is no phone.193 Thus, Sékou Touré and Guinea
are simply playacting; Guinea is a child’s dollhouse of a country. The exiting French were at
fault for the lack of modern conveniences, although the article explains, “The Guineans charged
that the departing French were taking everything,” however, the tone questions whether the
accusation was substantiated.
Like Touré, who appears precipitous in leading his people to reject the French
Community, Africa as a whole is childish or unreasonable in its desires. The article states that
Africa is in no mood to be practical, more colonies are hastily pushing for independence, and
Africans are “impatient at having their history written by others.”194 A break from the colonial
power seems ridiculous and impractical when the article reminds that until Europeans arrived,
Africa was “the continent that could not write,” a case of journalistic prejudice masking
journalistic ignorance.195
The one aspect in which the images of de Gaulle and Sékou Touré converge in the TIME
cover stories is in the use of masculinist representations. With his “hulking, outsized (6 ft. 4 in.)
body,” de Gaulle “restored” the country and gave France a new constitution. De Gaulle inspires
the confidence due a soldier and a father. The article on Sékou Touré offers a brief history of
colonialism in the area, during which nineteenth century Europeans began “penetrating the thick
forests of Guinea.”196 Here, Europe is the male actor, and Guinea is not only female, but
primeval. By the moment of independence, Sékou Touré is “broad-shouldered” and “handsome.”
If not educated and reasonable, he is at least strong, although describing a national leader in this
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way is incongruous to the duties he will face in a global economy, and the description offers a
subconscious reference to his Mandinka heritage and the residual stereotypes of African slavery
in American culture.
Throughout the February cover story, Sékou Touré clearly serves as a metonym for his
people in a way that de Gaulle does not. The citizenry of Guinea, so involved in the move toward
independence, were obscured, and a reader might think that other than Touré and assorted
political figures, the only other people in Guinea were naked dancing women and shrieking
griots197. At the very least, the masses have no agency. By contrast, the France of de Gaulle
teems with the diversity of a complex society; from Communists to protesting students. Because
Sékou Touré’s image fills the cover of the issue, but the article speaks more broadly of Guinea
and Africa, he becomes a metonym of West Africa – his childishness, virility, impatience, bad
political decisions, and primitivism are indicative of the continent and what is to come under
self-rule. By contrast, the cover story on de Gaulle is just that – a biography of one great man
who is neither a quintessential European nor responsible for the personality of an entire country.
In fact, de Gaulle possesses a deep and unique character; Sékou Touré is a mere silhouette.
For American journalists writing in the context of the Cold War and American racism,
Sékou Touré and Charles de Gaulle fit easily into the binary logic of primitive and modern,
childlike and paternal, communist and non-communist, mystical and intellectual. At times,
Houphouët-Boigny was also used as a foil to Sékou Touré, the Ivorian representing the
Westernized African who had fought off his initial youthful communist interest, and the Guinean
portraying the potential danger of an independent Africa that was possibly communist and
definitely authoritarian.
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2.4

Coverage in the Chicago Defender
The Chicago Daily Defender, one of only three national African American daily

newspapers, covered the situation in Africa through the lens of the struggle for racial equality in
the United States.198 Founded as a weekly publication in 1905 by Robert S. Abbott, the Defender
became a daily in 1956 under the guidance of Abbott’s nephew John H. Sengstacke who had
taken over in 1940. Abbott’s goal in creating the newspaper was to make it “a force to combat
the pervasive racism of the era,” and he advocated “fearless militancy in protest against
wrongs.”199 Despite the strong early-twentieth-century words of the paper’s founder, by the
1970s, the Defender earned criticism from the Black Power Movement for being too
accommodating. In his 2016 book The Defender: How the Legendary Black Newspaper Changed
America From the Age of the Pullman Porters to the Age of Obama, journalist Ethan Michaeli
details the work of the Defender in the struggle for racial equality and depicts it as a publication
whose leaders did not hesitate to promote a political stance in the paper. Although he explains
that Sengstacke “never attempted to exercise control over the content of the newspaper, believing
in the autonomy of his editors,” Michaeli also mentions that W.E.B. Du Bois and editor Metz
Lochard were let go for becoming affiliated with the Henry A. Wallace Progressive presidential
campaign in 1948 while the paper – and Sengstacke – announced support of Truman, pinning
hopes for positive civil rights action on his presidency.200 Maintaining the paper’s firm, yet not
radical political orientation, the “Defender Platform” established by Abbott in 1905, continued to
be printed in each edition during the years of decolonization in Africa:
1.
2.
3.
4.

“American race prejudice must be destroyed.”
The opening up of all trade Unions to blacks as well as whites.
Representation in the President’s Cabinet.
Engineers, firemen and conductors on all American railroads, and all jobs in
government controlled industries.
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5. Representation in all departments of police forces over the entire United
States.
6. Government schools open to all American citizens in preference of foreigners.
7. Motormen and conductors on surface, elevated and motor bus lines through
America.
8. Federal legislation to abolish lynching.
9. Full enfranchisement of all American citizens. 201
From the platform, it follows that the Defender’s primary focus would not be foreign
news, and despite the exhaustive nature of his book about the newspaper, Michaeli pays little
notice to the Defender’s foreign news coverage, showing it to be an outlet concentrated on topics
of national importance. Nevertheless, the Defender did take interest in international news and
followed the decolonization of Africa while also keeping an eye on Allies like France. The
platform stance against racism remains threaded through coverage of the 1958 French
Referendum.
Inclusions about Sékou Touré and Charles de Gaulle were many from June 1958 to June
1959, but the Defender largely relied on UPI stories for coverage. The tone of articles written by
Defender staff contrasts starkly with that of the copy pulled from the wire. In UPI pieces, Sékou
Touré earned many of the monikers already noted in TIME coverage: communist or potential
communist, unrealistic, and a known troublemaker. When articles were penned by Defender
reporters, editors, and columnists, Sékou Touré’s image shows drastic improvement, and he
becomes a hero, optimistic, and a go-getter. What both types of coverage share is a notion that it
was Sékou Touré who was responsible for the “no” vote in Guinea. As in some of the TIME
coverage, there is no mention of the popular vote or assistance or support from others. One
article even states that Sékou Touré had no opposition in Guinea, which was wholly untrue as
Diallo and Schmidt have shown. Thus, whether negative or laudatory, the Defender coverage of
Sékou Touré utilized his image alone as the definition of Guinean politics, society, and culture.
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The internal Defender articles were also prone to oversimplification of Sékou Touré’s person and
personality. As in the TIME coverage, he ceases to be a complex figure, but in the Defender,
Sékou Touré falls prey to the trope of the noble savage as writers seek to glorify him even as
they become mired in what scholars would today call Afro-optimism. Sékou Touré again served
as a metonym for black Africa, but in the Defender the image was positive.
As in TIME, de Gaulle earned more coverage than Sékou Touré during the year under
review. When including Africa or Guinea, the coverage focuses specifically on de Gaulle’s
return to power and his offer to the colonies with the new constitution. However, coverage of de
Gaulle and Africa comprises only about a third of the total amount of de Gaulle inclusions during
the year. Even when the question of African independence is involved, de Gaulle is depicted as
slightly grandiose, probably the best remedy for France’s troubles, and in possession of
reasonable reactions to various situations. Like Sékou Touré, de Gaulle too acts alone.202 He has
written the constitution, it is his constitution, he tours Africa to sell it, he makes decisions, and he
reaffirms himself. Unlike the TIME coverage that depicts de Gaulle as exceptional, in the
Defender, de Gaulle represents France. The June 4, 1958 column “Watch on the Potomac” by
journalist Robert G. Spivack states, “It was once said of the French general: ‘De Gaulle does not
think of himself as a Frenchman. He thinks of himself as France.’”203 Coverage in the Defender
upholds this idea.
The first inclusion of Sékou Touré and the possibility of rejection of the referendum vote
occurs on August 12, 1958.204 The article explains that the French have offered its territories two
options – integration or secession – and states that many African leaders want neither and favor a
system more equivalent to the British Commonwealth. The terms “integration” and “secession”
utilized by the Defender would have resonated with its readers. Integration was an important
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aspect of the Civil Rights Movement, and secession would have called to mind the American
Civil War. African independence was often depicted through the lens of the concurrent Civil
Rights Movement and was described with terms such as “integration” and “secession” rather
than “membership in the French Community” and “independence” as stated by de Gaulle and
Sékou Touré.205
In his August 25, 1958 speech in Conakry, de Gaulle never uses the word “integration”
to describe the offer of the new constitution but prefers various versions of “Communauté,”
which he uses five times. He also speaks of “l’oeuvre commun” that Guinea and France have
accomplished together. Likewise, Sékou Touré’s August 25 speech includes eight uses of
“Communauté,” and no use of the word “intégration.”206 While Sékou Touré includes
“sécession” once in his speech, he actually states that Guinea’s desire for independence is not the
same as secession. “Nous ne confondons pas non plus la jouissance de ce droit à l'indépendance
avec la sécession d'avec la France, à laquelle nous entendons rester liés et collaborer à
l'épanouissement de nos richesses communes.”207 He prefers to speak of independence, a word
he uses four times, and decolonization, which he uses twice. De Gaulle never mentions
secession, but does utilize independence twice. Interestingly, the Defender coverage does not
focus attention on Sékou Touré’s equating colonialism and the offer of French Community with
slavery even though in his August 25 speech, he calls three times for emancipation and makes
his famous statement, “Nous préférons pauvreté dans la liberté à la richesse dans l’esclavage.”208
Divergences in Sékou Touré’s image are apparent in the Defender’s reliance on stories
that came from UPI as opposed to internally-penned articles. Following the referendum vote, the
Defender quickly ran a story from UPI with a Conakry dateline titled “Only Guinea Fails To OK
De Gaulle.”209 Despite earlier Defender inclusions that characterized Sékou Touré as simply
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“Premier of French Guinea” who advocated a Commonwealth, once Guinea had actually voted
against the constitution, the tone of UPI coverage changed. Previously, Sékou Touré had been in
concert with other African leaders, like Senghor, but on September 30, Guinea stood alone, and
Sékou Touré was described as “an extreme leftist who was educated in Moscow and Prague.”
Although he hoped for continued aid from France, Touré should have heeded “De Gaulle’s
warning that any colony that chose freedom would be cut off at the pockets.”210
If UPI had become concerned about Sékou Touré’s Marxist tendencies, the Defender
reporters had not. Just a week earlier, the Defender proudly announced that Sékou Touré,
speaking for his people, would vote “no” on September 28, calling him “a bright new sun …
rising on the African horizon.”211 The article looks forward to the future end of colonialism
sparked by Sékou Touré’s decision. “Thus the first blow in the possible break-up of the French
colonial empire has been struck. Toure, who is Premier of the Guinean government, is one of the
ablest among clever French African leaders.”212 The article includes a long quotation from Sékou
Touré where he states that Guinea will vote “no” to a repabtized French Union, and claims
Sékou Touré’s statements “jolted metropolitan France,” still expecting a “yes” vote for the
constitution. Although Sékou Touré has drawn the ire of the pro-de Gaulle camp in the French
press, which “has charged him with seeking to become a ‘black African Nasser,’” the Defender
states, “We cast our vote for Sekou Toure!”213 Post-independence coverage of Sékou Touré in
the Defender remained positive, citing “a new African figure, vocal and resonant” in whom
“Africa has a leader of unsurpassable dynamism, courage and aggressiveness.”
The article goes on to praise Sékou Touré and dismiss the charges that he is a
communist:
He is a gifted speaker whose oratory and logic are irresistible. When he speaks France
and Africa listen. He is a spellbinder of the first magnitude. Only 36 years old, he is
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endowed with remarkable organizational talents. A fearless, tireless leader who is not
beyond personal sacrifices for the cause in which he believes and for the people whom he
loves.
Because he was President of the General Confederation of labor [sic], because he
attended the Institute of Economic Studies in Prague, and later visited Moscow and
Warsaw, he is called a leftist, a radical, a convinced Marxist. Nkrumah is assailed in the
same manner by the British press. In fact, any one who disagrees with the status quo is
called a left-winger, or pink or a red. Negro leadership everywhere must expect to be
smeared. Toure is a convinced nationalist who prefers liberty than slavery for his people.
No power on earth can prevent French Guinea from taking its place among the free
nations of the world.214
In order to support Sékou Touré, the Defender had to downplay or even negate his
leftist label, as during the Cold War, African Americans had less freedom to espouse a variety of
political viewpoints. According to historian Penny Von Eschen, the Cold War put an end to the
black radical anticolonialism in the United States. The rhetoric of antiracism and anticolonialism
had to be recast in a patriotic frame.215 Yet once the Defender elides Sékou Touré’s leftism, the
coverage can more safely allude to a connection between the struggle to end colonialism and the
fight for racial equality in the United States, one of the “free nations of the world.” Somewhat in
contrast to Von Eschen’s findings, Brenda Gayle Plummer has traced this trend in Rising Wind:
Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 and argued that the years from 1935 to
1960 constituted a transition in black politics from isolationism to internationalism.216
Considering the coverage of Guinea’s “no” vote, we note both phenomena as the Defender
featured news of decolonization in Africa and looked toward African leaders for inspiration, yet
made a point of first qualifying leaders like Sékou Touré and Nkrumah as non-communist.
The tone of the representation of Sékou Touré in the Defender deviates from what was
running concurrently in TIME in that where the Defender complimented him with the description
of aggressive, TIME considered him power hungry. In the Defender, his tirelessness showed self-
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sacrifice, but in TIME, it only led him to drive his people too hard. However, if TIME’s coverage
weighed on the negative aspects of Sékou Touré’s personality, the Defender fell into what is now
called Afro-optimism in its description of both the leader and his country’s future, some
statements more accurate than others.
With the Ivory Coast, Guinea “has the most promising future of all the West African
territories.”217 This is in part due to a $500 million investment program already in play, which
drew from international investors, not just France. “This strong position gives considerable
substance to the appeal by Toure to the rest of African to follow Guinea’s example.”218 It seems
huge international investment would be a next easy step following independence, although it
actually was not. A month earlier, the Defender had warned that African leaders were “realistic
enough to know that French Africa would not be able to maintain its independence for long
without mortgaging its economic future to some other hungry colonial powers.”219 Nevertheless,
Guinea had opted for independence and required a positive spin to be put on the situation. In a
complete reversal, the post-independence Defender article stated, “French Guinea is rich in
aluminum and other ores, it can sustain itself without mortgaging liberty to greedy, land-hungry
colonial powers.”220 Additionally, while the Western white world was “not shouting hallelujah to
these spectacular, unwanted developments,” and claimed “Africa is not ready for self-rule; that
African economy is primitive and ruinous,” the reply could be, “Africa is an old continent; if its
economy is unstable why did it not collapse long ago?”221 While expressing excitement about
Guinea’s bauxite deposits, the article failed to recognize that mining and extracting aluminum
from bauxite require major industry and energy due to the difficulty of the process.
Both the UPI articles and the Defender’s own coverage served to create and solidify the
myth of Sékou Touré for the readership. Here, as in TIME, Sékou Touré acted alone and
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instructed his people what to do. Statements like “he said to his people” and France had thought
“Toure would vote ‘yes’” show Sékou Touré as the decision-maker, and the entire mass of
Guineans as his subjects.222 With the “no” vote, Sékou Touré was destined to not only be a
mythical figure in Guinea, but throughout the world. “Toure’s successful bid for independence
for his country, is a major event not alone in modern African history, but in world history as
well.”223
Nevertheless, despite the Defender’s praise of Sékou Touré, the paper’s coverage relied
on colonial language with which to describe Touré, Guineans, and Africans, thereby relegating
them to a primitive place even if they were admirable. In this way, the Defender used the trope of
the noble savage to define Guinea and Sékou Touré. In several articles, people are referred to as
“natives” or “African natives” rather than simply “Africans.”224 Historian Curtis Keim has
explained that terms like “native” are fraught with colonial meaning even when used to denote
people actually indigenous to a place.225 Guineans are also idealized with statements such as,
“And, any honest traveller can testify to the courage, honesty and loyalty of the African
native.”226 Thus, when Sékou Touré is described in the following paragraph as a “spellbinder,” it
is a short leap to imagine him as some sort of witchdoctor. The difference between TIME and the
Defender is that TIME views the traditional nature of Africa, and therefore Sékou Touré as
backward, while the Defender imagines some of the same qualities as an idealized form of
humanity.
In 1959, UPI articles run in the Defender continued to remind readers of Sékou Touré’s
leftist leanings including one written by a stringer in Conakry who had the benefit of a personal
interview with the Guinean leader. The Defender published “Guinea’s Chief Bids For United
States of Africa” on March 17, 1959 and again on March 28, 1959, showing that the paper placed
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importance on the future of Africa. In this article, Sékou Touré calls for independence across
Africa and the formation of the United States of Africa as the only way to solve the continent’s
complex problems, which remained unnamed in the article. The reporter describes the Guinean
president as “a 37-year-old former trade union leader who rose in 10 years to become the head of
the world’s newest nation.”227 If the vague reference to trade union involvement and speedy rise
to complete power did not give the reader cause to consider Sékou Touré a possible communist,
the comment a few paragraphs later likely would: “The premier, who has attended schools in
Moscow and other Communist capitals, led Guinea to independence.” The writer next describes
the challenges Guinea must face as it “struggle[s] to build a prosperous nation.” Unlike Ghana,
which had been well-prepared by the British, “Guinea must learn from scratch.”
As in the TIME article, this one also states that Guineans “charged” that the French
took everything when leaving the country after the vote from fountain pens to plans for
Conakry’s sewers. Again, the sense is that the allegations have not been proven. Yet here, the
people charging France with this offense are called “bitter citizens.” The reporter next details
some of the problems facing Guinea, particularly due to the walk-out of more than 3,500 French
civil servants, reminding readers that the country had not been prepared for self-rule. “Long lines
form at the airport where one Guinean stamps passports – a job once done by three French men.
Downtown, three men try to run a government office formerly staffed by 12 Frenchmen.”228 The
country has serious staffing issues – a viewpoint that was also presented in the TIME cover story.
In the closing paragraph of the March 1959 Defender article, Sékou Touré is permitted
to rebut the allegation of communism; he “insisted that the trade links he has forged with Russia
and the Communist Eastern European nations could not affect Guinea’s sovereignty, and were
made on ‘a basis of liberty and equality.’”229 While the article’s headline touts Sékou Touré’s
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desire for a continental political union of Africa, the content of the article serves to question the
benefit of Sékou Touré’s desire to be at the forefront of African nationalist movement, which
would lead to that unity.
In April 1959, the Defender published an opinion piece “The World Looks At Africa,”
which offered Sékou Touré as the sole mouthpiece of the continent. By April 1959, longtime
editor Louis Martin had left the Defender, interestingly to assist newly independent Nigeria with
creating a media infrastructure, and a February 28, 1959 article announced L. Alex Wilson
Wilson as the new editor-in-chief. 230 Wilson had “gained national and international attention
during his coverage of admission of Negro students to Central High school [sic] in Little
Rock.”231 Readers may have remembered Wilson – he was the reporter beaten during riots over
school integration in Little Rock on Sept. 23, 1957, and his photo appeared in news outlets
across the nation the following day. The New York Times included a front page article with the
headline “President Threatens to Use U.S. Troops, Orders Rioters in Little Rock to Desist; Mob
Compels 9 Negroes to Leave School,” which included a photo of Wilson being kicked with the
caption “Violence in Little Rock: Alex Wilson, Negro reporter, is kicked at Central High by
white man holding brick.”232 Additionally, Wilson had served as a United Nations war
correspondent during the Korean War.
Under Wilson’s guidance, the story of decolonization in Africa continued to be told
through the lens of the African American experience. Colonialism was about racism, and it
“subjugated the black man, altered his cultural pattern, destroyed in many instances his
possibilities of development, used his wealth, taken his land, his power and dominated his
thoughts.”233 Although the April 1959 article states, “African leaders are as one in their
objectives,” it singles out Sékou Touré as the leader of the move toward independence. “To-date

70

the most forceful spokesman for African nationalism is Sekou Toure, President of the young
Republic of Guinea. Youthful (37), very dark, with deep-set brooding eyes and a striking
presence, President Toure is one of the major personalities to be reckoned with in the great
upsurge which is underway.” Through looking only at Sékou Touré (no other African leaders
are mentioned in the article), and claiming that all African leaders were of one mind, the article
oversimplifies the range of political situations and opinions of African leaders, and obscures
those of African peoples. Even within the French Community, the conflict between Senghor and
Houphouët-Boigny concerning federation and confederation shows that leaders were not “of one
mind,” and Sékou Touré certainly did not speak for all of them anymore than he did for the
continent as a whole. Again, we see the development of the myth of Sékou Touré. Further
condensing the continent into a monolith, the writer states:
African leaders are as one in their objectives. They want independence and unity. They
are leading a revolution in the name of all, unjustly enslaved and frustrated by centuries
of colonization … It is evident that Africa will have to evolve revolutionary principles
that are best suited to her conditions and experience. Such principles may be radical, but
not necessarily Marxist. First of all there is no class problem. There exists one and same
class – that of the dispossessed.234
This op-ed presents a Manichean view of the political, cultural, and socio-economic
conditions in Africa in 1959, a counter to the colonialist view of Africa and Africans as divided
and burdened by cultural, technological, and political deficits.
While Sékou Touré earned a significant amount of coverage in the Defender during
1958 and 1959, de Gaulle earned more. As the Defender strove to cover struggles around racism
and colonialism, de Gaulle remained a person of international interest whose decisions could
have important consequences for Africa. Speculation over his return to power and what it could
mean for Africa earned a June 2, 1958 article, which worried that “If Gen. Charles de Gaulle,
who has been called to power, assumes the ugly role of a dictator, as some observers are
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predicting, the French African colonies will see an indefinite postponement of their fervent wish
for self-government.” However, the article presents de Gaulle’s post-war progressive ideas
toward outdated colonialism as possible indication that “Africa and France may see brighter
days.” 235 Regardless of what de Gaulle’s assumption of power would mean for Africa, columnist
Robert G. Spivack considered de Gaulle’s effects on France. In his June 4, 1958 syndicated
“Watch on the Potomac,” which he wrote as the Washington correspondent for The New York
Post until 1961 when he was able to independently syndicate it, Spivack depicts de Gaulle as a
leader with a “father image.” France had a need for a hero to come to the rescue, and de Gaulle
fit the bill. De Gaulle could bring his strength, stubbornness, and steadfastness to alter the
character of France into that image as well. Spivack, who later called himself “‘a strictly old
fashioned liberal, not one of these new Leftists’”236 reviewed France’s many problems including
a history of invasion by Germany, the impending loss of empire and fighting in North Africa,
explaining that Frenchmen saw de Gaulle as bringing hope back to France. Thus, France was
weak, but de Gaulle was strong. The hope would be for France to become de Gaulle-like,
because truly they were one and the same. “It was once said of the French general: De Gaulle
does not think of himself as a Frenchman. He thinks of himself as France.”237 It is unclear
whether this statement would have reminded readers of the Sun King’s pronouncement, “L’état
c’est moi,” but the idea of an all-powerful ruler is implicit in Spivack’s writing.
Spivack continued to write about de Gaulle, dedicating his September 22 column to an
examination of the proposed French constitution. Again, he equated the general and the hexagon,
writing, “Yet, de Gaulle is the personification of France. Some say if you understand him, you
understand France.”238 According to Spivack, during his three months in office, de Gaulle “does
seem to have brought more order,” and while the constitution invoked fear because it “places too
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much authority in the hands of the chief executive,” the concern was not with de Gaulle’s abuse
of power, but “that they provide a springboard for some future French Hitler.”239
In column inches in the Defender and in actual fact, de Gaulle’s sphere of influence, thus
his claim to news coverage, was greater than Sékou Touré’s. During the year from June 1958
through June 1959, de Gaulle earned coverage in about five times as many Defender articles as
did Sékou Touré, even being included in articles about Africa when Sékou Touré was not. For
example, the August 18, 1958, “Rough Going From Africans” detailed the dashing of de
Gaulle’s hopes for federation by “the mounting wave of demands for independence” from
territorial leaders.240 The Defender continued to follow de Gaulle’s journey toward referendum
and covered his Africa tour, including two articles from UPI on August 26: “Fear DeGaulle
Losing Bid to Hold Colonies” and “De Gaulle Wins, Loses In Africa.”241 The articles describe de
Gaulle as “looking vigorous,” winning “thunderous ovation,” and receiving the respects of local
chiefs while the crowd shouted “‘vive De Gaulle.’” Nevertheless, de Gaulle is said to have failed
in rallying support among the local politicians and only “bucking a seemingly irreversible drift
toward independence in the African territories.”242 Reportage two days later comes from Dakar
where de Gaulle faced “the roughest reception experienced so far,” as “[t]housands of
Senegalese roared ‘De Gaulle, go home’ and ‘we want independence.’”243 In response, de Gaulle
told the crowd to take their independence if they wanted it, but he “warned independence would
mean the end of French aid.”244 De Gaulle’s attitude and countenance display paternalism, he is
again a father ready to scold his “roaring” children. A photo included in the same edition shows
de Gaulle holding his arms up in a V-shape, possibly for “victory,” although the caption again
details the negative aspects of his reception in Dakar.
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His success in France notwithstanding, de Gaulle does not win favor when placed in
opposition to Africa and African leaders. The Defender took a stern stance against racism and
colonialism as similar forms of oppression. Months later, after Guinea’s independence, the
Defender criticized de Gaulle for his questioning of the votes cast by the United States in the
United Nations – one in favor of Guinea’s seat in the international organization and the other
concerning Algeria. When U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles does not challenge de
Gaulle’s attitude, the Defender questions Washington’s commitment to “the rewarding principle
of self-determination.”245 While Dulles remains idle, the Defender demands why there should be
any question of Guinea’s right to a seat in the U.N.
De Gaulle’s question on this point raises a grave moral issue. Was France half-hearted in
its gesture of free choice to the African colonies last September? Is de Gaulle entertaining
measures of reprisal against the colonials that chose independence? These are disturbing
issues that call for a re-assessment of the political philosophy of [de Gaulle]…246
The coverage of de Gaulle in the Defender at a critical time in France and Africa’s
history serves to show two sides in conflict with each other. Continually imagining Sékou Touré
in positive ways, even when inaccurate, the coverage of this national leader sometimes
unintentionally relies on colonial discourse and leans on the image of the noble savage. In
contrast, de Gaulle takes on the character of a stern oppressor who loses despite the constitution
having been ratified by 82.6% of French voters throughout the Union. Furthermore, in the
Defender coverage, de Gaulle’s paternalistic attitude mirrors that of a colonial power.
2.5

Conclusion
The mainstream press, as evidenced by news weekly TIME magazine’s 1958 coverage of

Sékou Touré, was eager to show independent Africa’s potential for failure, while coverage in the
African American newspaper Chicago Defender sought to imagine a bright future for the
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continent, and its coverage of Guinea upheld that ambition. Using the “face-off” between Sékou
Touré and Charles de Gaulle to depict a dichotomous relationship between Africa and the West,
TIME posited Sékou Touré, and thereby Guinea and Africa as a whole, as traditional, childlike,
savage, and prone to communism, while de Gaulle represented the values of modernity,
paternalism, and Western civilization. By contrast, the Defender literally defended Sékou Touré
whenever possible, holding him up as a powerful example of Africa’s potential for the near
future. The African American press did not fear black rule in Africa, and through the use of
terms relevant to U.S. history and the Civil Rights Movement, Sékou Touré’s bravery and
bravado towards a former colonial master became a victory for African Americans too.
However, the Defender writers relied on Afro-optimism and even colonial discourse of the noble
savage rather than imagining Sékou Touré as a complex figure with potential weaknesses.
Most noticeable in the Defender’s coverage, Sékou Touré was a symbol of freedom: the
Guinean president was not actually a Marxist, he benefited from full support of his people, and
he represented strength rather than the Draconian rule alluded to in TIME. As his opposite, de
Gaulle stood for Western imperialism and arrogance. Despite his successes, de Gaulle drew
questions about potential constitutional failure, accusations of possible dictatorship, and
reprimands of opposing African freedom and progress.
In both TIME and Defender press coverage, the people of Guinea were obscured, and
Sékou Touré represented the country. Despite the fact that the referendum was a popular vote,
readers of TIME and the Defender could have the impression that Sékou Touré was the only
person voting in Guinea. The role of the teachers, students, unions, and grassroots activists
disappeared as Sékou Touré made decisions for his country. The Defender even published an
article stating that Africans were all of one mind. While the mainstream press helped reify the
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myth of Charles de Gaulle as the savior of France, Sékou Touré was placed in opposition to him.
The coverage in TIME advanced de Gaulle as a figure not equivalent to his people but different
from them, which was what gave him the power to lead. However, in the African American
Defender, de Gaulle represented France and Frenchman, as well as colonial oppression
generally.
As the American public followed the story of independence in Africa, print publications
offered competing narratives of the continent’s future. For mainstream outlets like TIME, the
fear of the failure of self-rule for Africans was expressed in terms of potential for communism
and dictatorship, rolled up in a package of traditional values and primitivism. The person of
Sékou Touré encapsulated these fears, and TIME warned about this “mystical” leader with “old
communist friends” who could be the first of many to too-early grasp independence on the
“impractical” and “impatient” continent. Useful for highlighting Sékou Touré’s Otherness, the
figures of de Gaulle and Houphouët-Boigny represented the height of Western classicism and the
good Westernized African respectively. At the same time, Sékou Touré signified Africa’s
potential for strength and greatness in African American news outlets such as the Chicago Daily
Defender. Willing to defy a leader of de Gaulle’s stature, the Guinean president possessed
“unsurpassable dynamism, courage and aggressiveness.”247 Although some Defender coverage,
specifically that gleaned from UPI, mirrored the attitudes of the mainstream TIME reportage,
when the opinions stemmed from Defender reporters, Africa’s future could not be more hopeful
with its strong leaders like Sékou Touré, its mineral deposits, its honest “natives,” and
burgeoning freedom. Even as the Defender succumbed to Afro-optimism, it offered a hopeful
narrative of Africa that diverged from what was offered by the mainstream press.
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3

LA DANSE MACABRE: THE CONGO CRISIS AND THE ASSASSINATION OF
PATRICE LUMUMBA, 1960-1961
As for the limber, goateed adventurer who in a few dizzy years had skyrocketed from postal
clerk to world figure, Tshombe had only a terse epitaph: "The fuss over this evil man will
soon die down. The people have no memories here. C'est fini."248
Within a few years of Ghana’s independence, Ralph Bunche and others had titled 1960

the “Year of Africa,” as nation after nation gained sovereignty. International attention soon
turned to the mineral-rich Belgian Congo, which celebrated independence on June 30, 1960.
Although Western leaders first found nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba a viable option to unify
the country and lead a stable government, after his unplanned independence speech, the
country’s first Prime Minister acquired a reputation as “unreliable, anti-Belgian, anti-white,
perhaps a communist and probably crazy.”249 With the swift onset of a post-independence
political crisis including a military mutiny and regional secession, Lumumba became a symbol of
everything that could and would go wrong in Africa, and his undeniable political experience
transmuted into a suspected communist orientation. Following Lumumba’s assassination in
January – reported only after it was officially announced by seceding Katanga’s leaders in
February – 1961, U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold intensified the organization’s
military efforts in the Congo. Earlier unwilling to mobilize U.N. troops in the Congo other than
as peacekeepers, Hammarskjold’s staff initiated multiple actions to remove mercenaries and
quell the Katanga secession. On his way to Ndola, Rhodesia to meet personally and privately
with Katanga’s leader Moise Tshombe to seek an end to the conflict, Hammarskjold died in a
plane crash of still unknown cause.
At the time of his assassination, Lumumba symbolized the instability of postindependence African governments and the possibility of chaos if pro-Western leaders did not
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take power. Congo was depicted as primitive, tribal, violent, and incapable of self-rule. “Africa
was coming into the heads of ordinary citizens. Americans learned what they knew about the
continent from Tarzan movies… Good knowledge of experts, such as it was, however, hardly
reached decision-makers, who gave no priority to Africa. Eisenhower tiptoed around the
independence of Ghana and Guinea in the late 1950s and the State Department took its cues from
the Europeans.”250 Rather than acknowledging issues of racism, colonialism, and economic
underdevelopment that lay at the heart of decolonization, U.S. media coverage turned to the
simple dichotomies of the Cold War to make Lumumba’s assassination understandable and even
acceptable. Imprisoned within a Cold War construct, Lumumba’s image in mainstream U.S.
press remained anti-American, radical, and dangerous. A front-page article in the Atlanta
Constitution on February 11, 1961, originating from UPI, labeled him “the pro-Communist
Lumumba” and stated, “Dead or alive, Lumumba threatened to plunge The Congo into civil
war.”251 Once the “official” story of Lumumba’s death had been delivered by Katanga Interior
Minister Godefroid Munongo, TIME magazine reviewed the situation in Congo, reminding
readers that Lumumba “dreamed of bossing a united Congo in the grand style of … Nkrumah.”
Although he had failed, Lumumba was still the “‘best demagogue around.’”252 As a result, his
assassination was greeted with a sense of relief within many mainstream U.S. media sources.
However, examining the treatment of Lumumba’s assassination in a variety of print outlets with
a range of political viewpoints – from liberal to socialist to communist – uncovers other reactions
to his death and adds depth to his portrayal in the media.
3.1

The Congo in Historical Context
With the world’s second largest rainforest, the Congo was imagined for Europeans by

explorers like Henry Morton Stanley whose “environmental racist determinism” has “contributed
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to the misrepresentations that have pervaded Western perceptions of Africa from the times of
European military conquest up to the present day.”253 Violence characterized much of the
Congo’s early colonial history. Initially the personal territory of King Leopold II of Belgium, the
Congo Free State was a “devil’s paradise” scarred by forced labor to harvest wild rubber and
ivory. The impact of the rubber trade devastated the area. Between 1880 and 1920, the
population decreased by 50%.
Reeling from negative media coverage of Leopold’s Congo Free State by journalist
Edmund Morel and the 1904 Casement Report describing the king’s malevolent regime, the
embarrassed Belgian government took control of the Congo in 1908. It espoused a policy of
“benevolent paternalism” that saw the state, corporations, and the church working together for
capitalistic and materialistic ends. The situation did not improve for the Congolese, who
continued to live through “one of the most draconian colonial regimes in Africa.”254 Congo was
administrated under, to use a British colonial doctrine, a dual mandate to generate profit for
Belgium and advance the civilizing mission. Politically, native chiefs were put in place by the
colonial administrators who (incorrectly) saw native politics as a story of clashing tribes. Small
political units called chefferies (chiefdoms) had reached more than 6,000 by the 1920s when the
administrators began merging chefferies into secteurs, while still selecting compliant chiefs to
lead these larger units.
The Belgian style of colonialism was highly restrictive when it came to opportunities for
the native Congolese.255 Most primary education and professional training was handled by the
Catholic Church, tax imposts were used to mobilize people into the labor force, and internal
migration required a passeport de mutation. Unlike the French and British, the Belgians
maintained an elite class in the Congo without providing Western education. “Worst of all, the
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Congolese elite, carefully groomed and coached by Belgian missionaries and educators, was cut
off from the rest of the world thanks to colonial propaganda and censorship.”256 Years later at the
time of independence, not a single Congolese had been trained as an administrator, lawyer,
judge, or medical doctor. Most economic development in the Belgian Congo took place in
mineral-rich Katanga, which boasted 80% of the railroad construction, and by the 1950s, onethird of the white population in Congo lived in that province. Moreover, the administration in
Katanga reported directly to Brussels, and private investment was encouraged.
After the First World War, a growing number of Congolese began moving to cities where
they engaged with Western cultural and political institutions, and a middle class developed. With
an eye on developments in the neighboring French Congo, évolués started to ask for more
involvement in the government. The onset of the Second World War brought the reinstatement
of forced labor, which had been abolished in the 1930s. Congo’s economic and material
contributions proved critical for the Allies. During the war, Congo’s first African newspaper La
Voix du Congolais was established as an intellectual Congolese elite developed. Following the
war, ethnically based cultural institutions and groups arose in order to maintain traditional ties
within multi-ethnic urban environments. Together with alumni associations (future national
leaders Kasavubu and Lumumba each belonged to one) and cercles d’études et d’agrément pour
évolués (Lumumba led one), these organizations provided prototypes for future political parties.
“Nationalist ideas were not a part of Congolese political life until relatively late, and when they
did appear they were immediately elided with ethnic sentiments and interests.”257
The first proposed plan of independence for Congo included a gradual emancipation after
thirty years during which an educated African elite would be created, and independence would
consist of a confédération belgo-congolaise. Evolués declined this offer, although other
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Congolese agreed in part. Ethnic organizations easily mutated into political parties, and the
demand for true independence was raised. Some parties remained ethnically based, such as
Joseph Kasavubu’s ABAKO, whose membership came from the Bakongo ethnic group, speakers
of Kikongo language. However, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) sought to unify
across ethnic identity groups. MNC became the party of Lumumba who traveled to Accra, Ghana
in December 1958 for the All-Africa People’s Conference and returned with a powerful speech
demanding independence as a right. During 1959, Belgium agreed to hold representative
elections by universal suffrage and to grant independence “without haste.” At the January 1960
Independence Roundtable in Brussels, the date for independence of the Congo was set for June
30, 1960. Since no single political party had the majority, Lumumba and Kasavubu formed an
uneasy alliance and created a coalition government with Kasavubu as President and Lumumba as
Prime Minister.
A metonym for African primitivism since Joseph Conrad portrayed it as the “heart of
darkness” in 1899, the Belgian Congo on the eve of independence “for many Western observers
… symbolized the inherent inability of Africans to rule themselves.”258 At the independence
ceremony on June 30, 1960, Lumumba made a speech that inflamed Western listeners and rallied
the Congolese. The events that soon followed – mutiny of the Force Publique on July 5, military
interference from the Belgian Council of Ministers on July 9, port attacks by Belgian naval
forces on July 11, and the secession of Katanga the same day – imparted to the world an image
of a government not in control of the country. President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba
dismissed each other on September 5, and by September 14, Joseph Désiré Mobutu, at that time
acting as leader of the Force Publique, with the encouragement of the CIA, announced a military
coup and created another national government. Mobutu put Lumumba under house arrest for his
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own safety. Lumumba left his residence, or “escaped,” on November 27 and was captured by
Mobutu’s troops a few days later. Initially, Lumumba was kept at Camp Hardy in Thysville, but
when his movement showed no sign of giving up, those in power sought a different solution to
the problem of Lumumba. On January 17, 1961, Lumumba was transferred with Maurice Mpolo
and Joseph Okito to Elizabethville, the capital of secessionist Katanga and home of his enemy
Tshombe. Today it is known that the three men were assassinated that evening. In 1961, the
world only knew that Lumumba had been taken to Katanga, which was considered a highly
dangerous move by those holding Lumumba. On February 10 came an announcement that the
three prisoners had escaped, and three days later Tshombe’s minister of the interior Munongo
announced that they had been killed by villagers during their flight. He said that “the bodies had
been identified and secretly buried, and that the name of the tribe responsible would not be
revealed for fear of Lumumbist reprisals.”259
Political scientist Kevin C. Dunn has shown that the crisis in 1960 was rooted in conflicts
over Congolese identity and who had the authority to create or define it. This identity
construction had “direct material consequences.”260 In the United States, The New York Times
and other newspapers and magazines gave front-page coverage to the crisis. They did not report
definite news of Lumumba’s death until February, and when they did, they repeated the official
story. U.S. government reactions conformed to Kennedy’s expression of “shock” – even French
press reported “le président Kennedy se déclarait profondément choqué.”261 Although questions
were raised at the time about the accuracy of reporting on Lumumba’s death, there was not much
doubt then that it was an internal affair – more evidence that the Congolese could not handle
self-government.262
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When considering the Congo, the U.S. government and media drew on colonial imagery,
updated by Cold War discourses, according to Dunn. The result was direct intervention by
Washington to “stabilize” the Congo, showing that discourse has the power to shape the
possibility of action.263 And yet, the narrative of Cold War intervention did not exhaust the
stories circulating around the Congo. Some outlets reported Lumumba’s ouster and subsequent
death as a conspiracy while others merely questioned Katanga’s escape story, raising an
eyebrow, but not pointing a finger. For the most part, mainstream media coverage quickly moved
from concern over Lumumba’s death to framing the Congo crisis in the binary structure of the
Cold War and assessing its impact on the balance of power in the East-West clash.
3.2

Cold War in Africa
Cold War scholars including Michael Clough have noted the strong influence the Cold

War agenda had on policy-making toward Africa, stating that because the East-West conflict was
most important, the U.S. commitment to democracy and development often took a backseat. This
meant that after WWII, the U.S. foreign policy agenda was more concerned with stabilizing
Western Europe as a safeguard against Soviet influence than it was with decolonization. In fact,
American policy makers feared that immediate decolonization could lead to chaos and an
opening for Soviet influence. However, once African independence began, the State Department
founded its first Bureau of African Affairs in 1958. Although the Kennedy administration wooed
African peoples and leaders, this increased interest in the continent was still part of the
overarching concern with Cold War rivalry. “American interest in Africa peaked during the
Kennedy era. Although cloaked in the rhetoric of liberal internationalism (and reinforced by a
genuine desire to help fledgling African states), John Kennedy’s eagerness to become involved
in the continent’s affairs was driven by the same geopolitical concerns voiced by Nixon, his rival
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in the 1960s presidential election.”264 Kennedy’s Africa policy meant augmented aid, which went
from $110 million in 1958 to $519 million by 1962. Nonetheless, the entire continent still gained
only a small percentage of total US overseas aid, just 8% in 1962. Clough sees a waxing and
waning of US interest and aid to Africa in line with American perception of the global
communist threat. By 1965, a notion that newly independent African nations retained stronger
ties to their former colonizers than to the Soviets led to decreased assistance.
Historian Peter A. Dumbuya has tracked a more drastic U.S. response to the spread of
communism in Africa during the Cold War and explains that, the United States often overreacted
to potential Soviet influence, by the backing of racist regimes and corrupt dictatorships that
shared Washington’s anti-communist worldview.265 As the United States gave up the Monroe
Doctrine in favor of the Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
claimed that development would halt communist infiltration, and “aid was meant to promote
sound economic development as an important factor contributing to democratic political
evolution.”266 This justified U.S. intervention in African affairs, even as aid and trade remained
low. “From the outset, the United States and its NATO allies overestimated Communist interests
in order to strengthen their influence throughout Africa during the decolonization period.”267
Abdul Karim Bangura found that U.S. aid to West African countries has followed U.S.
economic, moral, and political objectives on the continent, and U.S. policy has been influenced
by “fear of radical nationalism in Africa” or the “Congo syndrome.”268 Subject to U.S. Cold War
objectives and fears, it has been uneven and inconsistent, especially in supporting real, long-term
development.
Turning from a Cold-War lens on U.S.-Africa relations, historian George White Jr. has
highlighted racist underpinnings to U.S. policy toward Africa. While the East-West divide no
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doubt affected American actions, it was racism that drove policy decisions and caused the United
States to shy away from commitments to African development. “The Cold War provided the
perfect environment for the preservation of whiteness. The Eisenhower administration’s
objective was to hold the line during the tumultuous transformation of the 1950s so that the
global stream of benefits and burdens would not change.”269 Part of the reason for the racism in
African policy was that the administration saw foreign relations through the lens of the Civil
Rights upheaval at home. In The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the
Global Arena, Thomas Borstelmann has similarly shown how U.S. foreign policy decisions were
made within the context of the balancing act of pleasing or at least not offending actors ranging
from African dignitaries to Southern Dixiecrats.270 However, for White, the decision about
whose interests mattered most was clear: the normalcy and superiority of whiteness was upheld
unilaterally. According to foreign policy makers, the “only plausible explanations for African
radicalism” of the type that could lead to a character like Patrice Lumumba were “Black
incompetence, insatiability, and blind hatred of Whites, fed by Communist propaganda.”271
3.3

Who Was Patrice Lumumba?
The coming of independence in Africa in 1960, coincided with the deterioration of

relations between the United States and Cuba, and “the revolution in Cuba and the dangerous
Castro were the lens through which American decision-makers viewed the Congo.”272 They
imagined Lumumba as a budding Castro. Recalling that Castro had initially denied communism,
Americans saw his shifting stance as founded on a lie and assumed Lumumba would follow the
same path. Labeling him as fast-talking, militant, and communist ignored his complex ideas, for
Lumumba, like many other Third World leaders, preferred nonalignment. He called his policy
“positive neutralism.”273 In fact, as Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick have shown in their
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new book Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba, “the record shows little to mark
him as a revolutionary,” despite the presence of some Marxist advisors.
American policymakers parenthetically but recurrently noted not the communism of
Lumumba but his unreliability. He was a man whom they could buy but who would not
stay bought … The State Department’s intelligence division emphasized that nothing
substantiated the allegation of Lumumba’s communism or communist sympathies, and
noted his own description of himself as an African nationalist.274
According to Gerard and Kuklick, the most accurate description of Lumumba was that of
a State Department official who called him an unscrupulous opportunist who was loyal to neither
East nor West, and at the same time, likely the most capable and vibrant politician in the Congo.
However, within the CIA, Lumumba’s reputation suffered from much more derogatory
characterizations. Allen Dulles saw Lumumba as anti-Western, which in the 1960s was akin to
being communist. The CIA’s man in Congo, Larry Devlin, argued that if Lumumba remained in
power, it would prove a Soviet victory, and result in a domino effect, influencing surrounding
countries, destabilizing northwest Africa, and eventually causing Italy and Greece to go over to
the East.275 “Basing their projections on an interpretation of Cold War events, Dulles, Devlin …
accepted a scenario of ‘chaos to communism.’ This set of beliefs generalized about how the
USSR manipulated unstable personalities and political situations to make a successful
revolution.”276
Even before independence, the Congo exhibited a level of chaos that worried the
Eisenhower administration into action. Thus Lumumba’s death was not met with disappointment
by the U.S. government. In fact, the CIA had already plotted to kill him. From the moment of his
independence speech, Lumumba had been seen in the West as a precarious firebrand. Denying
Lumumba access to global discursive space enabled Americans to see intervention in the Congo
reasonable and even necessary. Following Lumumba’s independence speech, no international
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publication published an interview with him. He was silenced outside his country, opening up
possibilities for U.S. policy toward the Congo.277 Still, the eyes of Americans and other peoples
around the world were on the Congo. As Lumumba stated in a final letter to one of his wives,
“our poor people whose independence has been turned into a cage, with people looking at us
from outside the bars, sometimes with charitable compassion, sometimes with glee and
delight.”278
Events unfolding in the Congo yielded sensational headlines. After independence, the
Force Publique, Congo’s army, was a remnant of colonial rule still led by Belgian officers and
commanded by Belgian General Emile Janssens. The Force Publique mutinied on July 5, 1969,
and Lumumba attempted to quell unrest in the army with a promise of Africanization and raises.
Stories of disaffected soldiers attacking fleeing Belgian civilians and raping Belgian women
circulated, leading Belgium to send troops to Elizabethville at the request of its regional leader
Moise Tshombe. “Over the next week the Belgians intervened in more than twenty places. As
they did so, Lumumba and Kasavubu desperately cast about for a way to replace the
Belgians.”279
When Lumumba visited the United States and Canada in July 1960, he was told by both
governments that assistance from them would be funneled through the United Nations, but the
organization proved unhelpful. U.N. neutrality led to Lumumba’s fateful decision in late August
1960 to accept military transport from the Soviet Union in order to get his troops to areas under
rebellion. Examining new sources, Gerard and Kuklick show that various international parties
encouraged Kasavubu to dismiss Lumumba, which he did on September 5. “The Belgians
advised Kasa-Vubu about what they considered a coup d’état, but Kasa-Vubu used the UN to
carry it out.”280 These details are new, but even as early as 1968 Conor Cruise O’Brien, a U.N.
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special representative in Congo’s Katanga region during the crisis, had stated, “Whether or not
U.N. officials played a part in the shaping of Kasavubu’s coup, there is no doubt that they did
what they could to make the coup a success.”281 When Lumumba dismissed Kasavubu in turn, a
stalemate ensued until chief of staff Joseph Mobutu declared on September 14 that he was
neutralizing both of them as well as parliament. Mobutu’s “coup” resulted in “the definitive
ouster of Lumumba, the suppression of the Parliament – in which Lumumba still had a majority
– and the expulsion of the Russian and Czech diplomatic missions.”282 At each stage, the U.N.
“officially” remained neutral:
The United Nations protected him [Lumumba] for a time, “at his residence” – i.e. as long
as he kept out of politics. When he left his residence, and was apprehended by those who
later handed him over to his murderers, the United Nations could have intervened to save
him, but in fact washed it hands of him. “As Mr. Lumumba had left on his own
responsibility, orders were served to U.N. troops to refrain from any interference in
regard to Mr. Lumumba’s movements or those of his official pursuers.”283
According to O’Brien,
Hammarskjöld’s policy towards Katanga, culminating in his decision to bypass the Prime
Minister of the Congo in order to negotiate direct on 12 August 1960 with the President
of a seceding province of that country, and the use made of this in secessionist
propaganda were the factors that provoked Lumumba in his fatal step of calling for
Russian aid, in order to transport his troops to Katanga.284
O’Brien references international relations scholar Catherine Hoskyns, who worked with
anonymous sources, and reports that at the news of Lumumba’s capture Ghanaian U.N. troops
had asked to rescue him, but their proposal was refused.
After his imprisonment and assassination, Lumumba’s image in the Congo, Africa, and
many other parts of the world, became martyr-like. Literary evidence of this could be seen as
early as 1968 in O’Brien’s play “Murderous Angels” and continues in the present day. Haitian
filmmaker Raoul Peck has twice visited the subject of Lumumba’s downfall, first with the 1990
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documentary “Lumumba: La mort du prophète” and then with the 2000 feature “Lumumba.”
Peck’s documentary title makes his position clear. In his biopic, viewers meet a sanitized version
of the leader, which avoids complexities such as Lumumba’s summer 1960 visit to Washington,
D.C., which earned ire from Belgians when Lumumba slept in the same bed that the King
Baudouin had used, and Canada, when he met with the Soviet as well as Canadian officials.285
Further, Peck depicts Lumumba in romantic terms as a family man, but as writer Ludo de Witte
explains in The Assassination of Lumumba, his final letter may have been intended for his fourth
wife Pauline Opango or his third wife Pauline Kie, who visited him during his imprisonment in
Thysville.286 In fact, the letter begins, “Ma compagne chérie,” rather than “Ma femme
Pauline.”287 He was something of a ladies man, according to Gerard and Kuklick. Peck’s desire –
or need – to portray Lumumba as more prophet than politician, illuminates the position
Lumumba still occupies. “The name and fate of Patrice Lumumba have really reached the minds
and hearts of millions of Africans… For those who loved him, followed him and mourned him,
Lumumba represented the rejection of slavery.”288
3.4

Lumumba’s Ghost
Following the announcement of Lumumba’s murder – confirmation of what most

assumed would or already had happened – on February 13, 1961, protests broke out around the
world. “Some Western commentators, pointing to Lumumba’s leftist links, denounced the
demonstrators as communist-inspired.”289 Focusing specifically on the “riots” at the U.N., James
Meriwether has reviewed mixed reactions to the protests in the African American press, finding,
“Not surprisingly, black Americans themselves differed in their views of the protests at the UN.
Indeed, black responses to the U.N. demonstrations further demarcated the widening rifts within
black America over the scope and meaning of the domestic freedom struggle, as well as over the
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relevancy of Africa.”290 This spectrum ranged from conservative voices stressing their
Americanism – for example, Atlanta’s Daily World’s calling the demonstrations “nothing short
of ‘a disgraceful spectacle which will not help the cause of our race,’” coupled with a warning
“not to be duped by communists” – to more militant voices, such as columnist James Hicks
writing that the actions at the United Nations were justified and whose “stance received ringing
endorsement from readers of the Amsterdam News.”291 The divide was real:
Even as organizations like the NAACP recognized the importance of African
independence movements and the broader struggle against white supremacy … many of
these liberal activists remained wary of black nationalism, leftism, and militancy. They
worried about possible negative fallout from the actions of the demonstrators, and
distanced themselves from the events at the UN.292
According to Penny Von Eschen, this attitude aligns with the centrist position the
NAACP espoused as a survival mechanism during the 1950s. Closing her narrative in 1957, just
at the moment of Ghanaian independence, she shows that Cold War pressures put an end to the
heyday of black anticolonial politics of the 1940s. In the Cold War context, the rhetoric of
antiracism and anticolonialism had to flow from an explicitly patriotic standpoint.293 In
Meriwether’s telling, while the NAACP’s Roy Wilkins “emphasized the shock and horror caused
by the murder of Lumumba,” he also “attempted to isolate the UN protests from mainstream
black Americans.”294 Meriwether continues:
Conservative gradualists saw first and foremost communism and racialist nationalism and
thus rejected Lumumba. Liberal, pragmatic activists embraced a free contemporary
Africa yet struggled to balance the desire to support and promote an independent black
Africa with wariness about Lumumba. An increasingly militant segment of black
America found in Lumumba a black nationalist hero who had worked unwaveringly to
save his country from Western economic exploitation, neocolonialism, and
dismemberment – a view that reflected the rising tide of domestic militancy and interest
in broader pan-African ties, which in coming years would seep more deeply into both
cultural and political realms.295
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Historian Brenda Gayle Plummer paints an even more complex picture by including a
broad variety of sources, asserting that “black America” was always diverse and comprised many
voices. When Africans and African Americans threw eggs at the Belgian embassy after news of
Lumumba’s assassination went public, Wilkins could claim that the (global) protests did not
represent the “American Negro.” However, despite denials, “black opposition to the handling of
the Congo crisis remained widespread.”296
Mainstream newspapers and magazines picked up news of Lumumba’s death and the
resulting protests, seeking to “minimize the growing restlessness and militancy in black America
and the relationship of these sentiments to events in Africa.” Following Lumumba’s death,
Newsweek conducted interviews and “blithely concluded, ‘Responsible Negros want no part of
the “black nationalism” movements that have proliferated in the Negro community in recent
years.’” But Meriwether notes that James Baldwin “eloquently expressed the fallacy of
Newsweek’s position” in a New York Times Magazine article in March 1961, illustrating the fact
that mainstream press sometimes presented multiple and dissident viewpoints.297
Although Death in the Congo offers a well-rounded picture of Lumumba and the other
actors in this danse macabre, Gerard and Kuklick conclude that “contingency, confusion,
duplication of labor, and bungling” rather than simple conspiracy, shaped his fate.298 Many
scholars and artists have expressed outrage at what happened to Lumumba. In his seminal work
on Lumumba’s death, Ludo de Witte describes an interview with Belgians who were involved in
one way or another: “Not one of these Belgians, in positions where they could have influenced
the course of events, expressed a single word of regret for the three nationalists, not a single
word!”299
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A director in the U.N.’s Division of Political and Security Council Affairs during most of
1961, Conor Cruise O’Brien first wrote To Katanga and Back, published in 1962, before he was
moved by Catherine Hoskyns’ 1965 The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-1961, to
consider the role of the U.N. in the Congo and Lumumba’s death in a new way through the
medium of theater. “The germ of Murderous Angels is the conception that Hammarskjöld, for
exalted and convincing reasons, and in the service of humanity deliberately brings about the
downfall and refrains from preventing the death of Patrice Lumumba, which in its turn
precipitates his own downfall and death.”300 Even after the death of Lumumba, the Congo crisis
continued to rage. Given the Congo’s mineral wealth, Washington determined its interests would
be served by taking a lead in the country’s affairs.
3.5

The Congo Crisis in Print
This chapter focuses on editorial commentary on of the meaning and ramifications of

Lumumba’s imprisonment and assassination in print publications across a wide political
spectrum. Beginning with the establishment and moving to the left, I show how policy and
opinion journalism on Lumumba illuminates the story of the Congo and its importance in the
Cold War 1960s. As previous scholars have shown, the Eisenhower administration, diplomats,
and intelligence agents in Congo were hostile towards Lumumba. They saw him at the time and
later in their memoirs as uncontrollable. From Lumumba as an individual to the Congo as a place
– that it was a sovereign nation was up in the air – we will see that Lumumba was easily
discredited within some media sources to the extent that his death was regarded with indifference
or even relief. When Lumumba earned posthumous column inches, he often served as a
metonym for the Congo: unpredictable, incomprehensible, defiant, a Soviet pawn, and a potential
ally of Nasser and Nkrumah. It is the Congo’s need for outside assistance that makes Lumumba a
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liability, because he does not accept Western direction and seems open to other troubling
relationships.
While the newly inaugurated President Kennedy, claimed to be “shocked” by
Lumumba’s death, the voices of American policy makers were not raised in his defense.301 The
ghastly episode became an opportunity to bash the Soviets as well as justify U.S. intervention in
Africa and elsewhere. But if Lumumba served as a Cold War punching bag for some, how did
coverage and commentary differ in publications espousing liberal and leftist politics?
To set the gauge for comparison, I begin with Foreign Affairs. Filled with lengthy articles
each month, the journal tackled the global topics of the day. Readers included government
officials, opinion makers, experts, journalists, writers, reporters, and academics, who appreciated
its in-depth coverage of events and issues almost before they happened. Foreign Affairs editor
Hamilton Fish Armstrong selected the future of the United Nations as a critical question to be
examined in the April 1961 issue. He used the “crisis precipitated by the death of Patrice
Lumumba” as the starting point to question the U.N.’s survivability if the Soviet Union could not
check its desire to control the organization.302
Touted as a publication of liberal America – President Kennedy was photographed
holding a copy – The New Republic opened its February 27, 1961 issue with a hopeful article
“Reprieve in the Congo?” A three-page opening to “The Week,” the views contained in the
article can be attributed to the editorial staff, led by editors Gilbert A. Harrison and Helen Fuller.
Its optimism was characteristic of a liberalism that believed it had “the best and the brightest” on
its side and could lead the world as well as the United States.
To the left of liberalism, there were stirrings in ideas and activism that had not been seen
since the mid-1940s. These stirrings were evident in both the badly shaken “old left” and the
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youthful “new left.” In March 1961, editors of the independent socialist magazine Monthly
Review questioned President Kennedy’s “New Labels for Old Products” in their “Review of the
Month.” Concerning foreign affairs, editors Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy determined that
while “the new administration has most insistently proclaimed its intention to adopt new
policies” regarding the Congo and Laos, there was nothing “new” to be found.303
The Communist Party’s Political Affairs magazine also took notice of events. It refused
to accept the official version of “The Murder of Lumumba” in the March 1961 “Notes of the
Month.” Perhaps surprisingly, under editors Herbert Aptheker and Hyman Lumer, Political
Affairs removed the Congo from the Cold War binary and reported that the conflict in the Congo
was “no struggle between rival factions, hostile tribes or ‘pro-Communist’ and ‘anti-Communist’
leaders.”304
These media outlets encompass a diversity of political orientations from elite to liberal to
radical. Their editorial angles may align with the official lines of the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations or veer to condemnations of the United States and the United Nations. Given the
polarization around U.S. foreign policy later in the decade, it is instructive to trace the widening
of the spectrum years earlier.
3.6

Foreign Affairs
Editor for fifty years by the time of his retirement in 1972, Hamilton Fish Armstrong

helped make Foreign Affairs, published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “the most
influential magazine for the analysis and debate of foreign policy and economics.”305 Armstrong
was twenty-nine years old when he joined Harvard professor Archibald Cary Coolidge to cofound the journal in 1922. He had already graduated from Princeton, served in World War I, and
taken a position at the New York Evening Post as well as developed the internationalist stance for
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which he would become known. His managing editorship at Foreign Affairs came in tandem
with the executive directorship of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was told by Walter T.
Mallory who succeeded him at CFR, “‘ [T]he Council has been your creation.’”306 Considering
his roles at both the Council and the magazine – the most famous article in Foreign Affairs
enunciated the anti-Soviet strategy of containment – Armstrong must be recognized for his great
influence over U.S. foreign policy.307 A lifetime of travel and access to the world’s political
leaders gave him insight and judgment. For example, he proffered a timely warning of the
consequences of the rise of Hitler in his 1933 book Hitler's Reich: The First Phase.
Born in New York in 1893, Armstrong lived his entire life in the same house and grew up
in a “circumscribed world of ordered privilege whose affluent, well-travelled, and sophisticated
men and women traced their lineage back to the Founding Fathers and their principles to the
American Revolution.”308 Upon Armstrong’s death, President Nixon commented that he had
been a “valuable source of counsel for several generations of American leaders.”309 The
bolstering of the journal and the Council were his life’s work.310 According to historian William
L. Langer, “Under his stewardship the magazine attained a world reputation and an influence out
of proportion to its circulation.”311 In 1923, Foreign Affairs’ circulation was 3,700, and in 1973,
it was 70,000 copies, relatively small when compared to a mainstream publication like TIME that
reported a worldwide circulation of 3,000,000 in March 1960.312 However, Foreign Affairs
reached “centers of policy making and scholarship in every corner of the world.”313 Some of this
influence – gained hand-in-hand with the Council – developed through “numerous study sessions
and discussion groups” that “served the purpose of helping to hammer out an elite consensus on
foreign policy.”314 These meetings helped fashion initiatives like the Marshall Plan and NATO.
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Established in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations is a “noncommercial, nonpolitical
organization.”315 However, Marxist historian Laurence H. Shoup has claimed that the Council
was created to influence the U.S. government and “controls foreign policy on behalf of the
‘capitalist class.’”316 The organization’s history came about from blending leading New York
lawyers, bankers, and “other men of affairs” with the British Royal Institute of International
Affairs, which had been founded by experts from the Paris Peace Conference, so that the Council
became a fusion of the academic and business worlds. “From the beginning the emphasis was on
the influential rather than simple mass appeal,” and the Council’s disclaimer that it did not “
‘represent any consensus of beliefs’” was true in Foreign Affairs’ editorial policy, which
included articles from a range of contributors holding a variety of beliefs and political
orientations. However, “in practice the organization attracted and represented primarily those
elite Americans who had supported American intervention in the First World War and strongly
believed that the United States should have been more involved in world affairs after 1920.”317
Armstrong had claimed that it was the magazine’s policy to include different points of
view so that Americans could “form their own ideas, trusting that native common sense will
gradually develop good foreign policy.”318 At the same time, certain principles informed his
entire career, “and through it the policy of Foreign Affairs and the Council on Foreign
Relations.” His position could be described as modified Wilsonianism with a “concern for
national security and a readiness to use force when necessary, as does his involvement in the
Council’s assistance in developing the policies under which the United States pledged itself to
resist the spread of Soviet influence in Europe immediately after the Second World War.”319
Having been present at the 1945 San Francisco Conference that finalized the details of
the United Nations Organization, thanks to a part-time, non-salaried position with the Secretary
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of State, and serving on the bipartisan American delegation, Armstrong took upon himself the
task of analyzing the condition of the organization’s viability in a 1961 essay in his magazine,
“UN on Trial.” 320 Responding to a remark from the closing of the previous December’s General
Assembly that “‘The United Nations is done for,’” Armstrong uses Soviet reactions to
Lumumba’s death to illuminate some of the problems within the United Nations, most of which
seem to stem from Khrushchev’s aggressive behavior as well as non-aligned nations’ naiveté.
Here, the importance of Lumumba’s assassination is how it fits into the Cold War between the
U.S.-led and Soviet-led worlds. The first malign demonstration of the Soviets was inside the
United Nations:
the manner in which the Soviet block and fellow-travelling states exploited the crisis
precipitated by the death of Patrice Lumumba. They pounced on the killing to attack
ferociously and with preposterous untruth the United Nations itself, its operations in the
Congo, the office and person of the Secretary-General and all countries which recognized
the government of President Kasavubu.321
Outside the United Nations, the Communists then masterminded the demonstrations that
took place worldwide in protest of Lumumba’s assassination: “To add intimidation to calumny
they organized attacks on foreign embassies (including in some instances those of the United
States) in capitals where no public act can be spontaneous and the only demonstrations possible
are those approved by the government itself.”322
According to Armstrong, the United Nations is under attack by the Soviets who are using
Lumumba’s murder as a means to accuse the organization and Secretary-General Hammarskjold
of wrongdoing, which he claims to be erroneous. The Communists are also using the event to
lure support from “a considerable group of African and Asian states” in hopes of demonstrating
to “the American public that the United Nations had become helpless and useless and that
continued membership was a waste of effort and money.”323 In fact, Moscow had attacked
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Hammarskjold on February 4, 1961, branding him “an accomplice and organizer of Mr.
Lumumba’s murder,” some nine days before his actual death was announced by Munongo.
Throughout the essay, Lumumba’s death is viewed only in light of how it might affect East-West
relations and the balance of power in the United Nations. “The murder of Patrice Lumumba gave
the Soviets the opportunity they wished to bring the two forces into head-on collision in
conditions which they hoped would not be favorable to the West.”324
Armstrong had previously grappled with solutions to the balance of power within the
United Nations. In his 1947 book The Calculated Risk, he supported the Marshall Plan,
but also called for the modification of the United Nations charter to allow nations which so
desired to sign a separate protocol under which they bound themselves to come to the aid of
any nation attacked in contravention of any international treaty. This provision was intended
to circumvent the veto power on any United Nations action which its Charter gave to all
five permanent Security Council members, including the Soviet Union.325
The adhesion of many newly independent countries to the United Nations of course
complicated power relations in the Security Council as well as the General Assembly. In the
1961 Foreign Affairs essay, Armstrong’s fear is leftist tendencies in, and the general weakness
and pliancy of, non-aligned nations. At the same time, the Soviet foothold in Africa most likely
will not last:
although the Soviets currently exercise great influence with certain ambitious African
leaders, they must foresee difficulties … Aid programs and anti-colonist oratory will not
be enough to satisfy them once they being vying in earnest for supremacy … Soviet
encouragement of the Pan-African movement has been profitable … but there are
differences within the movement which orators on the theme of “the African personality”
skim over lightly. Already these differences … reveal the outlines of serious future
disputes.326
As the Soviets work to procure allies among the Afro-Asian states, Armstrong recognizes
that the United States has “found itself included in some general mistrust because it has
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maintained links with its wartime allies in defense organizations against Communist aggression.”
Acknowledging that several NATO countries continue to possess colonies, he explains the
dilemma of the United States between weakening its alliances by favoring independence or
damaging the confidence of the “African peoples” by maintaining its alliances. Typically, the
U.S. government has chosen to “straddle the issue, without remarkable success.”327 A case in
point, is the U.N.’s recent Declaration for an immediate end to colonialism, which found the
United States torn between an “innocuous” proposition and the prospect of “more Congos” – the
Congo representing the chaos that could ensue from precipitous independence. In the vote, the
United States elected to abstain.328
Seeking to exonerate the policy of the U.N. towards the Congo, Armstrong reminds his
readers that when the special emergency session of the General Assembly was called to consider
the Congo crisis, “the Secretary-General received a vote of 70 to 0 in support of the policy he
had been following in the Congo.”329 Yet just two months later, Hammarskjold’s actions had
fallen out of favor based on “growing African fear that Belgium was seeking to regain control of
the Congo and that U.N. operations were favoring this result.”330 However, Armstrong justifies
the presence of thousands of Belgian advisors and technicians in the Congo “because only they
could keep necessary public services running.”331 He declines to consider why that might be the
case and does not review old colonial policy that left newly independent Congo virtually without
a professional class. Hammarskjold, Armstrong states, was required to “show strict neutrality as
between Congolese politicians and factions,” but many African states had come to feel that
“what they had favored in principle worked in practice against ex-Premier Lumumba, who had
more and more become a symbol in their eyes of extreme nationalism and, in distinction to
President Kasavubu, of resistance to the former colonial power.”332
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In December 1960, two resolutions had been introduced regarding U.N. action in the
Congo. One from India, which was backed by the Soviet Union, called for the release of “former
Premier Lumumba” and neutralization of Colonel Mobutu’s forces. The second, introduced by
the United States and Britain, called on President Kasavubu to summon a roundtable of
Congolese leaders to work towards reconvening Parliament. Both resolutions failed.333 By
referring to Lumumba as “ex-Premier” and “former Premier” and Kasavubu as “President,” it is
clear that Armstrong recognizes the authority of Kasavubu’s government and found his dismissal
of Lumumba to be legitimate. Further, whatever its level of success, the U.N. mission in Congo
remained vital because increased “anarchy in the Congo” would lead to the “Soviet Union as the
ultimate beneficiary.”334 Again, the Congo’s sole importance is as a Cold War proxy, and “the
killing of Patrice Lumumba” merely a “signal for the Soviet Union to withdraw its ‘recognition’
of Secretary-General Hammarskjold and label him an assassin.”335 By a February 21 vote, the
Soviet resolution to oust Hammarskjold was defeated, and the U.N. Security Council agreed to
“take appropriate measures to prevent civil war in the Congo, including ‘the use of force, if
necessary, in the last resort.” The United Nations could ask for “immediate withdrawal ‘of all
Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and advisers not under the United
Nations command, and mercenaries.’”336 Armstrong’s emphasizes Soviet opposition to
Hammarskjold – “the Soviets had been so outraged by his impartiality in the Congo crisis that
they had promised to destroy both him and his office” – so that one might think Moscow would
be responsible for his death fewer than six months later.337
Closing the essay, Armstrong returns to his concern about the allegiance of newly
independent nations: “we should be able to put ourselves on the side of independence more
clearly than we have done so far.”338 In fact, he advises extending goodwill beyond the General
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Assembly by making personal friendships with diplomatic representatives from these countries:
“many delegates who find themselves in strange surroundings will be as grateful for friendship
and guidance as they will resent being ignored, particularly if they have reasons to imagine that
this may be because of their color.”339 The benefit of forming alliances with non-aligned
countries was diplomatic. After all, the United States and the Soviet Union already have the
power to destroy each other; “what matters is [a neutralist nation’s] political weight in the world
forum where its vote counts equally with the vote of any of the larger powers.”340
Foreign Affairs did not dedicate an essay to Lumumba or to the Congo in 1961. Instead
Lumumba was folded into the larger Cold War between Moscow and Washington, a struggle that
played out continuously within the United Nations and where the “hearts and minds” of
“unaligned” African and Asian nations were up for grabs. The problem for Armstrong was the
“tendency of some newer African and Asian states in the General Assembly to be ‘neutral on the
side of the Soviets.’”341 Thus, Armstrong used Soviet reactions to Lumumba’s death to display
their irascible nature and to make recommendations about how the United States might make
gains in a changing General Assembly. He did not recognize that Cold War skirmishes in the
United Nations could become full-scale battles in the Third World.
3.7

The New Republic
At the time of the Congo crisis, The New Republic was under the control of editor and

publisher Gilbert A. Harrison and managing editor Helen M. Fuller. Harrison served a long term
at the magazine, from 1953 to 1974, and during his tenure, the publication was “a strong voice
on behalf of the civil rights movement.”342 Following initial support of the Vietnam War, the
publication opposed it and criticized Johnson and Nixon. Harrison’s personal history included
supporting inter-religious cooperation at the University Religious Conference, where he met

101

Eleanor Roosevelt who invited him to chair the youth division of the Office of Civilian Defense.
He served in the Army Air Forces in the Second World War and then co-founded and chaired the
liberal American Veterans Committee. With his wife, an heiress and descendant of Cyrus
McCormick, he purchased The New Republic.
Harrison “published an intellectual, liberal but non-doctrinaire journal of opinions,
politics and arts” that, according to reporter Walter Pincus, was a must-read for the liberal left
while Harrison was at the helm. “[T]he magazine … was considered for most of the 20th century
as the leading liberal political magazine in the nation.” 343 Attesting to the magazine’s influence
is the story that the morning after Harrison published an editorial calling for a Democratic Party
challenge to President Johnson, Minnesota Sen. Eugene McCarthy appeared on Harrison’s
doorstep, “with the New Republic under his arm and a light in his eye.”344 Working on the
editorial team with Harrison, Helen Fuller was trained in law and had served as a special attorney
with the Justice Department and as director of the National Youth Administration before joining
the New Republic in 1941. Fuller began as Washington editor and political science director until
she was named managing editor in 1952. Ten years later, Fuller left the magazine to write full
time and soon published Year of Trial: Kennedy’s Crucial Decisions, a review of the president’s
leadership. As we have seen, the magazine’s liberal credentials were confirmed by the fact that
“the dashing, young President Kennedy had been photographed boarding Air Force One holding
a copy.”345
This liberalism was longstanding. Founded in 1914, and backed by banker Willard and
wife Dorothy Straight, The New Republic’s initial progressive orientation benefited from its first
editor Herbert Croly who had already written a “landmark book of progressive reform ideology,
The Promise of American Life.”346 Croly advocated a democracy that would become “a force for
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national organization and achievement rather than timidity and drift. Similarly, in foreign affairs
the United States must break the shell of isolationism and assume a positive and responsible
place among the nations. The New Republic was dedicated to these high purposes.”347
In its early years, the political and social bent of the magazine remained slightly on the
left, and it enjoyed a friendly rivalry for readers with The Nation. Son of Willard and Dorothy,
Michael Whitney Straight took over as publisher and brought in Henry A. Wallace as editor in
1946, aiming to double circulation, albeit not in a cost-effective manner. Wallace departed two
years later to run his presidential campaign, and the magazine endorsed his opponent Harry
Truman. With the onset of the Cold War, The New Republic espoused a more mainstream
American liberalism that was still present when the Congo crisis occurred. A new
hardheadedness “coincided with liberalism’s turn in that very same direction. In those years after
the war” New Republic writers “dispensed with all the old utopian fantasies about radically
remaking society … the United States faced real enemies in the world … The New Republic
insisted on drawing fine distinctions that were actually quite important, the sort of nuance that
was dismissed as mealymouthed by progressives further to the left.”348
According to Franklin Foer, a recent editor of The New Republic, “This is the
combination of styles – passionate but realistic, hardheaded but permissive of idealistic
daydreams – that makes New Republic liberalism so confounding to both left and right. It is a
style that through all the changes in ownership, has never faded.”349 Liberalism of the New
Republic sort, he says, “quibbles with capitalism and our constitutional system – views them as
imperfect and in need of constant improvement – but it has ultimate faith in both.”350
Just prior to the official announcement of Lumumba’s death, The New Republic
considered his imprisonment in the February 6, 1961 “From Jail to Power.”351 The article finds
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fault with “President Kasavubu” who removed Lumumba from power because that action only
gave Lumumba the mystique of martyrdom. By exonerating him from any responsibility,
Kasavubu assured Lumumba’s “symbolic position” as a “rallying point for militant nationalists
all over Africa.”352 According to this article, clearly, it is Kasavubu alone who is at fault; there is
no mention of supporting forces or foreign interlopers in the Congo. While Lumumba here earns
none of his oft-cited labels – leftist, Marxist, pro-Communist, radical – his portrait is not
flattering, for he sits “quietly in his prison cell watching his legend grow” without having to
commit himself to any course of action.353
More troubling than Lumumba’s image in the rhetoric of the article is the accompanying
political cartoon, which depicts two African-looking men in suits staring hungrily into a very
large pot, one holding a big knife and the other a fork. The pot contains boiling liquid, and on the
front states “African Politics.” A caption reads, “Wonder Who’s Rising to the Top Today?”354
Relying on the colonial trope of cannibalism, one that was particularly associated with the
Congo, the cartoon implies that a “native” could don a suit, but would still practice cannibalism,
whether in actual fact or for political reasons.355 This implication of political cannibalism is
fulfilled two issues later when the article “Lumumba’s Murder” looks briefly at the “political
assassination” within “this most troubled of African nations.”356 Bad news for Lumumba, it
seems, who is described as “a very human African national whose association with the Soviet
Union was pragmatic rather than ideological” (it is unclear what the writer means by “human,”
possibly a more polite way to call him “civilized”) but worse news for those who are left to deal
with his successor Antoine Gizenga who is “a far shrewder and more disciplined politician” and
whose “association with the Soviet Union is basically ideological.”357 Nevertheless, if the United
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States can perform “some very expert footwork in the UN,” civil war and an East-West clash in
Congo may yet be avoided.358
A third, this time more substantial, feature appeared the following week. As with the
previous articles on Lumumba and the Congo, the February 27, 1961 “Reprieve in the Congo?”
was included in the regular section “The Week.” However, in this case, the Congo piece led the
section. The tone of “Reprieve” is positive, proffering the idea that Lumumba’s murder has
brought hope despite “pro-Lumumba riots in the halls of the UN by American ‘Black Moslems,’
the violent demonstrations in Lumumba’s memory all around the world, Katanga President
Moishe [sic] Tshombe’s gloating, champagne-sipping interview.” This hope can be seen in the
United Nations.359 From Ceylon and Liberia to Nkrumah’s Ghana, each of the U.N. proposals
under consideration concerning Congo now “directly contravenes Soviet UN Delegate Zorin’s
demand for withdrawal of the United Nations force from the Congo in one month.”360 Each
proposal also supports a stronger UN stance and reorganization of Congolese forces into a
“unified non-political force” under UN auspices. None demands the ouster of Kasavubu.361 The
reactions to Lumumba’s death also show that African leaders are not necessarily pro-Soviet. In
fact “it is the Soviets who have been aligning themselves with the more militant Africans – not
the other way around.” Kennedy’s statement that the Big Powers did not require protection from
the United Nations, but “it is the small countries who have gained in stature and security as a
result of its existence” appears to have had a positive effect, according to the article’s author.362
As the writer rejoices over this apparent U.S. triumph in the United Nations (the
Armstrong article in Foreign Affairs provides a more uncertain assessment of the balance of
power), a sense of acquiescence to U.S./U.N. strategies pervades the description of agreement
from various Africans, both militant and particularist, and the Conciliation Committee. Now that
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just about everyone has realized the Soviet plan to remove U.N. troops and let the Congolese
work out their own political solutions would be a terrible idea, The New Republic advises the
United States to recognize its own culpability: “it is an open secret that the American Embassy in
Leopoldville played an operational role in the consolidation of the Kasavubu regime that went
somewhat beyond the normal limits of diplomacy.” Washington must also prepare for tensions
with some NATO allies – “painful as it may be, we are going to have to fish or cut bait – and
publicly – about Belgian irresponsibility to the whole Western cause in the Congo.”363 The
overarching message for liberal readers of The New Republic is that Lumumba’s death has
opened a real opportunity for the United States, via the United Nations, to aid Congo, secure
allies there and possibly elsewhere in Africa, and thwart the Soviets at the same time: “The
Kennedy Administration knows that the only hope of rescuing the Congo from the brink of
further disaster is by removing it from East-West competition and forging an Afro-Asian
consensus to protect it.”364
3.8

Monthly Review
If Wallace’s departure from The New Republic to run for President felt like a defection,

the election loss of the Progressive Party candidate moved radical friends Leo Huberman and
Paul M. Sweezy to found the independent Marxist journal, Monthly Review. Like-minded
individuals from different backgrounds, Huberman and Sweezy, were offered backing by F.O.
Matthiessen, a friend of Sweezy’s who was a Harvard professor of American Literature and had
recently come into an unexpected inheritance. The inaugural issue of Monthly Review, published
May 1949, launched with an essay from Albert Einstein titled “Why Socialism?” Since that time
– the Monthly Review still appears every month – contributors have included intellectual radicals,
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such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Loraine Hansberry, Cornel West, Jean-Paul Sartre, Fidel Castro, and
the economist Joan Robinson.
Unaffiliated and non-sectarian, the editors’ central goal with the Monthly Review was
“‘the critical appraisal of the capitalist order in the light of reason,’” the important point being
that the publication “stood in fundamental opposition to the whole of the capitalist order –
economic, cultural, ideological, political, and social.”365 According to the manifesto “Where We
Stand,” which was included in the May 1949 issue and reprinted in the first issue of every
subsequent year,
there are still many Americans who believe with us that, in the long run, socialism will
prove to be the only solution to the increasingly serious economic and social problems
that face the United States. It is because we hold firmly to this belief that we are founding
MONTHLY REVIEW, an independent magazine devoted to analyzing, from a socialist
point of view, the most significant trends in domestic and foreign affairs.366
After the initial grant from Matthiessen ran out, the Monthly Review Associates was
established in 1951, made up of subscribers who were also contributors, keeping the publication,
which did not accept advertising, afloat.
From 450 copies of its first issue, the magazine had reached a circulation of 6,000 in
1954, “where it remained until the early 1960s.”367 In fact, the magazine “thrived in the
atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s,” serving “to provide an arc of continuity between the
disintegration of the old left and the emergence of a new one.”368 A 1957 readers’ poll revealed
that most Monthly Review subscribers had higher-than-average incomes, 72% were college
graduates, and 42% had attended graduate school, meaning that, unfortunately, the editors had
not achieved their goal of reaching a broadly working-class readership.369
Called “the nation’s leading Marxist intellectual and publisher during the cold war” by
The New York Times, Paul Sweezy developed his radicalism as a “response to the Great
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Depression” and wanted the government to do more to “offset what he considered capitalism’s
failings.”370 Born April 10, 1910 to a father who was vice president of First National Back of
New York, Sweezy earned his bachelor’s degree and doctorate from Harvard, having also
studied at London School of Economics. During the Second World War, he served as an officer
in the Office of Strategic Services (the pre-cursor to the CIA) and returned to Harvard as an
instructor, but left when he was passed over for a tenure track position in favor of a non-Marxist
scholar. It was thanks to an inheritance from his banker father that he was able to become a fulltime writer and editor.371 During the McCarthy era, Sweezy was tried on a charge concerning the
content of a guest lecture he had given at University of New Hampshire. His appeal went all the
way to the U.S. Supreme Court, where his conviction was overturned on technical grounds.
Sweezy’s co-editor Leo Huberman was an “accomplished labor educator, journalist and
writer of best-selling histories of economic development and labor struggles.”372 He was born in
Newark, New Jersey on October 17, 1903 to parents he called “working intellectuals who
became middle class.”373 Even before co-founding Monthly Review, he had written Man’s
Worldly Goods: The Story of the Wealth of Nations, a book that sold a half-million copies and
uses history to explain economics and vice versa. Unlike Sweezy, Huberman attended public
schools, worked during his vacations, and completed a two-year teacher’s diploma, then taught
as he took afternoon classes at New York University. In this way, his socialism had experiential
roots compared to Sweezy’s largely intellectual commitment. After earning his bachelor’s
degree, Huberman taught at a progressive school in Greenwich Village. He wrote We the People,
a history of the United States from the perspective of the working people and then went to
London to research what would become Man’s Worldly Goods.374 Huberman published several
books on economics and history, served as labor editor of the left-wing New York newspaper

108

PM, and worked in union schools during his off time, even creating a maritime library program.
“Interestingly, the only self-congratulatory quote in [his] brief autobiography relates to the
achievement he most valued in a remarkable career: worker’s education.”375 Huberman also
drew the ire of the McCarthy Committee and appeared in front of it as a hostile witness. During
the last years of his life, he “probed and challenged the ongoing tragedy of white supremacy in
the United States.”376
Sweezy and Huberman received editorial assistance from Paul A. Baran, “probably the
only publicly declared Marxist then teaching in an American department of economics” until
1965. He wrote The Political Economy of Growth, “which explained the enormous discrepancy
between rich and poor nations as the result of the imperialist structure of the world economy.”377
He also co-wrote Monopoly Capital with Sweezy, which was greeted with rave reviews from the
New York Review of Books to The Nation. “For the New Left that emerged at this time it became
one of the fundamental texts.”378
Although Monthly Review pushed for socialist solutions at home, the editors also “saw
the cold war and the construction of the US ‘security state’ as the most formidable threat to
global survival” and asserted that “democratic promise rested in an interracial and international
coalition of peoples breaking free of empire at home and (as it became more and more apparent)
in distant parts.”379 During the Cold War era, Sweezy and Huberman “traveled widely, meeting
with writers and militants” and gave the Third World increased attention. When journalist I.F.
Stone wrote a book about the Korean War, but could not find a publisher, the Monthly Review
Press was created and has “become one of the leading publishers of radical books in the world,”
including books “critical of American foreign policy and unable to find a mainstream outlet.”
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The press has published works by Che Guevara, Kwame Nkrumah, Louis Althusser, Amilcar
Cabral, and many other notable authors.380
With decolonization unfolding throughout the world, the editors “focused more
and more upon empire as the key mode of global development and its hardest-hit victims as the
most likely prospects for challenging the system.” Monthly Review included “World Events” in
each issue.381 Radical scholar and advocate of the simple life Scott Nearing wrote the column
until the early 1970s.382 In the March 1961 issue, he wrote “As the Belgians Continue to Return-” describing how Patrice Lumumba was driven “out of the Congo premiership” while “a certain
reticence was maintained in the West regarding Belgium’s position in the Congo.”383
Nearing explains that a four-part strategy was used to create and exploit the crisis in the
Congo: denouncing Lumumba as a Communist to inspire fears of a Soviet base in the Congo
turned a majority of U.N. member states against him; staging a coup in Katanga; organizing a
military rule in Leopoldville “headed by strong man Mobutu”; and isolating Lumumba from his
Congolese followers. “All of these objectives were achieved under the watchful eyes of the
United Nations police forces.”384 The result was the re-entry of Belgians into the Congo, a
development also discussed, albeit in a more positive manner, by Armstrong in Foreign Affairs.
Nearing describes the events of 1960-1961:
These political maneuvers provided sensational headlines for stories from the Congo.
Behind the scenes Belgian, British, and the United States interests moved swiftly to
violate their promises of Congolese independence and to re-establish their threatened
privileges, first in mineral-rich Katanga and eventually in the entire Congo …
Reoccupation of the Congo by Belgian personnel constitutes an authentic counterrevolution.385
Nearing depicts Lumumba as a legitimate leader of the Congo who has been ousted by
foreign interventionists. He angrily denounces the recolonization of the Congo and blames the
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U.S. government as one of the culprits. His summary of the situation represents a complete shift
from the point of view taken by Foreign Affairs, which depicts the United States working
through the United Nations in the best interest of the Congo, or the New Republic, which urges
foreign intervention to save the Congo from civil war and worse.
In the same issue, the “Review of the Month” section looks at President Kennedy’s
foreign policies just a few weeks after taking office. The title “New Labels for Old Products”
gives away what the editors think about them. According to one of Monthly Review’s recent
editors, Robert W. McChesney, “‘Review of the Month’ is the most important feature of the
magazine.”386 By 1961, this section, which had begun as a “series of short commentaries,”
focused on a single subject, and was written by both editors.387 The editors explained in 1956,
“We try in every case to tackle problems fresh and as a whole … Drafts then have to be
exchanged between the editors by mail, and we often submit them to one or more persons in
whose judgment and knowledge of the particular subject we have special confidence.”388
Focusing specifically on the Congo and Laos, countries where the editors assert “the new
administration has most insistently proclaimed its intention to adopt new policies - no doubt
because it was in these areas that the old policies were most obviously failing,” the March 1961
“Review of the Month” demonstrates the desire among some in the West to keep the Congo
“weak, divided, and permanently exploitable.”389 The article closes with the date February 12,
1961, the day before Lumumba’s death was announced, and the topic of his murder is not
addressed. However, he and his followers are represented as cogent as well as legitimate voices
in the Congo: a federalized government “would be the greatest victory for the colonists and their
stooges, the greatest defeat for the forces of progress in the Congo.” The “forces of progress” are
explained in the next sentence: “There is not the slightest chance that the Lumumbists will fall
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into this clumsy trap, or that Lumumba’s partisans abroad, whether in Ghana or Guinea or the
Soviet Union, will accept anything less than real independence and unity for the new Congo
Republic.”390 The Monthly Review editors do not shy away from aligning Lumumba’s movement
with African radicals and even the Soviets and raising the stakes of anticolonialism. The U.S.
government under Eisenhower and now Kennedy, is ignorant at best, culpable at worst:
It is not impossible that Kennedy and his advisors have only confused ideas about why
recent policies in Laos and the Congo have been failing so ignominiously …
Eisenhower’s foreign policy failed not only in the sense of exacerbating rather than
contributing to the settlement of crises … it also failed in the sense that time and again it
put the United States in the worst possible light in the eyes of the world.391
Nevertheless, if the Kennedy administration cannot help solve problems, it will at least
make American policies “appear attractive” by blaming their failure on the “bad faith and evil
intentions of the other side,” which encompasses the Soviets and Armstrong’s “unaligned”
nations that refuse to side with the West in the UN General Assembly:
the Kennedy administration has neither the understanding nor the will to shape a foreign
policy designed to settle the great crises of our time and thus to end the cold war; instead it will
devote its talents and energies to shaping a foreign policy which will attract the support of the
uncommitted and wavering nations and peoples of the world and in this fashion help to win the
cold war.392
3.9

Political Affairs
The While Monthly Review editor Sweezy has been described as the leading twentieth-

century American Marxist intellectual, Political Affairs editor Herbert Aptheker earned the title
“the most dangerous Communist in the United States” from FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. “A
Theoretical and Political Magazine of Scientific Socialism,” Political Affairs was the monthly
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publication of the U.S. Communist Party (CPUSA), and successor to The Communist since
1944.393
The editor of Political Affairs from 1953 to 1963, Aptheker was a “prolific Marxist
historian” whose long career focused on black history. He was a “dominant voice on the
American left in the 1950s and 1960s” and, like the Monthly Review editors, appeared in front of
the House Committee on Un-American Activities.394 “Through his scholarly work … and in
editing Political Affairs, he carved out a niche for himself in the party as an intellectual.”395 A
longtime friend, Aptheker served as W.E.B. Du Bois’s literary executor and oversaw the
publication of his correspondence and collected writings.
Aptheker was born in Brooklyn on July 31, 1915 to Jewish immigrant parents from
Russia. In 1932, Aptheker drove to Alabama with his father, witnessing the Jim Crow South for
the first time. It was this event that he credited with the birth of his anti-racism. He returned to
the region as an educational worker for the Food and Tobacco Workers Union and served on the
Abolish Peonage Committee, which campaigned against sharecropping.396 Aptheker earned a
doctorate in history from Columbia University in 1943 with a dissertation, later published as a
book, entitled American Negro Slave Revolts. He joined the Communist Party in 1939, having
been introduced by his wife Fay who had already become a member.397 Aptheker served in the
U.S. Army during the Second World War. An academic and prolific writer, he was unable to
secure a university teaching position until 1969 due to his political affiliation.398
During the McCarthy era, Political Affairs struggled to expand its readership due to
“blackballing of the magazine by news outlets, above all in New York City, which limited
circulation of the magazine … to relatively few people, mostly party members.” The party was
hit hard by Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in 1956, and many members left. As Aptheker
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worked to reach new audiences through a broader range of writers, CPUSA Chairman Gus Hall
was displeased. “By the early 1960s Hall’s tolerance of Aptheker’s editorship had reached its
limits: he rejected the inclusion of contributions from nonparty leftists and decided to remove
Aptheker from the magazine,” explaining that although “‘Aptheker projects the correct Party line
in the monthly publication of “Political Affairs,” he never consults the Party leadership.’”399
Following Aptheker’s dismissal, Hall appointed Hyman Lumer as editor; he had served as
associate editor under Aptheker. Earlier a biology professor at Fenn College and Western
Reserve University, Lumer had served as the National Education Secretary of the Communist
Party; he also served an 18-month prison sentence.400 In 1958, he had been convicted of
“conspiring to file false non-Communist affidavits under the Taft-Hartley law.”401 In 1965, still
the editor of Political Affairs, Lumer would publish the pamphlet, “What are we doing in the
Congo?,” a synopsis of U.S. intervention throughout the crisis.402 Both Aptheker and Lumer
were on staff at Political Affairs when Lumumba was jailed and assassinated.
In its March 1961 edition, Political Affairs offers a scathing critique of the management
of events in Congo that had led to the death of Lumumba. Referencing Frantz Fanon, the article
contends that the recent “brutal murders” of Lumumba, Mpolo, and Okito represented an effort
of “dying colonialism to prolong its parasitic existence.”403 Not surprisingly given the
contrasting political orientations of the two publications, this version of the Congo crisis is the
polar opposite of the Foreign Affairs essay, which named the Soviet Union as causing trouble in
the United Nations as Hammarskjold and his supporters worked to quell the native unrest. In
“The Murder of Lumumba,” located in the regular section “Notes of the Month,” the Political
Affairs editors make three main points: Lumumba was the Congo’s legitimate leader as chosen
by the Congolese people; imperialists are the “real assassins”; and the United States plans to
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replace the Belgians to gain access to Congo’s resources. Focusing on the external causes of the
crisis rather than reducing it to an African problem removes the notion of chaos and incapacity
that obscure the dynamics of the situation in the Congo. The editors clarify that the colonialists
are “reaping the whirlwind” of their actions – specifically assassination of certain Congolese
leaders in Lumumba’s movement – and “chaos and confusion in the Congo have multiplied,” but
in Political Affairs, the madness and brutality flow from Western imperialism rather than African
nationalism.
“It was Lumumba, as the recognized leader of the Congolese people and the symbol of
their inspirations, who blocked the path of the imperialists and their tools, and for that he was
killed,” the article explains. None who opposed him can claim to speak for the Congolese people
– Tshombe is an “undisguised puppet of the Belgians” and the “pro-imperialist roles of President
Kasavubu and his hatchet-man General Mobutu are scarcely less evident.”404 Although
Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba, his action was illegal, and this “usurpation of power was
followed by the equally illegal arrest of Lumumba.”405 On the next point, Political Affairs and
The New Republic agree. “Lumumba only grew all the more in stature” when he was imprisoned.
Yet for Political Affairs, Lumumba’s martyr status that took him from jail to power led to the
“desperate decision to do away with him.”406 The editors give no credence to the idea that
Lumumba was killed while escaping; he was intentionally and deliberately murdered.
The details of Lumumba’s death are “shrouded in mystery and the Tshombe gang in
Katanga has belligerently announced that it intends to keep them that way.” However, the
conflict in the Congo “is no struggle between rival factions, hostile tribes or ‘pro-Communist’
and ‘anti-Communist’ leaders.” Instead, “whoever may have wielded the actual murder
weapons,” the assassins were “Belgian colonists and their accomplices” striving to deprive the
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Congo of true independence.407 Further, Lumumba’s murder, Kasavubu and Mobutu’s
ascendancy, Tshombe’s secession, and the Belgian reentry – “the whole outrageous business” –
were all made possible by “the disgraceful role of the UN forces in the Congo ... under Dag
Hammarskjold” who insisted on following a policy of neutrality even though Lumumba had
asked for help.408 In lieu of aiding Lumumba’s government or even consulting with him,
Hammarskjold “countenanced and supported the illegal actions of Kasavubu and Mobutu” and
has allowed Tshombe to defy the United Nations by building an army of mercenaries. And the
organization persisted in its course “despite repeated protests in the UN by Lumumba, as well as
by the Soviet Union and other countries.”409 These protests are likely some of the vociferous
outbursts by Khrushchev that had so offended Foreign Affairs editor Armstrong.
Finally, Political Affairs enlightens readers about the true objective of the United
Nations’ unjust decisions. While the editors’ disdain for Hammarskjold is apparent, they admit
that he “has not acted on his own, but as the faithful servant of the imperialist powers in the UN
– above all the dominant power, U.S. imperialism.”410 The Congo crisis is a conflict created by
neo-colonialist forces and projects. The United States intends to “restore imperialist control in
the name of the UN, in order to replace Belgium as the dominant power in the Congo.” The
editors state that this is the reason Washington has recognized Kasavubu’s government and
allowed his seating in the United Nations, although Gizenga “alone represents the true interests
of the people.”411 Kennedy and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson insist
on “retention of the UN troops in the Congo, on the basis of the same false ‘neutrality’ as before”
because what is really at stake in the Congo is profitable access to the nation’s strategic mineral
resources.412
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As a solution, Political Affairs supports the proposals of the Soviet Union, which would
be to remove Hammarskjold, back Gizenga, drive out the Belgians and mercenaries, and disarm
Kasavubu and Tshombe. In direct opposition to the assessment of Foreign Affairs, these editors
state, “The United States and its supporters in the UN self-righteously charge the Soviet Union
with seeking the UN’s destruction. But it is those who have acted to convert it into an instrument
of imperialism who are wrecking it as an instrument for world peace.”413
Aptheker, a scholar of black history, continuously confronted racism and racist histories
and was ideally suited to consider Congo’s right to independence in fact, not just in name. His
obituary in The Guardian noted his challenge of U.B. Phillips’ early-twentieth-century racist
history, in which blacks were portrayed as “passive, inferior people whose African origins were
devoid of civilsation.” Aptheker countered with an image of Southern history defined by “‘the
drive of the rulers to maintain themselves in power, and the struggle against this by the
oppressed and exploited.’”414 He likely saw the same factors at work in the struggles over
colonial domination and national liberation in Africa.
3.10 Conclusion
Conflict continued in Congo after Lumumba’s death. As Kasavubu reconvened the
government, with Cyrille Adoula as prime minister, U.N. troops moved to take control of
Katanga and expel its mercenary army. In September 1961, Hammarskjold was on his way to
meet Tshombe in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia when his plane crashed in suspicious circumstances.
Secession in Katanga – and fighting – continued until 1963. Rivalries for power also persisted,
and the “internal situation in the Congo generally remained unsettled.”415 In 1964, President
Kasavubu welcomed Tshombe into the government, and Tshombe released hundreds of political
prisoners, including Gizenga, in hopes of reconciliation. However, rebels throughout the country

117

continued to strike. The dwindling U.N. forces left the Congo in mid-1964, at which time
Mobutu claimed that his army was “capable of maintaining order.”416 In 1965, Mobutu staged
another coup, deposed Kasavubu, and assumed the presidency. Although he initially stated that
he would hold the presidency for five years, Mobutu led the country, which he later renamed
Zaire, for more than thirty.
The political machinations that enabled Mobutu’s ascendency did not occur without the
involvement of foreign powers. Historian Piero Gleijeses has shown how even Cold War events
cannot be reduced to East-West conflicts. In the case of the Congo, the United States, Cuba,
Tanzania, South Africa, Rhodesia, and Egypt played parts in the ongoing crisis.417 Nevertheless,
U.S. print media coverage of the Congo crisis and death of Lumumba often offered a reductionist
account of actors and events. By examining a range of media providing coverage of the same
situation, a more nuanced story begins to emerge.
Some publications, including The New Republic, relied on colonial tropes to connect
readers to events taking shape in the Congo. From the political cartoon reimagining cannibals in
suits to the idea that the Congo needed assistance from the West. The New Republic seemed to
suggest that the liberal notion of modern progress could be exported at least partially to Africa.
For Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Lumumba and the Congo crisis were Cold
War conflicts that could best be resolved on the battlefield of the U.N. General Assembly floor.
The United States needed to gain support from Afro-Asian nations in order to ensure that the
balance of voting power would be on the side of the West rather than the Soviets. Some of
Armstrong’s assumptions and estimates appeared in The New Republic as well, as the editors
were encouraged by various proposals that promised to counter Soviet plans. Neither of these
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publications recognized Lumumba as the Congo’s legitimate leader, or mourned his dismissal,
detention, and death.
By contrast, for the editors of both Monthly Review and Political Affairs, Lumumba was
the rightful leader of the Congo as chosen by the Congolese people. His overthrow was illegal,
and his murder was an assassination. Rather than casting blame on the Soviets – who were
depicted by Foreign Affairs and The New Republic as trying to stir up trouble – the left-wing
editors pointed to the United Nations. While Monthly Review discussed the British, U.S., and
Belgian forces working behind the scenes of the United Nations activities in Congo, Political
Affairs more boldly stated that U.S. imperialists were the culprits and were preparing to replace
the former colonial power with a new brand of neo-imperialism.
While the three other publications largely considered the Congo through the lens of the
Cold War, Political Affairs surprisingly offered the only view that removed the Congo crisis
from the Cold War binary and positioned it as a neocolonial maneuver driven by the United
States. For Aptheker and Lumer, events in the Congo must be viewed in the harsh light of
imperialism and racism. Adding this voice to the Congo story problematizes the justification for
U.S. intervention in the Congo, the ultimate result of which was to solidify Mobutu’s power for
decades to come. In the United States during the 1960s, disregarding the Cold War would have
been viewed as picking the wrong side. Already known for choosing communism, for which they
each paid a price, the Public Affairs editors offered a bold as well as critical story of
decolonization in Africa, even if only to their small readership. If American Communists could
think outside their own box in the early 1960s, an even wider spectrum of voices on West Africa
would emerge in the years to follow.
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4

AFRICAN SUCCESS, FAILURE, AND FAMINE – INDEPENDENCE FOR
BIAFRA OR CIVIL WAR IN NIGERIA?, 1967-1970

[T]here is something about the discontinuity of events and the day-to-day reporting of news
that always seems to make either too simple or too mystifying the altogether anomalous
predicament of Biafra. 418
Africa’s most populous nation faced the challenges created by the arbitrary borders and
ethnic divisions that had been exacerbated during colonialism when the January 15, 1966
military coup in Nigeria led to the execution of the Northern Hausa Prime Minister and the
installation in his place of southeastern Igbo General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. A counter-coup on
July 29 the same year resulted in the coming to power of Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon.
Although Gowon provided an opportunity for compromise because he was both a Northerner and
a Christian, killings of Igbo residents in the North followed the contested inauguration of his
leadership. Ten months later, on May 30, 1967, the Eastern Region under the military
government of Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu seceded, declaring the independent state of Biafra.
Nigeria fell into a civil war, which did not end until January 1970.
The conflict was closely followed by U.S. media. Mainstream media outlets like TIME
provided ample coverage of the crisis, and more importantly for Biafra, photo inclusions. During
1967, thirteen weekly issues of TIME featured inclusions about Nigeria, and following Ojukwu’s
charge of genocide during an Address to the joint meeting of the Consultative Assembly and the
Council of Chiefs and Elders on January 27, 1968, images of starving Biafrans, mostly children,
upped the coverage to seventeen weeks for the year, including a cover featuring Ojukwu.419 How
to locate the war was uncertain. “Nigeria” was the location in the title in most articles, even
when Biafra was the subject. For example, “Nigeria: Agony in Biafra” and “Nigeria: Biafra’s
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Two Wars” were titles in August 1968.420 Seventeen weeks of TIME included the Biafra-Nigeria
war again in 1969, and by that year, “Biafra” earned the dateline more than Nigeria.
While coverage of the Nigeria-Biafra War earned significant placement in mainstream
press, including television, the conflict seemed to secure more interest from the American public
than it did from the U.S. government. This was due in part to sympathy raised by the widespread
images of the starving children that later came to represent “Africa,” so starkly, for example
during the famine-relief efforts of Band Aid’s “(Feed the World) Do They Know It’s
Christmas?” and USA for Africa “We Are the World” campaigns during the mid-1980s.421 While
international agencies like Joint Church Aid and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), as well as the American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive (ACKBA) at home sprang to
the aid of Biafrans, donating funds and supplies for the relief effort, the U.S. government under
both the Johnson and Nixon administrations refused to use its diplomatic influence to promote a
peace settlement or become involved militarily. As Nixon commented, there was a difference
between responding to a humanitarian crisis and getting involved in other nations’ politics. The
United States was willing to do the former, but not the latter.422 Nevertheless, American
organizations quickly emerged in support of the relief effort for Biafrans, which became an
international affair. Journalist Philip Gourevitch has credited news coverage of Biafra with the
birth of humanitarian aid. “Suddenly, Biafra’s hunger was one of the defining stories of the age –
the graphic suffering of innocents made an inescapable appeal to conscience – and the
humanitarian-aid business as we know it today came into being.”423
Many studies have looked at British and international press coverage of the conflict, for
example Adepitan Bamisaiye’s 1974 article “The Nigerian Civil War in the International Press”
in Transition. By contrast, American media coverage has received little scholarly or critical
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attention.424 Although the U.S. government declined military support of either side, the conflict
shows how government policy and press coverage converged and diverged. Whether referred to
as the Nigeria-Biafra War or the Nigerian Civil War, the conflict earned significant attention in
U.S. print media and often served as a lens through which various publications sought to
promote specific ideas on economic development, neo-imperialism, and the United Nations. And
while Washington eventually got on board with the relief effort, the U.S. government did not
take a political position on the war. In effect, it supported Nigeria and its British backers, a
position that, despite efforts by politically minded organizations like ACKBA, typified much
American press coverage.
Where U.S. print media coverage of Guinea’s independence and the Congo crisis had
often singled out leaders as expressions of the Zeitgeist and representative of the will of their
nation and people, the story of war in Nigeria was told less through the personalities of leaders
and took people as the main subjects. “Biafrans” – starving, modern, educated, and righteous –
conflicted with “Nigerians” – represented mainly by the Federal Military Government (FMG).
While the FMG’s Gowon and Biafra’s Ojukwu continuously earned column inches, the Biafran
famine secured more. And if the diplomatic solution remained unclear, the humanitarian need
was unquestionable.
In order to analyze this rift between the humanitarian and the political concerning the
Nigeria-Biafra War, articles in two publications will be considered – the quarterly political and
diplomatic journal Foreign Affairs and the weekly magazine offering a “mix of reporting and
commentary,” The New Yorker.425 Both provided lengthy pieces on “the trouble with Nigeria.”426
While Foreign Affairs coverage early on noticed discontent in the new nation’s government and
near the end of the war featured an essay on political recommendations for the reunification of
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Nigeria, The New Yorker staked its claim in the realm of on-the-ground correspondence, humaninterest with a political agenda, with a significant essay by Renata Adler. In keeping with The
New Yorker’s own trend of serious writing in an age of New Journalism, the type of reportage
produced by Adler could easily have called to mind Susan Sontag’s “Trip to Hanoi” that had
been featured in Esquire the previous year.
Exploring this oscillation between coverage of political/diplomatic and humanitarian
concerns provides a clear picture of how the mass concern felt in America for the Biafrans could
have been coupled with Washington’s refusal to back the would-be independent nation in its
efforts or to step in and put an end to the war. At no time did the U.S. government consider a
solution beyond “One Nigeria,” as will be seen from the recommendations in Foreign Affairs, a
magazine published by the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Moreover, while some
action could have been taken by the United Nations, on the heels of the Congo disaster and
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold’s suspicious death following U.N. action to oust
mercenaries and broker peace, U.N. policy under U Thant lay decisively on the side of nonintervention.
After a hiatus, Biafra has experienced renewed interest. Recent years have seen an
eruption of books and novels depicting the war years, particularly by those who lived through
it.427 The Biafran Zionist Movement is still active, and on November 5, 2012, one hundred men
and women were arrested carrying the Biafran flag through the streets of Enugu, Nigeria.428 Most
recently, a new collection edited by Toyin Falola and Ogechukwu Ezekwem considers the
intellectual history of the Nigeria-Biafra War through an examination of war literature, both
fiction and non-fiction.429
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Scholarly interest in the question of genocide in Biafra has also been renewed, warranting
a special edition of Journal of Genocide Research in 2014, and the crisis with Boko Haram has
even the media looking to the past for answers or comparisons. Nigerian playwright Wole
Soyinka recently invoked the civil war when railing against the election-focused government for
negotiating with fundamentalists rather than fighting them: “‘The threat that this situation poses
for Nigeria is worse than the crisis of Biafra that had almost destroyed the country in the
1960s.’”430
While Soyinka’s statement may be more a criticism of the government than a comparison
of the thousands killed by Boko Haram since its first attack in 2003 to the millions who perished
in the 1960s war, Biafra has not been lost from international memory. Indeed, the images of
starving African children have become a recognizable trope throughout the West, and the first
image that appears on the Wikipedia page for “kwashiorkor” today is a child from the “Biafra
War.”431 Often, the visual of starvation and famine supersedes any need to consider causation.
As Amartya Sen explains, “Famines imply starvation, but not vice versa.”432 Instead, “ownership
of food is one of the most primitive property rights, and in each society there are rules governing
this right.” His explanation is that starvation results from a failure to be “entitled” to a
“commodity bundle” with enough food.433 In the case of Biafra, starvation resulted from war and
a population cut off from food supply lines, but the stark images offered a distillation of
starvation, often omitting its political cause. What is more, the starvation images conform to the
stereotype of African poverty, for as Sen states, “starvation implies poverty.”434 By the
conclusion of the conflict, war had cost Nigeria an estimated $840 million, and two to three
million people had died. During the war, “deaths due to hunger and starvation totaled sometimes
as many as 10,000 a day.”435
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4.1

Background to Biafra
Delineated territorially in 1914 to coalesce the British West African colonies of Southern

and Northern Nigeria, Nigeria gained independence on October 1, 1960 as a federation, despite
many of the nation’s leaders favoring confederation. While Nigeria claimed many assets – a
large population, a fledgling oil industry – the composition of the federation indicated problems
ahead. The legacy of colonialism and the 1914 borders left Nigeria divided among three main
ethno-linguistic groups – Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba – with roughly 250 additional smaller
ethnic groups throughout the country. Reinforcing separate identities, the British created three
regional political divisions along major ethnic group lines. Simply explained, the Hausa-Fulani
Muslims, occupied the Northern Region, which was the largest in square mileage and population.
In the Western Region, site of the capital Lagos, the Yoruba dominated and were a mix of
Christian, Muslim, and practitioners of Yoruba religion. The Eastern Region was mostly
occupied by the Igbo, many of whom were Christian. The Eastern Region gave rise to the largest
population of Western-educated Nigerians as well, so that in Lagos and other parts of the
country, the majority of administrative positions were held by Igbo. “At the national level, the
three ‘mega-tribes’ competed for state resources that had become increasingly lucrative thanks to
the revenues from oil and other commodities.”436
Politically, post-independence Nigeria was divided among three main parties, more or
less congruent with the main ethnic groups and three regions: the Hausa-led Northern People’s
Congress (NPC) in the North, the Yoruba Action Group (AG) in the West, and the Igbodominated National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the East. “These regional based
parties assured two things: firstly that none of the parties could govern Nigeria on its own, and
secondly that ethnic conflict was only a matter of time away.”437 However, while the parties
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were commonly identified with these ethnic group interests, the actual party membership was not
quite that simple, as explained by Richard Sklar:
In Northern Nigeria, the NPC endeavored to reconcile traditional authority in all parts of
that culturally diverse region with the requirements of modern government. Rooted in the
Muslim emirates, the party was never intended to promote a specifically ethnic interest.
NPC policies were generally true to the nonsectarian precept of the party’s regionalist
motto: “One North: One People Irrespective of Religion, Rank or Tribe.”438
In Eastern Nigeria and later the Mid-West, the NCNC
rarely lost an election in the Igbo-speaking constituencies. Yet this party was also
supported by a decisive majority in the preponderant, Edo-speaking, linguistic group of
the Midwest. Furthermore, the NCNC retained sizeable pockets of electoral and
parliamentary strength in the Yoruba-speaking Western Region until 1964. Similarly, the
Action Group, rooted in its Yoruba origins, emerged in 1956 as the foremost party of
‘minority’ group interests in the Eastern and Northern Regions.439
At independence, the NPC, with the largest population, led the federal elections, with
their man Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa taking control as Prime Minister. Detractors
claimed that Balewa was a mere puppet of the Premier of the North, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the
Sardauna of Sokoto. With the South split between the NCNC and the AG, Bello’s “ability to
hold the North together meant that the NPC in essence became Nigeria’s ruling party.”440
Through a temporary alliance, the NCNC’s Nnamdi Azikiwe served first as Governor General,
and then President when the country became a republic in 1963, effectively leaving the AG and
its leader Obafemi Awolowo out in the cold. “Southerners resented the fact that the government
was being ruled by proxy by a regional ruler and viewed Bello as the real power behind the
throne.”441
Within the ranks of the AG, a rift occurred between Awolowo, who favored opposition to
the conservative federal government and Samuel Akintola, Premier of the Western Region, who
asserted that developing stronger links with the federal government was a better strategy.
Akintola led the formation of a new party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP),
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which aligned itself with the NPC and others, later forming the Nigeria National Alliance
(NNA). Due to multiple crises in the Western Region, the government declared a state of
emergency and imprisoned Awolowo. Eventually, the NCNC and AG’s oppositional group
joined forces to create the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) in time for the 1964
elections.
Nigeria was rocked by one crisis after another following independence. Even prior to the
elections, strife among regions developed concerning the census. Since population determined
representation, the Northern Region and southern regions bolstered their population figures. The
North also earned criticism for its practice of counting its entire population, which was roughly
double its electorate, despite the fact that women were not allowed to vote in the traditional
Muslim Northern Region. When the 1964 elections took place, the NCNC partially boycotted
them, allowing the NPC to maintain federal control. According to Richard Sklar, the rigged
Western regional election the following year led to months of violent unrest in that region, which
culminated in the coup d’état of January 1966.442
4.2

Two Coups
Called the Young Majors Coup, the overthrow of Balewa’s government and the

assassination of Balewa, Bello, Akintola, and several others, in January 1966 saw Maj. Gen.
Johnson T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo, assume power. Although Ironsi had not been among the
planners of the coup, many of the coup plotters were Igbo. Once in control, Ironsi appointed
military governors to each of the four regions (the Mid-West had been created out of Western
territory in 1963), including Ojukwu as military governor of the Eastern Region and Gowon as
army chief of staff. Ironsi suspended the constitution and centralized the government, causing
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Northern outcry and threats of secession over what it determined was an Igbo takeover. In May
1966, riots in the North led to the killing of 3,000 Igbo citizens residing there.443
The historian Frederick Cooper describes Ironsi’s government as a simple outburst of
“military populism,” but the major general was seen as an “Igbo power grabber” in the North.
Nigeria’s second coup, in July 1966, overthrew and assassinated Ironsi and other leaders, a strike
viewed in Eastern Nigeria as “an anti-Igbo move.”444 The original intention of the Northern coup
plotters was secession, but the new leader Gowon was persuaded by the British High
Commissioner and the American ambassador that Northern secession would be injurious to that
region’s economy. Immediately following the coup, “the government of Nigeria had virtually
ceased to function and was in danger of totally breaking down, leading to a state of anarchy.
Gowon at that point in time was simply a compromise candidate for the post of military head of
state.”445 However, in the Eastern Region, Ojukwu refused to recognize Gowon’s leadership.
Killings of Igbo in the North resumed in September 1966, and the toll mounted rapidly over the
next several months.446 Northern Igbos fled the region for the East, and words like “pogrom” and
charges of “genocide” began to circulate. “Whether representatives of the Nigerian state
systematically organized the killings remains disputed. At the very least, the Nigerian
government failed to halt the riots.”447
A meeting held in Aburi, Ghana in January 1967 offered an opportunity for leaders to
“settle their differences and compromise over what had become an extremely intractable
problem.”448 However, each of the participating leaders was constrained by circumstances in the
region he represented: the West had recently been in political turmoil, the North had come close
to secession with the second coup, and the East was on the verge of rebellion. Ojukwu was
interested in the future of Nigeria as a confederation, while Gowon wanted to see the unity of the
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army restored and “to pull Nigeria back from the brink of anarchy and total disintegration.”449
According to historian Michael Gould, the smaller indigenous groups “could see that greater
autonomy by the four regions would lead to the denigration of the smaller ethnic groups in
Nigeria” and the North “could see their oligarchic power being threatened should Nigeria
become a confederation.”450 Ojukwu’s view prevailed, and Nigeria became a confederation.
Since Ironsi had appointed Ojukwu military governor of the Eastern Region, he remained in
control there. However, Gowon did not honor the agreements of Aburi.
Scholars today emphasize the role oil played in the Nigeria-Biafra War, but, as we shall
see, U.S. news coverage during the conflict only mentioned the resource in passing. Yet, for
Cooper, oil proved more pivotal than ethnic troubles. “Nigeria plunged into civil war soon after
oil exports began… Eastern autonomy seemed the only way to keep regional hands on the
spigot.”451 Due to the fact that oil requires little labor, much of it from foreigners, and it
necessitates few relationships - mostly between rulers and global firms – “it defines a spigot
economy: whoever controls access to the tap, collects the rent.”452
On May 27, 1967, Gowon announced the division of Nigeria into twelve states, and by
May 30, the former Eastern Region under Ojukwu declared the independent nation of Biafra.
Claiming fear of genocide and broken accords, and in accordance with “the joint session of the
enlarged Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders, after full
deliberation,” Ojukwu proclaimed “that the territory and region known as and called Eastern
Nigeria together with her continental shelf and territorial waters shall henceforth be an
independent sovereign state of the name and title of ‘The Republic of Biafra.’”453 It was not
coincidental that secession quickly followed Gowon’s May 27 division of the country into a
dozen states. The new partition took oil-producing areas, which had previously been located
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within the Eastern Region, out of the section that comprised Igboland, so that the oil was no
longer geographically under Igbo control. Nevertheless, the geographic entitlement to oil was not
asserted as a reason for secession. When Biafra declared independence, its boundaries as claimed
by Ojukwu included the entire former Eastern Region, far outside of Igboland, and incorporating
the oil producing areas as well as Port Harcourt.
Gowon immediately stated that the Nigerian federal government would “crush” the
rebellion. In addition to mobilizing the armed forces and barring “the foreign press from printing
anything detrimental to his government,” Gowon placed an embargo on Biafra’s ports and
discontinued telecommunications links.454 A bomb explosion in Lagos on July 2 was attributed
to Biafran terrorists, and Igbos living there were attacked, causing many of them to leave the
capital city for Biafra. On July 6, 1967, fighting began with a federal attack, and the FMG
considered the conflict a police action that would succeed quickly.
“The FMG’s major strategic advantage was not its military force, but its diplomatic
status: internationally recognized statehood. That the FMG could argue that it was a sovereign
government facing an insurgency was decisive.”455 It allowed for the organization of a blockade
and for foreign governments and international agencies like the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and the United Nations to deem the war an internal matter in which they declined to
intervene. International recognition also meant that Nigerians were able to purchase weapons
through open international trade, while Biafrans relied on the black market. Despite the claim
that the conflict was a civil war and unsuitable for interference from international actors, the
British and Soviets backed the FMG with weapons, while the Biafrans belatedly received support
from the French. The Portuguese dictatorship and South African and Rhodesian apartheid
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regimes clandestinely supported Biafra, supposedly in hopes of weakening one of Africa’s
strongest states. Later, China cast its vote for Biafra, partly to oppose the Soviet Union.456
“Realizing their slim chances on the battlefield, the Biafran leadership moved the conflict
into the propaganda domain.”457 Biafrans put forth representations of their citizenry as modern,
educated, talented, and Christian, while maintaining that the Nigerian government sought to
exterminate them, a genocide that was prompted by jealously and disdain for their
aforementioned positive attributes. Nigerians, it was stated, were fearful of Igbo adaptability and
success. Once the effects of the blockade were in full force, the international press circulated
images of starving Biafran children across the world.
Since Britain was held partly responsible for the genocide claim due to its support of the
FMG, the British government sponsored an internal observer team to visit Nigeria and report on
the genocide issue. During the visit, the Nigerian government did not permit the team to enter
Biafran territory – precisely where the genocide as a result of the fighting and the famine was
said to be taking place. Notwithstanding this obstructed view of events, the international
observers concluded that “genocide was not taking place, and international public opinion
largely concurred.” Further, the conflict was officially termed a civil war.458
By the war’s end more than 30 months later, Biafra had shrunk to a tenth of its initial
territory, and as the FMG stepped up its efforts in early January 1970, “a coordinated effort by 3
divisions” proved too much for the Biafran military. Ojukwu left for asylum in Ivory Coast, and
Maj. Gen. Philip Efiong (Effiong) remained to announce by radio Biafra’s surrender on January
12. The formal document was signed three days later, and while Gowon proclaimed a
reunification “with our brothers,” Ojukwu called “on the world to save the Ibos from ‘complete
annihilation’ by Nigerians” asserting that the government would execute elite Biafrans and fail to
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feed the masses.459 Casualty numbers varied. Journalist Mark Kurlansky reported the civilian
death toll by starvation at one million.460 Other estimates place casualties as high as two
million.461 Hundreds of thousands to a million Biafran refugees were said to be hiding in the
bush and clogging roads.462
4.3

Theory, Methods, and Sources
As Paddy Davies, the Biafran Propaganda Director explained in the 1995 documentary

Biafra: Fighting a War Without Guns, Biafra fought two wars – military and propaganda.
“Biafra was blockaded by air, land and sea, and so it had to no outlet. It therefore had to turn to
propaganda.”463 Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe has detailed his experience as part of the state
propaganda team in his 2012 war memoir There Was a Country. Throughout the conflict, both
sides issued conflicting communiqués, and as political scientist Peter Schwab has shown, cities
were continuously up for grabs as the FMG and the Biafran government would lay claim to
control over various areas. The press often reflected such conflicting accounts, and in a single
news article, mixed messages might appear. News coverage tended to follow only one side or the
other, for instance, accepting or denying charges of genocide. For outlets or reporters interested
in the Biafran side of the story, media coverage mirrored the shifts in the state propaganda
campaign throughout the course of the war. Historian Douglas Anthony has explained that Biafra
positioned itself as modern, the victim of genocide, a neo-imperial pawn, and a casualty of white
supremacy. While promoting Biafra’s modernity and claims of genocide were commonplace in
U.S. media coverage, reporters and editors were less likely to include criticism of Western
imperialism and claims of racism. U.S. audiences consumed images of starving African children,
but not accusations of white supremacy, which would have removed blame for the conflict from
the FMG or the rebels and placed it on Western imperial shoulders.
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Despite conflicting messages, visual images added credibility to reports on the BiafraNigeria War, in particular, those that chronicled the humanitarian crisis. Writers on the NigeriaBiafra War typically boasted some type of authority to speak about the country. Whether a
journalist visiting Nigeria or more likely Biafra, a scholar of Africa, an aid worker or religious
figure, or an actual Nigerian or Biafran citizen, opinions were stated as fact due to the writer’s
special knowledge of the country, people, and conflict. This type of on-the ground reporting
served activists well, as Lasse Heerten and A. Dirk Moses have shown: “Making use of the
channels of the mass media age, this new breed of activists believed in what became known as
témoinage, the outspoken public discourse of what humanitarians and journalists had witnessed
in the field.”464 The FMG and Biafra each waged propaganda campaigns, and “it became almost
impossible to ascertain a relatively objective picture, and arguably these opposing views fostered
divergent and opposing western opinion which unfortunately helped to sustain the war’s
longevity.”465
Biafra’s propaganda effort was bolstered by a sophisticated international public relations
strategy that swung public opinion, if not global political opinion, on its side. Claims of genocide
were backed up by stark photos of children starving and suffering from kwashiorkor.
This genocide claim provoked an international debate about the humanitarian crisis
unfolding in Nigeria. It also placed immense pressure on the British government, whose
support for the FMG attracted accusations of neo-colonialism by Biafran proponents.
Public opinion there was firmly on the Biafran side; government rhetoric about Nigerian
unity and its long-standing military relationship was no match for images of starving
babies, the widespread circulation of which was part of the Biafran public relations
campaign.466
Messages of genocide were paired with characterizations of Biafrans as Africa’s most
modern, educated, and capable people. In this case, Igbo/Biafrans became almost synonymous
and often interchangeable. The theme of intelligent Igbo/Biafrans runs through U.S. media
coverage whether pro-Nigeria or pro-Biafra and regardless of whether or not the writer agreed
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with the genocide claims.
Even though, Biafrans and others raised accusations of genocide against the Nigerian
government, the claim of genocide was eventually disregarded or officially invalidated by the
international observers, the OAU, and even Azikiwe. Despite a massive amount of international
attention during the war, Biafra was rarely considered outside Nigeria by the 1970s. However,
recent scholarly interest and literary coverage of the war and its legacy mean that Biafra needs to
be inserted into genocide studies. According to Heerten and Moses, editors of the Journal of
Genocide Research’s special issue on the Nigeria-Biafra War, the conflict had previously been
omitted because its characteristics lay outside the Holocaust-generated definition of genocide.
With the Biafra journal issue, the authors aim to “historicize the discourse about genocide and
Biafra” to highlight its relevance “for genocide studies, and suggest how assumptions
dominating the field could be reconceptualized in view of the issues raised by the conflict.”467
“Genocide” was used to mobilize public opinion and humanitarian aid, and as early as the 1966
pogroms, a claim for genocide had been launched. The Igbo were soon cast as the “Jews of
Africa,” according to Heerten. In the media and among sympathetic organizations, comparisons
were drawn between Biafra and Auschwitz encouraging aid and assistance, even as pro-Nigerian
rhetoric worked to delegitimize Biafra and rebut the charge of genocide.468 Despite Nigerian
efforts, images circulating the globe gave credence to the possibility of genocide. As Heerten
explains, the power of the images of starving Biafra children
stemmed from their association with the Holocaust. The images from Biafra reminded
countless contemporaries in Western Europe and the United States of the photographs
taken during the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps; fears of an “African
Auschwitz” abounded. These associations were also cultivated by Biafran propaganda,
which relied heavily on allegations of genocide and a language of comparisons
connecting the Biafran crisis with the fate of Europe’s Jews during World War II.469
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Much was at stake in determining whether or not Igbo were the victims of genocide. Had
genocide been proven, member states of the U.N. who had signed the “Convention of the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” would have been required to intervene.
According to the Genocide Convention, which entered into force on January 12, 1951, genocide
meant, “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethical, racial or religious group.” Further, punishable acts included not only genocide,
but the attempt to commit genocide or complicity in genocide as well, and the Convention stated
that “whether committed in a time of peace of in a time of war,” genocide was a “crime under
international law” for which the culprit would be punished.470
4.4

Understanding or Understating the Role of Oil
Today, Nigeria’s importance in the production of oil is well known, and in 2009, Max

Siollun touted the country as projected to provide 25% of the United States’ oil supply by 2015.
While U.S. oil imports from Nigeria have instead declined since 2010, it nevertheless has at
times been a significant supplier.471 Thus, with Nigeria's current status as an important oilproducing nation, scholars have begun to look more closely at the role oil played in the NigeriaBiafra war. Access to oil was not part of the Biafran or Nigerian propaganda campaign, but it did
play an important role in both international interest, such as the supply of weapons from Britain,
and some scholars cite it as a reason the FMG insisted on maintaining unity as well as a factor in
the date of Biafra's secession. In U.S. media coverage of the war, oil earned few mentions, and
writers repeatedly stated that Biafrans chose to secede out of fear for their lives. However,
international attention turned to Nigeria's oil capabilities in May 1969 when Biafran forces
attacked an oil facility, killing eleven workers and taking another eighteen – Italians, Germans,
and a Jordanian – captive.472 Following international outcry and negotiation by the Pope, the
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prisoners were released. According to historian Roy Doron, “Biafra sought not only to hold the
workers hostage, but to frighten the oil industry, which the Biafrans considered complicit it what
they characterized as a genocidal war.”473 Biafrans knew that oil was a vital issue of the war and
their future, whether or not U.S. media opted to feature the issue of oil in coverage of the war,
and regardless of whether they included oil in their propaganda campaign.
While modernity and claims of genocide, neo-imperialism, and white supremacy were
discourses mobilized by the Biafrans, the Nigerian government made assertions about civil war,
rebellion, and the safety of Igbo people as well. Although as Anthony states, the Biafrans
efficaciously succeeded in their public relations campaign, not all reporters fell under the spell of
the Biafran publicity team. U.S. media coverage included voices raised in favor of each side of
the conflict.
The goal here is not to find out which propaganda campaign was more accurate, what the
true causes of the war were, or what really happened. Rather, my dissertation looks at the types
of messages circulating within U.S. print media leading up to, during, and just after the war.
Which versions of the crisis earned headlines in U.S. print media, and what if any conflicting
viewpoints were available to American readers?
4.5

Early Post-Independence Discord in Foreign Affairs
Nigeria experienced two coups and widespread unrest before Biafran secession took

place. In 1965, Foreign Affairs published a lengthy article by Nnamdi Azikiwe, at the time
President of Nigeria, in which the potential for conflict was palpable. Called “the father of
African independence” by Achebe, Azikiwe, known as “Zik,” grew up in many parts of the
future country and was a founding leader of its nationalist movement.474 Born in 1904 in the
North to Igbo Christian parents, he learned to speak Hausa before being sent to live with Igbo
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relatives in the eastern city of Onitsha. Azikiwe later moved to Lagos where his father worked,
and next followed him to Kaduna. As a university student in the United States, he earned degrees
in Religion and Anthropology and taught Political Science. Azikiwe became interested in
Garveyism, which informed his later nationalist rhetoric.475
Before returning to Nigeria, Azikiwe spent time in the Gold Coast city of Accra, working
as the editor of the African Morning Post and acquiring admirers “especially young aspiring
freedom fighters, including Kwame Nkrumah, the greatest of them all.”476 Back in Lagos in
1937, Azikiwe founded The West African Pilot, distinguishing it from the competition,
newspapers that “went out of their way to be highbrow,” and using accessible English in order to
“speak directly to the masses.”477 He went on to establish newspapers in cities like Ibadan and
Onitsha and founded the African Continental Bank in 1944 in a move to gain financial autonomy
from the British. At independence, Azikiwe became Governor General, and when the country
shifted to a republic in 1963, he was redesignated President. A member of the body that
mandated Biafra’s separation from Nigeria in 1967, Azikiwe would later withdraw his support
for Biafra.478
In his 1965 Foreign Affairs article, “Essential for Nigerian Survival,” Azikiwe depicts
post-independence Nigeria’s volatile political situation and responds to the challenges facing
Nigeria’s unity and claim to democracy. He reviews the recent problems with the census and the
elections and then makes recommendations for necessary constitutional changes in order for the
Federal Republic of Nigeria to endure.479 In summary, he lists among the problems with the
current government structure and practice: uneven representation, the rushing of government
measures through Parliament, “carpet-crossing” (party switching while in office), major issues
with the judiciary, legalized intra-regional discrimination, and lack of power for the Head of
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State combined with a “power-loaded” Head of Government. The article provides an
illuminating perspective on antagonisms on the eve of the conflict in Nigeria.
Azikiwe recommends specific solutions to Nigeria’s problems, beginning with changes to
representation, “Either there should be universal adult suffrage in the North or the seats allocated
to it to be reduced to make it reflect its male population only.”480 He calls for reform of the
Senate, which has no power of consequence and should be vested with “complete concurrent
jurisdiction with the House of Representatives,” and for Senators who stand for election in their
constituencies so that the Senate will not become the place for those who failed to win popular
elections.481 Likewise, extensive reforms of the judicial system were required, for example,
accused persons should have the ability to decide whether to use the Sharia Court of Appeal,
particularly since not everyone in Nigeria who might fall under this jurisdiction would be
Muslim (i.e. Christians living in the North).
Whilst I admit that only persons learned in Islamic jurisprudence should be appointed to
dispense justice in customary courts where Muslims may be tried, yet I must insist that
the courts of the land should not take cognizance of the religious beliefs or political
attachment of any person when his liberty is placed in jeopardy. After all, Nigeria is a
secular state; it is not a Christian or an Islamic state.482
In a footnote, Azikiwe offers some examples of the severity of local courts, which
include customary and al-kali courts, such as rioters being sentenced to twenty-four years in
prison and flogging with twelve strokes of the cane, or some Action Group supporters accused of
criminal defamation being sentenced to twelve months in prison and eighty strokes of the
cane.483 Already shedding light on regional divisions, he states that the solution to the problem of
discrimination is constitutional amendment: “Therefore, our Constitution must be revised to
enable Nigerian nationals – be they Northerners or Easterners or Westerners or Mid-Westerners
or Lagosians … to enjoy all the rights and fulfill all the obligations of Nigerian citizenship
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anywhere in Nigeria.”484 Additionally, the restructuring of the regions should be executed so that
“no one region should be in a position to dominate the rest.”485 Hand-in-hand with these reforms
Azikiwe calls for diversification of the federal system by basing it on the local authorities and
provinces as well as the regions to “expand the areas in which the Federal Government shares
responsibility so that all the governments of the Federation participate in the crusade for even
development, and thus ensure economic, social and political equality for all, irrespective of the
abstruse doctrine of states’ rights.”486
Although early in the article Azikiwe mentions that the recent crises have even included
“the threat of secession by one of the four regions forming the Federation,” his writing focuses
only on what must be done to ensure that this does not happen, that Nigeria does not become a
Confederation or worse, cease to exist. His optimistic outlook sweeps “tribalism” under the rug;
in fact, he never mentions ethnic groups by name and only refers to regions, parties, and
religions – all designations that could live together in a modern nation-state. He closes by
reiterating that the solution does not lie in loosening the bonds, but by tightening them: “The
central problem of federalism in Nigeria is how to coexist in harmony. How can people who
speak diverse tongues and have inherited different cultural traditions cultivate a national spirit of
oneness?” His answer is, by enlarging the scope of authority of the Federal Government.487
Zik was a founding leader of Nigeria and a staunch proponent of One Nigeria during the
move toward independence, and more than anything, his Foreign Affairs article shows he had not
changed his nationalist view of the importance of the national form of state. “We must either
have one country or separate and independent countries. We are either Nigerians or we are
not.”488 Despite his emphasis on solutions, Azikiwe points his finger at the “real” causes of
Nigeria’s problems: Nigerians who lack (Western) education, are too traditional, or oppose
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federalism; those who are opportunistic, tribal, or regional in their loyalty; or discriminatory.
These are the enemies of democracy. Azikiwe states, “The requirements of contemporary
political life are becoming extremely complex and the demands of the modern state on the
citizen are becoming more exacting, if not confounding,” and also, “The majority of Nigerians
are still illiterate; their cultural development is still limited to the tribal level, comparatively
speaking, so that it is the source of power and show of authority that appeal to the primitive
mind, the poverty-stricken opportunist, and the sophisticated careerist.”489 For all of his
promotion of One Nigeria, Zik has a specific vision of what Nigeria should look like, which was
not a country led by a traditional, Muslim, or religious majority. While he never refers to ethnolinguistic groups by name, Azikiwe does specifically blame Northerners and Muslims for some
of Nigeria’s problems.
The American Foreign Affairs reader may or may not have known the names of various
Nigerian government, party, and regional leaders and what these names meant. However, what
would have resonated would have been the idea that Nigeria was in crisis, and the setback
resulted from some of the population’s attempt to hold onto seemingly traditional cultural and
religious values and identities. Here, the Muslim population and the North are aligned with
tradition, leaving the various regions of the south to represent modernity and hope for Nigeria’s
future. The very characteristics Zik applies to the Nigerians who will provide the nation’s
solution - “We must ensure that well-educated people of good character are elected to
parliamentary seats in order to participate intelligently and responsibly in parliamentary
debates”490 – will be the traits Biafrans claim for themselves, and the U.S. media will apply to
both “Biafrans” and “Igbos.” Azikiwe’s framing of the issues represents a nationalist discourse
that could not fit Nigerian Islamic or “tribal” identities into its modern political culture. Although
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“Essentials for Nigerian Survival” advocates One Nigeria with a strong federal government, we
can already see in 1965 that there were two perceived Nigerias – one modern, one traditional.
This dichotomy will be mobilized in Biafra’s publicity campaign at secession just two years
later.
4.6

Civil War or War of Independence?
TIME and other news publications gave significant coverage to the Nigeria-Biafra War

during 1968, however, The New Yorker magazine paid minimal attention to the conflict despite
the war’s escalation. As Kurlansky pointed out in the title of his book, widespread unrest in 1968
“rocked the world.” The war in Nigeria had plenty of competition for headlines from events
occurring in places like Vietnam, France, Mexico, and Czechoslovakia, as well as the United
States. “Most of the world, preoccupied with the year’s busy agenda, regarded this war with a
fair amount of indifference, not supporting the Biafran claims to nationhood, but urging the
Nigerians to let relief planes get through.”491
Nevertheless, to the surprise of many, the war in the West African country escalated. On
January 27, 1968, Ojukwu officially charged Nigeria with genocide. Port Harcourt fell to the
Nigerian army in June, a devastating defeat for Biafra that cut its access to the sea. In his 2013
book on the Biafran war, Michael Gould states, “international journalism, describing life in
Biafra and giving snapshot pictures of malnutrition, starvation, genocide and indiscriminate
bombing of innocent civilians by Federal Government aircraft, led the Federal authorities to
invite an international observer team to look into these descriptions and accusations.”492 A group
of foreign observers, including representatives from the United Nations and the OAU, began a
tour of Nigeria on September 25.
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Biafra’s success in gaining international sympathy was uneven. Although Ojukwu
requested assistance from Washington in January 1968, the
U.S. government Feb. 5 reaffirmed its support for the Nigerian federal government. State
Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey said in Washington that the U.S. ‘has in no
way encouraged or otherwise supported the rebellion in Nigeria.’ He added that the U.S.
‘regards the breakaway movement as an internal conflict which in the last analysis only
the parties themselves can solve.’493
Biafra did gain recognition and support from some unlikely allies, including Tanzania,
Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Zambia during April and May. France announced its support of Biafra
in late July, and China joined the cause in September. Later in the year, the U.S. Senate began to
take more notice. “On August 2 the war became a U.S. political issue when Senator Eugene
McCarthy criticized President Johnson for doing little to help and demanded that he go to the
United Nations and insisted on an airlift of food and medicine to Biafra.”494 And on September
23, during a speech to the Senate, Ted Kennedy pressed the administration to send relief to
Biafra.495 By December, President Johnson officially urged both sides to end the war.496
Johnson’s appeal did not generate any momentum – Nigeria and Biafra had stumbled through
several attempts at peace talks during the year, but each proved more fruitless than the previous –
and the lame duck president was of course hardly a credible advocate of peace.
Representatives for both sides had met in London in May 1968 to arrange peace talks in
Kampala, Uganda, which began on May 23. Without compromise, the Nigerian government
continuously insisted on renunciation of secession before a ceasefire would be initiated, while
the Biafrans insisted that no agreement that assumed Biafra as part of Nigeria could be
entertained. In July, parties met in Niamey, Niger where they agreed to hold OAU-led peace
talks in Addis Ababa and developed an agenda for the upcoming meeting. From August 5 to
September 9 in Addis Ababa, the two sides again failed to make headway. “During the
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negotiations, the 2 parties presented their own peace formulas – the Nigerians demanding that
the Biafrans renounce secession and the Biafrans claiming that Biafra must be accepted as an
independent state.”497
In its first foray into the crisis in Nigeria, The New Yorker included a brief comment in
“The Talk of the Town.” Founded in 1925, by the 1950s, The New Yorker was more than a
magazine, it was “a habit, a status symbol, a pillar of one’s identity” and by 1969, its circulation
would reach an all-time high of 482,000.498 In the August 3, 1968 edition, a writer laments the
suffering children in Biafra and the fact that Robert Kennedy is no longer around to “arouse us
all with his eloquent stammer!”499 The comment responds to a recent issue of Life, which
featured “Biafran children whose hideous gaunt faces appeared” and “who will certainly die of
protein starvation unless a way can quickly be found to get the food from where it is to where
they are.”500 Interestingly, in its plea for people from the President to anyone who can write an
“ample check,” the brief write-up does not refer specifically to Nigeria, the war, or give any
explanation at all of the causes of starvation of the children. Of course, savvy and educated, The
New Yorker readership would have been well aware of current events worldwide. Nevertheless,
the noncontextualized plea entrenches the trope of the starving African child by separating the
“image” from any sense of its cause, implying that generally, African children are starving, a
representation that has not faded to this day.
Following the failed peace talks of 1968 and the official visit by the team of foreign
observers who concluded that there was no genocide, the war continued through 1969. In some
cases, humanitarian efforts were blamed for sustaining the Biafrans and prolonging the war.
Biafra’s allies, particularly France, were the targets of similar criticism. In April 1969, another
round of peace negotiations was attempted, this time in Monrovia, and again sponsored by the
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OAU. Unfortunately, the meeting ended with the same result as the 1968 sessions – “the Biafran
delegation refused to accept the Nigerian demand that it renounce its secession before a ceasefire.”501 In June, Biafrans killed eleven and captured eighteen foreign oil workers, a situation that
led to public outcry throughout the West, and caused Ojukwu to question why a few white men
were valued more than millions of African children.
This Biafran turn in promotional messaging could already be heard during Ojukwu’s June
1, 1969 speech that came to be known as the Ahiara Declaration, in which he positioned the
Biafran struggle as part of the battle against white supremacy:
our struggle is a movement against racial prejudice, in particular against that tendency to
regard the black man as culturally, morally, spiritually, intellectually, and physically
inferior to the other two major races of the world - the yellow and the white races. This
belief in the innate inferiority of the Negro and that his proper place in the world is that of
the servant of the other races, has from early days coloured the attitude of the outside
world to Negro problems. It still does today.502
Ojukwu asserted partnership with peoples of African descent throughout the world, “Our
struggle is not a mere resistance - that would be purely negative. It is a positive commitment to
build a healthy, dynamic and progressive state, such as would be the pride of black men the
world over.” He criticized the effects of colonialism as well as neo-imperialism,
We now see why in spite of Britain’s tottering economy Harold Wilson’s Government
insists on financing Nigeria’s futile war against us. We see why the Shell-BP led the
Nigerian hordes into Bonny, pays Biafran oil royalties to Nigeria, and provided the
Nigerian Army with all the help it needed for its attack on Port Harcourt.503
While much U.S. media coverage had previously reiterated Biafra’s publicity campaign,
the Ahiara Declaration earned scant attention in the media outlets under review here. For the
most part, Foreign Affairs assumed the crisis would only end with reunification, and The New
Yorker did not shift from characterizations of starvation and intelligent Biafrans as reasons to end
the war to feature the place of oil and the effects of global racial inequality on Nigeria and
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Biafra’s predicament. Further, international mediation efforts were not to be mobilized to defend
oil access for either side.
The year’s events proved suggestive for U.S. media coverage as some publications
looked precipitously forward to a reunited Nigeria and others continued to champion the Biafran
cause, although more as an inducement for humanitarian aid than one concerned with politics.
Continuing its humanitarian stance on Biafra, The New Yorker published a short article six
months prior to Adler’s full-scale feature. Once again included in Talk of the Town, the
inclusion depicts an interview with Senator Charles Goodell who visited Biafra for a study
mission and then reported to the Senate about his findings. Goodell’s tour and The New Yorker’s
coverage of it clearly follows the Biafran public relations campaign points of modernity and
genocide.504 When describing how he had become interested in Biafra, Goodell cites an Israeli
philanthropist who “‘likened the situation to that of the Jews in Germany. He said that a form of
genocide was taking place.’”505
The New Yorker stayed with the idea of genocide; the later Biafran publicity tactics based
on claims of neo-imperialism and white supremacy would have been less likely to rally reader
support. Without referring to the international committee of observers that had determined
genocide was not present in Nigeria, The New Yorker, through Goodell, refutes the denial of
genocide by explaining that “in a country with a famine, you don’t always see the sufferers on
the street … if they’re dying they stay in their huts, or they go out in the bush to die.”506
Goodell’s report featured Biafran propaganda motif of modernity, and the Senator
describes Biafrans as “‘an amazing people … naturally bright, friendly, optimistic … and they’re
amazingly well organized.’” Further, he states, “‘The Biafrans are very resourceful … some of
these people bordered on geniuses.’” Before closing, the article returns to the threat of genocide,
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with increased distress now that Biafrans’ have been characterized as valuable people, “‘the
Biafrans would be slaughtered by the Nigerians if they gave up the battle.’”507
4.6.1

The New Yorker’s Renata Adler Goes to Biafra

Following Senator Goodell’s eyewitness report, The New Yorker featured “Letter From
Biafra” by award-winning journalist and staff writer-reporter Renata Adler who visited Biafra
and penned a lengthy article, an example of témoinage writing, which was published in the
October 4, 1969 issue. Just 100 days before Biafra would capitulate, the article offered the
magazine’s first in-depth coverage of the crisis. Although she was only 31 years old, by the time
Adler went to Biafra, her ability to report on important political events had been proven. Known
for her 1965 “Letter From Selma,” which detailed the march from the Brown Chapel African
Methodist Episcopal Church in Selma, Alabama, to the statehouse in Montgomery, and the 1967
“Letter from the Six-Day War,” focused on the Third Arab-Israeli War, her subsequent “Letter
From the Palmer House,” about the national New Politics Convention in Chicago was included
in Best Magazine Articles: 1967. 508 These and eleven other articles, all originally appearing in
The New Yorker, comprised the book Toward a Radical Middle: Fourteen Pieces of Reporting
and Criticism, published in 1969. Adler finalized the Introduction in July 1969, months before
her trip to Biafra.
Born in Milan, Italy in 1938 to parents who had fled Nazi Germany, Adler grew up in
Connecticut, studied Philosophy at Bryn Mawr, and earned graduate degrees in Comparative
Literature from Harvard and Anthropology from the Sorbonne, where she studied with Jean
Wahl and Claude Lévi-Strauss. In the late 1970s, she would also earn a J.D. from Yale Law
School because, as she explained later, “I believed an American journalist ought to know the
law.”509 Adler’s career with The New Yorker spanned four decades. Beginning in 1963 as a
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manuscript reader, she became a staff writer. In 1968-1969, she served as chief film critic for
The New York Times, but did not care for the pressure of daily deadlines and returned to The New
Yorker.
One of the pieces republished in her 2001 collection Canaries in the Mineshaft, which
Adler regarded as addressing “misrepresentation, coercion, and abuse of public process, and, to a
degree, the journalist’s role in it,” was Adler’s “Letter From Biafra.” The essay strives to elevate
her hosts from unnamed subjects to valid sources, and in keeping with her disdain for unnamed
sources – she was critical of Watergate coverage – she provides names, titles, and characteristics
for nearly all those she met in Biafra.
Writing during the heyday of New Journalism, Adler “did not admire—‘detested,’ in
fact—the sprawling and subjectivized” form.510 This type of reporting included narrative
journalism “novelistic re-creations and works that were modeled more on a film or play, where
the journalist has observed the events being described but withdraws from the narrative and
presents them in the form of scenes, complete with dialogue and expository stage directions” as
well as subjectivity, which sometimes “took the form of stylistic experimentation, excess, or
playfulness … And sometimes, the reporter stepped out from the shadows, unashamedly put his
or her subjectivity on display, and did what you learned not to do on the first day of Journalism
101, became part of the story.”511 Adler maintained her disdain for New Journalism in a 2014
interview, “I didn't care for New Journalism. In fact, I did sort of hate it.”512 Adler’s opinion of
New Journalism proved to be in keeping with The New Yorker’s editorial department, as the
trend “passed the New Yorker by. The magazine’s reportage in the mid and late sixties was …
serious (if not somber), more or less impersonal, and expressed in restrained and syntactically
impeccable prose.”513 In fact, Adler “wrote, in a word, like a square.”514 At the same time,
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although the magazine’s editor William Shawn recognized the use of the first person in some
New Yorker articles, he said, “‘The I in our first person reporting is still an observer – objective
and impartial,’” yet the magazine’s reporting “was moving decisively away from traditional
objectivity and impartiality” in the 1960s.515 Especially evident concerning coverage of Vietnam,
features in The New Yorker began to display an “unmistakable political agenda.”516
It is within this genre of traditionally written, but politically aware reporting that Adler’s
“Letter from Biafra” lies. The article also offers an example of témoinage reporting, written
accounts of what journalists observed on the ground. While the article’s copy intersects with
Biafra’s early propaganda campaign, relying heavily on discourses of modernity while also
replicating the image of Biafrans as smart and innovative people, Adler’s telling of the Biafran
war story diverges from that of reporters who relied almost solely on state communiqués (from
the FMG and Biafrans) and reports of Western humanitarian aid workers.
Adler has been described as “a ruthless investigative reporter with an ear for dialogue and
an eye for human contradiction. Her writing was morally concerned and lyrical, cutting and
fearless … Her reportage is rich and unfussy.”517 Other critics have found fault with her choice
of detail. “Letter From Selma” is “charming but ultimately forgettable … the article is too full of
incidental details … and reads more like limp event coverage than reporting. Her dispatches
from conflict zones – the Six-Day War and Biafra – are similarly marked by halfhearted
irreverence.”518 This may be true, but it misses the point, for she was never a war correspondent.
Like Goodell and many other international visitors, Adler went only to Biafra and did not
go to Nigeria-controlled territory or meet with representatives from the FMG. She arrived in
Biafra by hitching a ride at the last minute with Joint Church Aid, flying in with reporter Eric
Pace of The New York Times who engaged in more traditional reporting, for example quoting
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Biafran radio reports and providing opinions from “civil servants and other middle-class
Biafrans” without including names or specific quotations.519 Adler later described her entry into
Biafra:
I had wanted to go there even before the Times job came my way. It was very hard to get
a visa … There was a question about other people going to Biafra, but Mr. Shawn didn’t
think it was safe … I made it as far as the coast but I couldn’t get a visa. I thought, ‘I’m
going to have to go all the way back to The New Yorker and say I didn’t get in.’ But
suddenly, my application for a visa came through from Joint Church Aid. So we flew in
on these aid planes. That was amazing.520
Adler toured Biafra with a handful of hosts, accepting their rhetoric about the country and
its inhabitants. In her article, she begins to utilize their internal jargon, for example, referring to
areas as “disturbed” instead of overtaken. Scholars have demonstrated that Western media
helped convey Biafran propaganda and embraced and reproduced it. Before arriving in Biafra,
Adler had already heard the Biafran side of the story from her reading of journalist and future
best-selling-thriller-writer Frederick Forsyth’s The Biafra Story, which was published in 1969. In
“Letter From Biafra,” Adler refers to Forsyth’s book twice, calling it “one of the few cogent
accounts of what took place” and later describes how she “spent the rest of Tuesday night [in
Biafra], with a flashlight, rereading Frederick Forsyth.” 521 Of all the items she could have
transported to Biafra, she chose to bring Forsyth’s book, and it is from his work that she appears
to draw her synopsis of the conflict as well.522 Forsyth’s book took a clearly pro-Biafra stance, as
Forsyth admits in the Preface, “It is the Biafra story, and it is told from their standpoint … Where
views are expressed either the source is quoted or they are my own, and I will not attempt to hide
the subjectivity of them.”523
With utmost authority, Forsyth, having been stationed in Nigeria by the BBC before
going freelance when he refused to toe the line of the British government’s pro-Nigeria stance,
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and signing the Preface with his Umuahia, Biafra location, offers background on the context that
led to war. He claims it was British inattention to local desires and “the tribal hostility embedded
in this enormous and artificial nation” that set up the country for failure. In Forsyth’s telling, the
breakup of Nigeria was inevitable. Siding consistently with Easterners/Biafrans, he shows that
the January 15, 1966 coup was not an all-Igbo affair. He states that the January coup was
legitimate, in part because the mutineers were put in prison rather than achieving power, while
the July coup that installed Gowon was not legitimate because the insurgents “took over the
control at the Federal Government and in two Regions. The third Region recognized the new
régime later. The fourth Region [Ojukwu’s] never did, nor was it obliged to by law.”524
Although she did not mention it in the 1969 article, Adler was aware that her press tour
was just that, and she consented to it because, like Forsyth, she believed in the Biafran cause. In
a 2014 interview, she explained, “It occurred to me that a lot of what I saw was staged for me.
Because they wanted to look good. I mean, first of all, the Biafrans were right. They were on the
right side.”525
In addition to the discourses of genocide and Biafran modernity included in her New
Yorker article, Adler replicates the Biafran rhetoric that characterizes Nigerians as backward, and
includes statements that legitimize the secession and Ojukwu’s leadership. In a 2013 interview,
Adler explained her affinity for dichotomous conditions, “I loved reporting … and the characters
were so colourful, and you could tell who the good guys were, and who the bad guys were.”526
Much of the Biafran war reporting has been criticized for providing an image of a neocolonial relationship between the mostly white priests and other humanitarian workers and the
suffering Biafrans:
This visual image of the white man helping the African, coupled with the near invisibility
of Africans as spokesmen and sources for stories, reinforced another cultural assumption.
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This condescending assumption is that the white man, or former colonial masters, still
need to intervene to help their African brothers and sisters. Biafran leader Col. Ojukwu
only rarely granted interviews, and many of the Biafran combatants were not sought as
sources once the focus of international reporting moved from the battlefield to the
feeding centers and hospitals.527
Adler’s copy paints a more complex picture of the situation in the breakaway state. Voices of the
Biafrans she meets – nearly all doctors, professionals or educated clergy – are heard throughout
the article. Adler secures interviews with Effiong and Ojukwu. And while the “starving masses”
fade into the background, Adler recognizes their invisibility: “the children of villagers who are
not strong enough to trek nearer the front to buy what food there is more cheaply and trek back
to market to sell it more dearly.”528 In addition to the professionals, intellectuals, and starving
children in the villages and bush, Biafrans include soldiers at the front, whom Adler does not
meet. Clearly, this story intentionally deviates from conventional war reporting. Printed months
after The New Yorker’s 1968 inclusion on the situation in Biafra, which requested readers send
off an “ample check,” Adler’s article could have encouraged both emotional and financial
support for the Biafran cause.
Defining the “good guys” and “bad guys,” Adler clearly contrasts Biafrans and Nigerians.
On the one hand, Biafrans are smart, professional, educated, ingenious, and legitimate in their
breakaway. On the other hand, Nigeria does not uphold the terms of the Geneva Convention and
bombs civilians in order to battle against its real enemy, which is modernity. In the opening
paragraph of the article, Adler states, “Ever since a plane of the International Red Cross was shot
down … by Nigeria,” showing immediately which side would serve as her story’s antagonists.529
Later, she describes the scene in General Effiong’s office, “On the walls were pictures of the
mangled victims of Nigerian bombing raids,” reminding readers that Nigerians bombed civilians
in addition to Red Cross planes.530
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Nigerians have no time for education and technology: “Nigerian forces invaded Biafra …
set fire to the university and destroyed all its books,” Adler explains. The image of book burning
would have resonated with readers in the 1960s as a Nazi undertaking of just a few decades
earlier. Furthermore, making this connection between the Nigerian government and the Nazis
could have strengthened the image of Biafrans as comparable to the persecuted Jews. For Adler,
too, whose parents had fled Nazi Germany, the allusion to Nazi persecution would have been
particularly powerful. In a 2015 interview, she acknowledged the impact of having a family
displaced by the Nazi regime, “I think it affects a lot else, specifically being a refugee. I wasn’t
born there. I didn’t experience any of it. But they were refugees. So then I was thinking of this
business of being a refugee, no matter in what sense.”531 Adler alludes to the Nazis elsewhere in
the article by stating, “But Biafrans (fighting a war, in a sense, for a position argued in Hannah
Arendt’s ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’) are determined to avoid at least the accusation of passive
complicity in their own destruction.”532 Here, the Biafrans learn from the history of genocide and
responses to it and fight back in a way that Arendt would not criticize.
Throughout, Adler characterizes Nigerians as the enemies of modernity, for example,
quoting Biafra’s Chief Health Officer, “‘The water supply, you may have noticed, was disrupted.
All equipment was broken. All wires were cut. I think they were at war with science. I think they
were at war with books.’”533 Making matters worse, we can see that Nigerians might be
controlled by the Soviets in coming years when Adler quotes N.U. Akpan, the Chief Secretary to
the Military Government who said, “‘Nigeria, you see, has mortgaged its future to the Soviet
Union, but we would wish after the crisis that they would be stable.”534 With the diametric
opposition of Nigerians and Biafrans, if Nigerians could be associated with the Soviets, by
extension, the Biafrans could not.
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Unlike the FMG, Biafrans earned Adler’s respect for being kind, intelligent, and modern.
She explains that it was common to call Nigerians “vandals,” and quotes a Biafran woman who
magnanimously refers to Nigerians as “friends” – “‘I call them “my friends.” I have nothing
against them. We are all human beings.’”535 Modern infrastructure earns recognition too,
“Biafran roads, before the bombings the best roads in Nigeria” and “‘Before the crisis, we were
developing sanitation-consciousness in our people,’ he said. ‘We even anticipated problems of
air pollution.’”536 A head surgeon of a teaching hospital “studied at Johns Hopkins and did his
residency at Cook County Hospital in Chicago” and had a chair “littered with cartridge tapes –
Bach, Mozart, Stravinsky.”537 In one section, Adler describes court proceedings, ongoing despite
the war and turmoil within the country, and elsewhere, she mentions that Biafrans had tried
conscription for three months and found people did not like it, so they stopped. These
descriptions of civility negate the image of African dictators and depict Biafra as a democratic
and participatory society despite the formal institutions of a military government.
Readers also meet Biafrans who are educated and accomplished men and women. By
including professional women in her article, Adler proffered further evidence of Biafra’s
modernity because, particularly in colonial situations, women’s bodies provided a site where
cultural authenticity and tradition was upheld. While the world knew that starvation ravaged the
country, Biafrans did not sit idly by waiting for supplies: “‘We are studying plants which will not
tempt people to eat the seedlings,’ he said. ‘We are studying the wild local vegetables for
identification.’”538 And without the necessary medical equipment, Biafrans found new ways to
heal: a doctor pointed out “the results of operations: a Steinmann pin, consisting of a sterilized
nail through an injured limb, with a bag of pebbles for traction at the foot of the bed; a splint
made of scrap metal and screws for bad fractures.”539 Adler describes the strategic farming
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methods, which had been implemented, and “the hospital’s pharmacy, in which some young
scientists were producing dextrose, extracting pain killers and tranquillizers from mixed pills (for
the tetanus and artillery cases), analyzing native remedies (‘It is like deciphering a code,’ a
young scientist said), and making pills in test tubes.”540 Even the precious necessity, oil, found
new life in Biafran hands: “What fuel there is in Biafra is made in little roadside refineries.”541
Throughout her visit, which seems to have lasted about a week, Adler encountered many
Biafrans, nearly all of whom appear to be professionals.542 In her account, she never hesitates to
explain her contacts’ educational backgrounds; several of them boast American or British
advanced degrees. When lacking a title conferred by a university education, Adler often
mentions a Biafran person’s Christian faith. Thus, Adler meets: “Arthur Mbanefo, a Biafran
government official, and Professor Ben Nwosu, a Biafran nuclear physicist educated in
California;” “Dr. Fabian Udekwu, head surgeon;” “Miss Etuk, who received her doctorate in
child psychology from Columbia University;” “a Presbyterian elder;” “Dr. Pius Okigbo (a
Biafran economist and former representative of Nigeria to the European Common Market);”
“Chinua Achebe, a Biafran novelist;” “Biafran intellectuals;” “a twenty-two-year-old nurse;”
“Mr. Nwokedi, who was educated at the Ibo university at Nsukka;” “Ralph and Patience
Nwokedi, who are Protestants;” “Dr. Ifegwu Eke, Commissioner of Information (who studied at
McGill and at Harvard, where he earned his doctorate in economics);” “Dr. Bede Okigbo… who
was once Dean of Agriculture at University of Nsukka, who studied at Washington State
University and Cornell;” “a lady barrister and an engineer;” and finally the leader of Biafra who
is no intellectual slouch. “General Ojukwu himself, thirty-six years old, bearded, not slim,
educated at Oxford, and, much later, at Warminster… His father, Sir Louis Odumegwu Ojukwu,
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who began in poverty, became a small investment banker, and died one of the richest men in
Nigeria.”543
In the background are many children, most of whom she encounters when visiting
orphanages, schools, or feeding stations. Sometimes, Adler explains who is in charge – a
Western priest or a Biafran schoolteacher – but other times, the station seems almost unstaffed,
and the mere evidence of the population could be more visible than the people, such as one
refugee camp, which exhibited “few occupants, although hundreds of pallets and bundles of
personal belongings on the floor of a single room.”544 Missing from the populace were adults
who were not educated professionals, although their omission from the story could have been
caused by a language barrier – perhaps Adler saw them, but could not interview them – or by
their presence elsewhere, at the front or in the bush.
Despite the unseen nature of most of Biafra’s starving masses, Adler remains connected
to the discourse of genocide: “It is possible that another ethnic population will be decimated
before modern intelligence completes its debate about the extent to which the greatest crimes can
be said to be the fault of the victims of them,” she states on the article’s first page, and on the
next, “Nigeria intends to eliminate the peoples of the region that is now Biafra, and that the
intention of genocide is not one that you test, passively, until the last returns are in.”545 Later she
describes, “A naked child hunkered outside, with the swollen stomach and utter lassitude of
kwashiorkor.”546
These apparent differences in levels of modern intellectual professional achievement of
Biafrans and Nigerians, coupled with the threat of genocide, legitimate the secession for Adler.
Without directly stating a political opinion, she does treat Biafrans as leaders rather than rebels,
consistently naming them as Biafrans, while referring to the other side as Nigerians and making
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it clear that many non-Igbo people whom she meets are supportive of Biafra. She explains,
“Members of the Eastern minority tribes have often been killed along with the Ibos, and many of
the minorities who once chose to remain in disturbed areas and risk Nigerian occupation have
since taken refuge in Biafra.”547 Throughout her article, Adler portrays the conflict as a war
between Biafra (the former Eastern Region) and Nigeria, depicted as two sovereign entities. This
is not a civil war. In these ways, without directly stating it, Adler displays her approval of
Biafran self-determination and the legitimacy of secession. In this, Biafrans were “persuaded by
a series, both before and since the war, of broken accords, systematic exclusions, and outright
massacres.”548 Adler’s article supported other inclusions about Biafra published in The New
Yorker, during the war and beyond, that urged readers to financially support the humanitarian
efforts to Biafra.
In spite of her palpable admiration for the Biafrans – and by extension, their cause –
Adler’s article at its core expresses a sense of chaos, which is clearly visible in several comments
about driving. More than mere descriptive material, driving can be seen as a metaphor for the
forward progress of the country. When Adler first arrives in Biafra, at night due to flight
restrictions, her chauffeur “drove nearly blindly, with dimmed headlights.”549 Elsewhere, she
illustrates the haphazard nature of an official state transport: “The driver of a State House car,
who had already nearly hit a goat and a chicken, nearly ran him down,” “Before dawn on
Tuesday morning, a State House car, which had already nearly run over several hitchhikers on
the road to Mbano,” and finally, “On the way back to Owerri, the State House driver ran over a
chicken, and he did not stop.”550 The fact that in most cases it is an official car wreaking havoc
on the roads, allows the driving comments to convey the disorder and volatility of life and
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government in Biafra at the time of Adler’s visit. The subtext shows that Biafra, like its vehicles,
may have been on the move, but the journey appeared neither smooth nor stable.
The topic of oil earns little coverage in Adler’s account of the situation, yet today it
appears to scholars to have been possibly the most crucial element in the conflict. In the writing
of Adler and others, it appears quite peripheral to the war. However, a recent study by economic
scholar Chibuike U. Uche has shown that “British oil interests played a much more important
role in the determination of the British attitude to the war then is usually conceded. Specifically,
Britain was interested in protecting the investments of Shell-BP in Nigerian oil."551
The lack of interest in oil at the time can be seen in Forsyth’s Biafra Story, where he
considers Britain’s involvement in the conflict and determines that oil was a factor, but not a
major one. “It is still difficult to discern the precise reasons for the British Government’s
decision of total support for Lagos,” Forsyth explains.552 “As regards the oil, Nigerian
propaganda stated that 97.3 per cent of the oil production of Nigeria came from non-Ibo areas.”
He does not take oil as a true cause of Britain’s support for Nigeria. “Besides which, every eyewitness present during the months before the decision to break away from Nigeria was made said
later that oil was not the chief motive.”553 Instead, Forsyth determines two possible reasons that
seem discernible. “One is that Whitehall received information at the start of the war from its
High Commissioner in Lagos that the war would be short, sharp and sweet, and that one should
certainly back the winner.”554 The other likely cause of war, according to Forsyth, was that
“Britain had decided, though on the basis of what reasoning no one has explained, that the
Nigerian market shall remain intact no matter what the price.”555
Adler follows Forsyth’s line of thinking concerning the oil situation – it was more
important to Nigerians than to Biafrans: “Most of Nigeria’s oil fields are in the Biafran region,
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and the oil companies had their doubts … when it was not all over quickly, the Labour
Government vastly increased its shipments of arms to Nigeria, and covered it up at home.”556
She also comments that although Biafra seceded as the Eastern region, which included the oilrich areas, oil had not been a reason for earlier disputes. She places Ojukwu’s mandate to secede
before Gowon’s restructuring of the country into twelve states, which placed the oil fields
outside Igboland, explaining that when chiefs and elders gave Ojukwu “a mandate to withdraw
from Nigeria … The next day, Gowon published a decree which, among other measures, divided
the Eastern Region into three small states, with Port Harcourt and the Eastern oil fields to be
excised from the Ibo region… The oil fields, which had only begun producing just before
Nigerian independence, had not been a factor in the dispute before.”557
Analyses of the Nigeria-Biafra War today pinpoint oil as a significant factor in the war’s
progression. The opening of journalist Philip Gourevitch’s 2010 article in The New Yorker
reverses the news coverage viewpoint of genocide as the cause of the war and oil interests as an
effect, stating, “In Biafra in 1968, a generation of children was starving to death. This was a year
after oil-rich Biafra had seceded from Nigeria.”558 Siollun’s book Oil, Politics and Violence:
Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture 1966-1976 clearly shines a spotlight on the role of oil in
Nigeria’s post-independence history. While this begs the question of whether oil was a major
factor in the secession and subsequent war, the point here concerns the attitude of the U.S. media
toward oil as a major factor. While oil received occasional recognition, it was not the focus of
coverage. Reporters and editors preferred to concentrate on either the humanitarian issues or the
need for reunification. Neither did it form a vital part of the Biafran propaganda campaign, as
concerns about genocide and starving children earned more international sympathy than would
stories of a territory striving to maintain control of its oil reserves. As much as today’s scholars
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note the importance of oil in its origins and British support of Nigeria when looking back on the
war, Adler declines to follow suit during a 2014 interview. In response to the comment “Because
so many countries weren’t backing them [Biafra] presumably to get their hands on the oil,” she
states, “These guys were clearly the underdogs. And they were starving,” as if talking about oil
at all would diminish the humanitarian crisis she witnessed.559
Notwithstanding the success of Biafra’s public relations campaign highlighting the issues
of genocide and starvation, the OAU, Azikiwe, and others officially declared that genocide was
not occurring in Biafra. In turn, the breakaway state’s publicity strategy shifted its focus to issues
of race and neo-imperialism, claiming that the West backed Nigeria out of fear of Biafra as a
nation of sophisticated and striving black men. With the Ahiara Declaration on June 1, 1969,
Ojukwu positioned the Biafran struggle within the ongoing anticolonial struggles in Africa and
invited comparisons to the civil rights movement in the United States. "Where the declaration
drew on conventional critiques of imperialism and white supremacy, Ojukwu presented them in
dialogue with early arguments about modernity." While not eliminating the previous rhetoric
around modernity, Biafrans positioned themselves “toe to toe not with 'feudal', tradition-bound
northern Nigeria but with dynamic, global white supremacy."560 However, although Biafra may
have adjusted its propaganda tactics, these new messages were not taken up wholesale by U.S.
media. In a Christian Science Monitor article, a reporter who was in attendance during the
presentation of the Declaration:
downplayed Ojukwu’s racial arguments. She described his vision of Biafra as “essentially
Christian in outlook, and free of neocolonialist influence”. After opining that “Ojukwu is
probably overestimating the racist factor” she also noted that “focusing on the race issue
has helped Biafrans define more clearly what their role might be in a broader context.
They now see their conflict with Nigeria as more than a war for independence and their
homeland. They are now ready to believe that they can become the first truly
independent, black nation in Africa.”561
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By contrast, Adler openly allows Effiong and Ojukwu to make points about racism,
imperialism, and the tenets of the Ahiara Declaration. Effiong tells her “‘If we fail, you see …
then the black man in Africa is going to fail, and the minority man wherever he is. One would
think we had done enough against all this to prove that we deserve to live.’”562 Ahiara
“concludes that the reason the two-year war has not won more of the worlds’ unambivalent
sympathy is that the Biafran people are black,” Adler explains.563 When she interviewed
Ojukwu, issues of race and neo-imperialism were raised, “When I asked [Ojukwu] why he
thought the Ahiara Declaration had not had much of an impact, particularly among American
radicals, abroad, he said it was not the sort of speech to invite ‘that sort of dramatic
response.’”564 Later:
[Ojukwu] spoke of the black “secret admirers” of Biafra, who feared the great unknown
and could not believe that Biafra might succeed. I asked him how this compared with the
white liberal position, and he said he thought white liberals were more openly
sympathetic… I asked whether by success he meant the establishment of the first viable
black republic, able to compete on an equal basis with white nations of the world, and he
said that was exactly what he meant.565
One can detect here an almost Fanonian Sixties engagement with the psychological
impact of colonialism and racism on people of color. But the challenge was structural as well as
moral and intellectual. Finally, Ojukwu said, “‘This is the worst system – this colonial, this neocolonial fraud. It can only yield short-term results. There is no logical case against Biafra.’”566
4.7

Toward Resolution in Foreign Affairs
Even as The New Yorker stepped into the ring to encourage sympathy and support for the

Biafran cause, the contrasting show of support for One Nigeria remained firm in the second
Foreign Affairs article taking the West African nation as its topic.567 In his July 1969, thirteenpage “Elements of a Nigerian Peace,” Rev. Joseph C. McKenna, S.J. proffers recommendations
for the “specific issues of the war which must be resolved.”568 McKenna was one of “three Joes,”
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the first Jesuits assigned to Nigeria, Fr. Joseph Schuh, S.J. having arrived on August 16, 1962.
Expecting to teach at the University of Lagos when he first set off for Nigeria in 1963, he instead
worked at the National Catholic Education Section of the Nigerian Bishops Conference as a
Catholic education advisor.569 McKenna lived and worked in Surulere, part of the Lagos
metropolitan area, and in 1965 became superior of the Jesuit mission in the country, “overseeing
its growth and development through the tragic civil war.”570
In addition to the benefit of his background as a political scientist, the choice of
McKenna as author of the second Foreign Affairs examination of the situation in Nigeria was in
keeping with the central voice Catholic – and Protestant – missionaries claimed during the war.
Curiously, McKenna’s recommendation for peace and reunification deviates from many of the
pro-Biafra utterances of other priests on the ground. The typical image of the Catholic
missionary during the war was one who helped win support for the Biafran cause from the
outside world and spearheaded humanitarian relief efforts.
During the war, the Catholic Church dedicated itself to serving the Biafran cause in relief
and publicity efforts. It was Pope Paul VI who directed Caritas Internationalis, the Church’s
emergency response organization, to initiate a relief program for Biafra. A papal peace delegate
visited Biafra in January 1968, determining that roughly 3 million people had already been
displaced and declaring the level of starvation “‘horrific.’”571 On March 27, 1968, Father
Anthony Byrne organized the first relief airlift to Port Harcourt based on the delegate’s report,
and in July, he participated in a conference in New York where he described the starvation crisis.
His speech prompted Catholic Relief Services to organize an emergency airlift, which left New
York just over a week later. Church groups in Europe and North America began to send relief
supplies, chartering aircraft to do so. A desire to increase relief efforts soon led to the formation
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of Joint Church Aid (JCA), a consortium of groups from thirty-three countries, which was
formalized at a meeting in Rome convened by a representative of Caritas Internationalis on
November 8-9, 1968. JCA comprised Catholic and Protestant organizations and also gained
support from the umbrella organization American Jewish Emergency Effort for Biafran Relief.572
JCA airlifts of food and medicine became more crucial after the ICRC plane was shot down on
June 5, 1969.
Despite the collaborative nature of JCA, Catholic involvement remained at the forefront
of the organization. “For the entire period of humanitarian assistance, the JCA relied on
missionaries who were already in Biafra for the organization and distribution of relief aid. Most
of these missionaries were Catholics.”573 Although the on-the-ground distribution relied on
transportation provided by the Biafran government, JCA did not allow Ojukwu’s functionaries to
distribute relief materials, and “church humanitarian agencies were still largely able to maintain
their operational independence. Church relief officials were keen to be seen as independent
actors because of the perception on the Nigerian side that humanitarian agencies were
sympathetic to the Biafran cause.”574
The FMG would have had good reason to question the Church’s support of Biafrans
because Catholic missionaries often served as media sources and even tour guides for media
visiting Biafra to provide coverage of the ravages of war. For example, Holy Ghost Father Kevin
Doheny, a veteran missionary in Nigeria, led British television journalist Alan Hart to capture
scenes of the war’s young victims in Spring of 1968. Within hours of Hart’s story airing, “people
worldwide were asking how they could donate money to stop the suffering, while demanding
that their governments put aside political considerations and mobilize more resources to help.”575
When international journalists turned to Forsyth for reliable sources, he led them to Irish priests,
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as he had worked closely with Doheny for a BBC story.576 During the conflict, several Irish
priests became “international celebrities” and developed a calculated communication strategy,
which included an “ongoing public relations campaign on behalf of innocent victims” that was
executed in Europe and the United States.577 By June 1968 when media coverage of the war
turned to starvation, it was priests who were credited with pronouncing the statistic that by the
end of the rainy season 1 million Biafrans would die from hunger-related diseases.578 Throughout
the conflict, priests continued to serve as media sources, and Doheny wrote to his brother of his
happiness with the publicity they had generated.
In the United States, the famous Life magazine photographs published on July 12, 1968
resulted in part from the photographer’s tour with Holy Ghost Father Daniel O’Connell. “While
these media stories represent just a small portion of those reaching English-speaking readers, this
focus on the civilian population often highlighted the twin themes suggested by Kevin Doheny:
genocide and starvation.”579 Further, while some stories did focus on the political situation, most
of the human-interest features came out of Biafra, due in part to the FMG’s refusal to share
information or allow journalist access.580 Indeed, “the missionaries and humanitarian workers'
claims about how many people were affected, and what needed to occur to stop further death, are
framed as carrying more weight than the frequent pronouncements from the Nigerian and British
governments, and even from international bodies such as the United Nations and the
International Red Cross.”581
In his article “Blaming the Gods: Christian Religious Propaganda in the Nigeria-Biafra
War,” Nicholas Ibeawuchi Omenka discusses the religious rhetoric that was “widely and
effectively used as war propaganda,” whereby the actual religious diversity in Nigeria was
reduced to a Christian Eastern Region (Biafra) and a Muslim North, which was then substituted
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for “Nigeria.”582 The purpose, according to Omenka, was the depiction by Biafra and
international Christian bodies of the conflict as a religious war. However, “The Christian Igbo
versus Muslim Hausa/Fulani stereotype of the Civil War collapses under scrutiny.”583 At the time
war began, three Catholic ecclesiastical provinces existed in Nigeria – one in the former Eastern
Region, one in Lagos, and one in Kaduna, in the North. “Yet the religious war rhetoric remained
a formidable force in the Nigeria-Biafra propaganda war not only in Biafra but also among its
foreign Christian sympathizers.”584
This war publicity strategy served to alienate Nigerian Christians and also “threatened the
very existence of the Church in Nigeria” as the FMG grew concerned about Christian
humanitarian relief efforts that did not respect Nigeria’s sovereignty.
In a goodwill message to the Nigerian Catholic bishops meeting in conference in
September 1969, General Gowon, the head of state, extolled the achievements of the
Catholic Church in Nigeria but at the same time expressed his ‘dismay and
disappointment’ over the ‘anti-Nigeria acts’ of some members of the Catholic Church
overseas, who had, among other things, ‘dubbed our present crisis a religious war.’ He
expected the bishops as spiritual leaders to give unflinching support to the struggle for a
united Nigeria.585
When it finally engaged in a concentrated propaganda campaign of its own, the FMG
pressured Christian leaders “to undertake worldwide counter measures against the religious war
propaganda,” which “proved very effective.”586
Thus, despite his status as a Jesuit leader in Nigeria, McKenna penned his Foreign Affairs
article from Lagos, even basing his information about Biafra on “journalists who visit Biafra.”587
His article, published in 1969, toed the line of FMG instructions and never mentioned religion:
“The secession of Nigeria's Eastern Region in May 1967 and its assumption of national
sovereignty as the "Republic of Biafra" erupted out of a complex skein of historical experiences,
cultural differences, economics, party politics and ethnic antagonisms.”588
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In the opening paragraph, McKenna refers to the conflict as a civil war, making plain his
political viewpoint, and although he offers an extensive show of sympathy for the Igbo, and even
questions Gowon’s legitimacy, he favors unification. “The most painful and provocative incident
leading to the war was the outburst of attacks on the Ibos by civilians … Unable now to feel
secure away from their native soil, the Ibos saw themselves as the target of genocide. The
trauma… cannot be overestimated. Secession had become almost inevitable,” McKenna explains
during the article’s review of the situation up to 1969.589 Introducing Gowon as a Northerner
“from one of the Middle Belt tribes,” McKenna explains, “In strictly legal terms his title to
succeed Ironsi is not clear, for there was not, as in January, any formal transfer of power and
Ojukwu, still Governor of the East, studiously refrained from acknowledging Gowon’s
position.”590
Despite this show of understanding for the Biafran cause, McKenna seeks to elucidate the
reasoning of the FMG’s refusal to accept the secession of Biafra despite the fact that “fear and
personal insecurity were the prime driving force of the Ibo’s move,” fear, which he says “was a
fact, and a fact to which the Nigerian Government has never given the weight it deserves.”591
Nevertheless, the government’s motivation to suppress the secession was “grounded in rational
concern for the interrelated political and economic integrity of Nigeria. The prestige which the
country has consistently enjoyed in international forums rests partly on its size and economic
promise… Moreover, the FMG was not disposed to abandon the Eastern oil that promised
development capital for the whole country.”592
McKenna’s wholehearted support of a peaceful resolution and Nigerian reunification
takes into account seven issues that the country must overcome; nevertheless, he rationalizes the
imperative of One Nigeria by writing “to concede Ibos independence would cause enduring
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conflict in Africa as bitter as that of Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East, permanently draining
the resources of both sides into a senseless arms race and possibly exposing the area once more
to a dangerous rivalry of major powers.”593 Thus, even though McKenna, who served as a Jesuit
missionary in Nigeria for nearly twenty years, recognized the validity of Igbo fears that led to
secession, independence for Biafra would mean the downfall of all of Africa. This viewpoint
diametrically opposes Ojukwu’s claim that Biafra would signify the world’s first successful
African nation.
In the final section of his article, McKenna reiterates the necessity and benefits of a
united Nigeria as well as the correctness of the view of the conflict as a civil war, rather than a
war of independence, underlining the idea that Biafra has nothing to gain by the continuation of
fighting. Even if it were possible for
Ibos to wage guerrilla warfare long after they have lost their last airstrip… what they
could gain would hardly seem to justify their heavy losses… Even if guerrilla tactics do
compel a Federal withdrawal, Biafra would remain surrounded by hostile forces …
landlocked and with only minimal natural resources on which to build a viable
economy.594
McKenna sees the people as members of one nation notwithstanding their ethnic
identities, bemoaning the civilian casualties that “may already exceed 1.5 million persons – all,
be it remembered, citizens of Nigeria.”595 A ceasefire and reunification would be in everyone’s
best interest:
Economically, the peoples of Nigeria would prosper far more together than apart. Both
parties would profit from a reopening of rail and motor roads from the northern states to
Port Harcourt and Calabar; from the electric power and water-level control on the Niger
afforded by the new Kainji Dam; and from the complementarity of Enugu coal and Jos
tin, of Ogoja yams and Owerri markets, of Ibo managerial and technical skills and Rivers
oil. In the long politico-military contest between the Ibos and the FMG that began in July
1966, the mutual advantage in coming to terms has seldom been as clear as in the first
half of 1969.596
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In closing, McKenna admits, “The task of reconstruction will be vast,” but this does not
sway his political belief in a united Nigeria, an opinion that converged with the position of the
U.S. government.597 Willing to provide humanitarian aid, Washington remained “neutral” on the
“civil war,” which was labeled an internal conflict, in effect supporting a unified Nigeria and
maintaining Anglo-American solidarity through this rhetoric. At the end of the war, about 500
Christian supporters of Biafra, including the Holy Ghost fathers and other aid workers, were
deported.598 By contrast, McKenna, who promoted Nigerian reunification rather than Biafran
independence, remained in Nigeria until 1980.599
4.8

The New Yorker Considers One Nigeria After Biafra
With Biafran surrender announced by President Philip Effiong on January 12, 1970 –

Ojukwu had fled to Ivory Coast days earlier – U.S. media interest in Biafra and the future of
reunited Nigeria continued for some time. Immediately following the conclusion of the NigeriaBiafra War, there was an urge to make sense of what had happened and an early outpouring of
academic reviews, war stories, and novels.600 Media coverage in 1970 looked toward Nigeria’s
future and the safety of Biafrans, both civilians and soldiers, now under Nigerian control.
In keeping with its earlier coverage, The New Yorker voiced similar concern for the
welfare of Biafrans in a January 24 inclusion in Talk of the Town titled “Aid to the Defeated.”
Reviewing the situation in Biafra, determined dire despite the war’s conclusion and Gowon’s
promises, The New Yorker visited the New York offices of several Biafran relief organizations
including ACKBA, Joint Church Aid, Catholic Relief Services, American Jewish Emergency
Effort for Nigerian-Biafran Relief, Biafra Relief Services Foundation, and Americans for Biafran
Relief and phoned the International Services of the American National Red Cross in Washington.
The consensus showed continued apprehension about the well-being of Biafrans and either a
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disbelief in the Nigerian government’s claim of protection of former Biafrans or at least a lack of
faith that the government would be able to get the supplies of food and other necessities to the
Biafrans in time. “‘[T]he Nigerian government is utterly incapable of mounting a relief effort to
feed all these people … You can’t fool around for three weeks with the life of a starving man,’”
said Reverend Fintan Kilbride of the Holy Ghost Missionaries who had recently returned from a
16-day trip to Biafra and was conferring with the chairman of Americans for Biafran Relief.601
At ACKBA, efforts were being made to convince officials to send telegrams to President
Nixon “asking him to send not only relief but observer teams.”602 The need for American
government involvement was necessitated by Gowon’s condemnation of:
certain of the foreign relief agencies … for having prolonged the war by aiding Biafra…
Spurning any future offers of help from these agencies, and also from any country that
had been ‘studiously hostile’ toward Nigeria … Some of the affected agencies turned to
the United States government in their search for a way to help, but again they were
blocked, for this country’s stated policy involves a willingness to trust the Nigerian
government to behave well toward the former rebels, and to accept the proposition –
disputed by most of the agencies – that Nigeria will be able to provide food and medical
supplies fast enough to prevent millions of people from dying of starvation.603
Even with assistance from the U.S. government, it is questionable that Gowon would
have accepted immediate relief efforts. According to Schwab, on January 11, Nixon had already
ordered Air Force cargo aircraft and helicopters ready to distribute food supplies and authorized
another $10 million in food and medicine. In reply, “Gowon expressed ‘warm appreciation’ for
the offers of aid from Britain and the U.S. but gave no indication when he might give approval to
move the stockpiled food and supplies donated by foreign countries.”604 Massive relief was
available, but the difficulty lay in getting it to those who needed it. “‘There is no need to collect
more food or money now … Everything exists and is ready. The only question is getting the
Nigerians’ permission to bring the supplies in,’” Samuel Krakow, director of International
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Services of the American National Red Cross explains to The New Yorker.605 Multiple contacts
express concern that thousands of Biafrans were hiding in “the bush,” and therefore would not
have access to feeding stations even if food made its way to former Biafran territory. In the
meantime, accusations of genocide continued in The New Yorker reportage. Father Kilbride
recommends an international observer team to witness the conduct of Nigerian soldiers:
“I don’t mean just four or five people – I mean fifty people, or maybe even a hundred.
Because the Biafrans are convinced that they will be exterminated … and there is much
evidence to support this belief – that there will be a selective genocide, that a lot of the
educated people will be killed off, maybe under the pretext of their being war
criminals.”606
Notwithstanding this intense level of concern in January, The New Yorker failed to
continue to assess the situation in Nigeria/Biafra. The next inclusion of Nigeria came in the
March 28 issue with a Talk of the Town article about a Judge Dillard who had just been elected
to the International Court of Justice. Dillard jokes that he can fix a traffic ticket in Cameroon or
Nigeria. Thus, Nigeria has been reinstated to its pre-war status as a symbol of corruption.607 By
July, the conflict could be used as an example of the trouble with Africa in an article questioning
the continuation of the Vietnam War. The reporter interviewed Eugene V. Rostow, Johnson’s
Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1966 to 1969, on the necessity of U.S.
intervention in Vietnam due to his “eagerness to defend it in public.”608 In explaining his take on
U.S.-Africa foreign relations, Rostow referred to the recent war, albeit with mistakes in his
recollection:
“We’ve been very passive about Africa. I don’t think we’ve been doing enough there,
myself. But, again, tensions can build up pretty acutely. Take the Nigerian affair. At first,
our attitude was ‘Let the British take care of it, it’s not our concern.’ Then it went to hell.
And then it became insoluble. We tried to help resolve it through diplomacy, through the
Emperor of Ethiopia and the Organization of African Unity. The Africans didn’t want it
to come to the U.N. They wanted to deal with it themselves.”609
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Coverage of Nigeria in The New Yorker during the remainder of 1970 comprised only
inconsequential mentions in three additional articles. The concern about genocide, the call for
humanitarian relief, and the modernity of Biafra were not raised again that year.
4.9

Conclusion
Biafra’s wartime publicity campaign had long-lasting results, and the war continues to be

explained in terms developed during the crisis. For example, Mark Kurlansky describes the leadup to secession thus: Gowon came to power in a “second coup and slaughtered thousands of Ibos
who were resented for their ability to adapt to modern technology.”610
Throughout the war, Biafra launched a strong international propaganda campaign, which
was widely recognized as more successful than the promotional efforts of the FMG. The
discourses of the Biafran campaign were received with varying levels of acceptance based on the
orientation of the publication, its writers, and its editors. The U.S. government’s consistent
message of political neutrality conflicted with its actual backing of its ally Britain. According to
Frederick Cooper, “the publicity generated sympathy for Biafra and deepened the image of
Africa as a land of starving children victimized by wars that seem a product of irrational tribal
enmity. That it was a war of maneuvering politicians, as much to do with geographic region as
with ethnicity, was more difficult to convey than the stark images.”611 However, coupled with
this lingering image of starvation and suffering were depictions of modern, educated, and savvy
Biafrans, an image that has not similarly embedded itself into Western stereotypes of Africa.
Even with the extensive supply of photos and news reports covering starving children and
dying babies, U.S. media coverage also featured interpretations of the war and its effects. While
a liberal publication like The New Yorker rallied people to bolster humanitarian efforts, Foreign
Affairs paid cursory attention to the crisis and looked toward Nigerian unity. As Forsyth asserted,
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the role of the press was pivotal in the Nigeria-Biafra War, “Looking back it is odd to think that
despite the efforts of the Biafran publicists and lobbyists on their own behalf, this translation of
the Biafra affair from a forgotten bush-war into an international issue was basically caused by a
typewriter and a strip of celluloid, used many times over. It showed the enormous power of the
press to influence opinion when its organs are used in concert.”612
A salient issue for recent scholarship on the conflict, oil drew minimal attention in U.S.
media coverage at the time of the war. Perhaps this was because, as Uche states, “Given the fact
that America had no colonial knowledge of the region, there was no basis for upsetting economic
interests there.”613 While American companies had fledgling operations in Nigeria in 1967, 84%
of the oil at that time was produced by Shell-BP, and Gulf Oil Nigeria, the American oil interest
was located offshore in the Midwest region. “The consequence was that the American
government did not give serious thought to the Biafran secession. It simply treated it as the
internal affair of Nigeria and a British responsibility.”614 The U.S. government “expressed
regret” but continued to reject involvement, “since it considered the dispute to be an internal
matter to be settled by the two disputing parties.”615 However, as evidenced by coverage in
Foreign Affairs and The New Yorker, the American public was responsive to views ranging from
humanitarianism and sympathy of the Biafran cause to admiration for Biafra’s modernity, as well
as advocacy of reunification coupled with reform in post-war Nigeria. In keeping with the handsoff policy of the U.S. government, effectively a vote for Nigerian unity and an endorsement of
British policy, Foreign Affairs inclusions looked only to outline problems and solutions for the
young nation.
Thus, throughout the Nigeria-Biafra War, U.S. media reflected and promoted a
multiplicity of analyses, solutions, and predictions. In The New Yorker, as in Forsyth’s Biafra,
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readers were exposed to a liberal viewpoint and were prompted to become actively involved
through “writing a check” and providing humanitarian aid to the Biafrans who seemingly
provided an example of the success of colonialism’s civilizing mission. The New Yorker
coverage replicated Biafran-initiated discourses of modernity and genocide, also creating an antiConrad discourse that negated the dehumanization of Africans. Even if her humanistic reporting
of African intellectuals and professionals, willing and able to help themselves fight a genocidal
enemy has been abandoned, Adler brought to life for New Yorker readers, for a time, a new
telling of the African story.
And if the Nigeria-Biafra War has been forgotten outside Nigeria, the photographic
images circulated during the conflict have remained. During the late nineteenth and the twentieth
centuries, Africa has been depicted as a space where modernity and “tradition” contended, but
since then, the trope of African suffering has strengthened. Paired with that image, the notion of
a continent in dire need of humanitarian aid, due to war, disease, or poverty, has only solidified
in the reportage of the U.S. media.
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5

THE GENTLE REBEL: HOW THE RADICAL PRESS DISPATCHED AMILCAR
CABRAL’S PLAN TO REMAKE SOCIETY IN GUINEA-BISSAU, 1972-1975
But now the tragedy is too great for us, your Comrades.
The great Cabral is now no more and no more
As the whole wide world does now shockingly know;
The courageous warm Cabral’ll soon be dust,
Will soon be one and the same with the very soil,
The very soil for which while alive he did heartily toil.616
As Biafrans relinquished the fight for independence and Nigeria reunited, the peoples of

“Portuguese Africa” continued their struggle for liberation. Like Patrice Lumumba before him,
African revolutionary Amilcar Cabral was featured on the front page of The New York Times
when he was assassinated in January 1973.617 Cabral, head of the PAIGC, the party fighting
Portuguese colonists for the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, enjoyed a much
better image in the U.S. press than had Lumumba. An agronomist and intellectual, Cabral was
called “The Gentle Rebel” in his TIME magazine obituary.618 Although TIME interpreted the
assassination as a loss to Lisbon in light of Cabral’s moderate stance, it was later determined that
Portuguese forces were behind his murder. Cabral’s death only strengthened the PAIGC’s
resolve: nine months later, its leaders declared Guinea-Bissau’s independence on September 24,
1973.619 The following April in Lisbon, fed up with colonial wars the country was fighting in
Angola, Mozambique, and East Timor as well as Guinea-Bissau, the Portuguese military staged a
coup, and the new government in September 1974, formally granted freedom to Guinea-Bissau.
However, the goals of the PAIGC were not met completely until Lisbon conferred independence
to Cape Verde in 1975.
By the early 1970s, the question of colonialism and decolonization had become less
prominent in U.S. press coverage. A decade had passed since the United Nations issued its 1960
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Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the
majority of African countries were now independent. In the United States, the New Left was
peaking, the Civil Rights Movement had given way to Black Power, and women’s rights and gay
rights were rising on the agenda for social change. The Vietnam War had eclipsed American
worries about Soviet influence in Africa. U.S. interest in Africa often focused on white minority
rule in South Africa and Rhodesia. Between 1956, when the PAIGC was formed, and 1972, on
the eve of Cabral’s murder, he was featured in almost thirty articles in The New York Times.
Given their strategic location and vast resources, Angola and Mozambique earned thousands of
inclusions in that newspaper. “The economic links between the Portuguese territories and
Rhodesia and South Africa are strong, and likely to grow stronger,” The Times of London news
team determined in 1968.620
The New York Times’ relative lack of coverage of Guinea-Bissau was not mirrored by the
radical press. These outlets, which flourished during the late 1960s and early 1970s, set new
agendas for what counted as important news, and framed stories and people in independent ways.
Media scholars Linda Lumsden and Janice Hume ague that social movements have not fared
well in mainstream coverage, but the radical press emerged to redress this negative treatment.621
Including the radical press in any inquiry concerning press coverage of anticolonialism in West
Africa seems vital. Yet, as communication professor and former editor of Monthly Review
Robert W. McChesney points out, “Journalism historians have shown a remarkable
disinclination to study the radical and noncommercial press, particularly in the twentieth
century.” He suggests this is because journalism history and the field of communication
“nurtured by corporate grants and close links to the media industry, have yet to cut the umbilical
cord and seriously entertain any notion of meaningful social criticism.”622
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Media scholar Elaine Windrich examines U.S. media coverage of the Reagan-era conflict
in Angola and the propping up of “freedom fighter” Jonas Savimbi. She relied on numerous
media sources, most in the mainstream press, but also some “right-wing and conservative”
publications. When mentioning media that opposed Savimbi, she points out that “no label would
accurately describe such diverse opposition sources as the alternative press, publications of the
anti-apartheid movement, the churches and the Afro-American community, and some of the
mainstream press.”623 As the war continued, interest grew, and the interest in South Africa
received greater scrutiny. Windrich’s study suggests there is much still to learn about the role
and reach of the radical print media in the relationship between the United States and West
Africa in the age of independence.
Considering the breadth of approving American media representations of Cabral, this
chapter begins by reviewing the treatment of his death in The New York Times, which offers a
baseline to which radical media outlets can be compared. What initially interested me about
mainstream characterizations of Cabral was the fact that despite his obvious Marxist outlook and
the PAIGC’s goal of social transformation as well as political independence, the U.S.
mainstream media focused instead on his reluctant use of violence, soft voice, fondness for
poetry, and other qualities not typically ascribed to African leaders. Cabral did indeed have a
melodious voice and a peaceful manner, even though many photos showed him in fatigues
surrounded by PAIGC fighters. Cabral’s image is something of an anomaly among African
leaders considered in this dissertation: Nkrumah, Touré, Lumumba, Gowon, and Ojukwu.
Building on Cabral’s mainstream U.S. media image, this chapter explores coverage of Cabral in
the leftist African American quarterly Freedomways, the radical monthly Ramparts, and the
underground Atlanta weekly The Great Speckled Bird. Aiming for congruency, most articles
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under review concern Cabral’s death and the aftermath. Stephanie Urdang’s book Fighting Two
Colonialisms is also considered for its look at the work of the PAIGC to liberate women,
something that was not a focus of media coverage in mainstream or radical press outlets.
5.1

Background to Liberation
Portugal’s involvement in African began some six centuries ago. Slaves were part of the

trade between Portuguese and Africans in small trading posts along the Rio Grande. GuineaBissau is a small country, about the size of Switzerland and at the time of the liberation struggle
had a population of fewer than one million Africans, 35,000 Portuguese soldiers, and a few
thousand Portuguese civilians. With the scramble in Africa, the territory was given to the
Portuguese as a wedge between the British and French empires in West Africa. Siting today
between Senegal and Guinea (Conakry), it once stopped the French from taking a long and
continuous swath of West African coast.624 Initially, the Portuguese did not have significant
plans for the territory, nor did they understand much about the region. However, the requirement
of “effective occupation” according to the Berlin Conference, led wars of conquest against the
indigenous peoples. Pacification proved a slow process, which was achieved after some fifty
years of military campaigning.625
The land of Guinea-Bissau includes swampy lowlands along the coast and an interior of
grasslands, forests, and savanna. A network of rivers characterizes the western and southern
areas including estuaries from the Atlantic. Most of the urban areas are located near the coast.
“The topographical features of Guinea-Bissau are striking in their variety in view of the limited
land mass of the country.”626 Lands near rivers are fertile, while other areas have been depleted
of minerals and subjected to erosion and aridity, although most land offers “varying degrees of
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soil fecundity making possible the cultivation of a wide range of tropical as well as more
temperate products.”627 The Portuguese utilized Guinea-Bissau as an agricultural producer; the
main crop was peanuts. As is common in colonial situations, this cash crop was cultivated at the
expense of staple food crops.
Until military rule began in Portugal in 1926, the Portuguese colonial record was better
than that of the Belgians. In 1932, António Salazar took the position of Prime Minister of
Portugal, and under his conservative, “fascist” government, forced labor accompanied lack of
opportunity for Africans. Economically, the colony was run as a monopolist trading company,
the Uniao Fabril. The structure allowed for minimal development with much of the population
forced to produce cash crops.628 Portugal did little to “improve” Guinea-Bissau. “At home and in
overseas Africa, according to official statistics and information in the early 1960’s [sic], Portugal
lagged behind the welfare programs established in other European countries.”629 Although,
Portuguese colonial policy offered assimilation, the colonial government made achieving the
preferential status of “assimilado” nearly impossible. In order to become assimilado, an African
had to speak proper Portuguese, prove good character, qualify as educated, earn sufficient
income, and manage a significant amount of paperwork. In Guinea-Bissau, only 1% of the
population was literate at an elementary level.630 On the Cape Verdean Islands, things were
different. Islanders became citizens in 1914 and were treated as assimilados.”631 Salazar’s
government did not eliminate this policy. Born in Guinea-Bissau to Cape Verdean parents,
Cabral was classified as assimilado.
His status as an assimilado permitted Cabral, a rarity among Guinea-Bissauans, to travel
for advanced studies in Lisbon where, like the founders of négritude in the 1930s, he met other
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colonial students and initiated a project for change. Cabral worked with Angolans Agostinho
Neto and Mário Pinto de Andrade to form the Centre for African Studies in Lisbon, claiming
they wanted to study native African languages. The Centre allowed them to pursue political
discussions about how they could play a part in liberating their countries. Upon examining the
colonial structure, they determined that no real progress could be made within the framework the
Portuguese had put in place.632 When Cabral returned to Africa, he worked as an agricultural
engineer, which allowed him to tour most of Guinea-Bissau and gain a deep understanding about
the cultures and peoples living throughout the territory. This experience proved critical when he
began to organize the PAIGC and later envision its guerrilla war strategy.
In 1956, Cabral led the formation of the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independencia da
Guiné e Cabo Verde), a clandestine political organization. When striking dockworkers were
“shot back to work by the police” who killed fifty participants on August 3, 1959, the “whole
situation suddenly sharpened.”633 On September 19, the PAIGC leaders met to declare struggle
against the Portuguese “‘by all possible means, including war.’”634 Their strategy would be to
mobilize the peasants in the countryside, strengthen the organization in urban areas but keep it a
secret, develop unity around the Party of the African masses without discrimination, prepare as
many cadres as possible, reach out to émigrés in neighboring territories, and work to acquire the
means that would be needed for success. This meant that the struggle for liberation would also
need to develop outside of the country, and bases were set up across the borders in Sékou
Touré’s Guinea (Conakry) and Léopold Sédar Senghor’s Senegal.
Cabral and the PAIGC did not rush into war. They began with acts of sabotage began in
1962, and armed struggle officially commenced on January 23, 1963 with an attack on the
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Portuguese barracks at Tite.635 For several years, the PAIGC recruited, educated, and trained.
“The PAIGC needed three years of active political work in the villages before they could reply to
the Portuguese with guerrilla warfare.”636 Cabral tailored the liberation struggle and its message
to the needs and context of the Guinea-Bissauan peasants. The PAIGC fought a guerrilla war for
many years, step by step, as Cabral would say, taking over territory and setting up an alternative
government. Rather than beginning with the cities, they worked through the forest and
agricultural areas so that by the early 1970s, they controlled what they called liberated zones in
two-thirds of the country. Just before Cabral’s death, he was planning to go to the U.N. to
declare an independent nation based on the territory the PAIGC governed. The rest of the
territory, they claimed, was under enemy occupation.
Cabral grounded his theory and practice of revolution on a “Marxist analysis of social
reality” and, more importantly, “an analysis of social reality in [Guinea-Bissau].”637 For Cabral,
revolution had to be accompanied by social transformation. “Hence the central concept of
national liberation was to be defined not so much as the right of a people to rule itself, but as the
right of a people to regain its own history: ‘to liberate, that is, the means and process of
development of its own productive forces.’”638 Thus, in the midst of the struggle in 1966, Cabral
laid out a plan for “political action, armed action, and national reconstruction,” which needed to
occur simultaneously.639 While fighting the Portuguese, the PAIGC must “Find better solutions
for the economic, administrative, social, and cultural problems of the liberated areas, increase
farming production, develop craft-industry, lay foundations for at least rudimentary industrial
production, and continue to improve our health and education services.”640 Along with
education, production, and political participation, women’s emancipation was part of the process
of social transformation sought by the PAIGC. “Armed struggle and defeat of the colonialists
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was not the ultimate goal; rather, the overall perspective of the PAIGC embraced the need
simultaneously to pick up arms and to build a new, nonexploitative society.” The PAIGC
ideology integrated the “emancipation of women into the total revolution.”641
Cabral did not live to witness the full results of the PAIGC revolutionary strategy.
Outside his Conakry home one night, returning from an event, Cabral was shot by Inocencio
Kani, a PAIGC member who had been turned by Portugal. Now led by Marcelo Caetano, the
Portuguese had determined that killing Cabral and other leaders of the PAIGC would cripple the
organization and disrupt the liberation struggle. However, this strategy proved unsuccessful.
The plan to behead the PAIGC failed, for the collective leadership had escaped intact,
minus Cabral. In fact, Cabral’s assassination had a paradoxical impact unforeseen by
[Portuguese General António de] Spinola. With Cabral, the PAIGC had achieved a great
deal. He had steered the party and its nationalist army to critically acclaimed success. He
had helped transform the party and its structures into an entity greater than himself. The
party was now indeed indispensible, even as Cabral proved not to be. He had become less
than what he had helped create. And what he had helped create proved capable of
marching forward with new leadership. That truly was the greatest achievement of
Cabral, the true slave to a vision – an ordinary man gripped by history to do his job in the
context of his time.642
Shortly prior to Cabral’s assassination, the Portuguese had put in place some belated
measures to improve the lives of the people in its colonial territories, hoping to win them over.
Portugal was a small country without great wealth, and the colonial wars were draining its
coffers. Nevertheless, Portugal was unwilling to part with the small Guinea-Bissau, lest it
encourage resource-rich Angola and Mozambique to intensify their efforts for independence.
People around the world mourned Cabral’s death. He had traveled extensively and
spoken at the United Nations about Guinea-Bissau’s fight for liberation. He was known for his
soft-spoken, philosophical nature. Even though his guerrilla war was Marxist-inspired, Cabral
was treated with respect in mainstream U.S. media coverage. However, the United States

181

government would never back the liberation struggle against its NATO ally.643 In 1971,
Washington and Lisbon signed the Azores Agreement, which provided $436 million in muchneeded aid over a two-year period, “roughly equivalent to Lisbon’s annual $400 million military
security budget, most of which” supported “three colonial wars.”644
5.2

The Mainstream Press Laments Cabral’s Death
By the early 1970s, American publications covered African colonial wars in a social and

political climate that had undergone several shifts since the Congo crisis. The civil rights and
later black power movements, the New Left, Vietnam, and Watergate affected the way writers
reported and readers understood events like Cabral’s assassination. Coupled with the growth of
alternative media sources, such as the “underground” press, the demographic of mainstream
media staff had begun to change. At the elite mainstream New York Times, for example, black
journalists Thomas A. Johnson and C. Gerald Fraser would contribute some of the pieces about
the PAIGC’s murdered leader.
Johnson joined the paper in February 1966, “the only black reporter at The Times,”
according to former managing editor Arthur Gelb.645 He was one of the first black journalists to
serve as a foreign correspondent for a major daily newspaper and was stationed in Lagos, Nigeria
from 1972 to 1975, which allowed him to provide copy following Cabral’s January 20, 1973
assassination.646 Based in Vietnam among other locations prior to his stint in Africa, Johnson
won awards for his coverage of black servicemen. With The New York Times, he “often found
himself as both a reporter and an interpreter of racial conflict and change.”647 Johnson’s fellow
reporter Fraser had worked for The Amsterdam News, a hotel workers union newspaper, West
Indian publications, and The New York Daily News before joining The New York Times in 1967.
As a metropolitan staff reporter, he “became a vocal advocate for improving coverage of issues
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important to blacks and expanding opportunities for black journalists.”648 He reported on the
Attica rebellion in 1971 as well as the presidential campaign of Shirley Chisholm in 1972.
With their coverage of Cabral’s death, Johnson and Fraser relied less on African
stereotypes and accusations of communism than we have seen in mainstream media coverage of
Sékou Touré or Lumumba. In fact, Times readers had the opportunity to revisit Guinea and its
leader Sékou Touré when Johnson attended Cabral’s funeral in Conakry.649 A far cry from the
dancing women, shrieking griots, and wild beating of the tom toms that characterized Guinea’s
independence celebration in TIME, during this dignified ceremony, Cabral’s carriage was
“slowly paced by drums and horns” as “thousands of Guinean military men and women,
policemen and workers paraded through the stadium.”650 Johnson makes it clear who Guinea’s
allies are, mentioning that parade participants carried “a mixed assortment of Soviet-made rifles,
automatic rifles and submachine guns” while “six MIG fighters roared overhead.”651 Yet,
Guinea’s enemy was quickly identified as Sékou Touré called to the crowd, “‘Racism?,’
‘Imperialism?,’ ‘Fascism?’” to which the “multitude” responded “No!” each time. The prior day,
Johnson had attended a symposium in honor of Cabral including “more than seven hours of
eulogies and denunciations of ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism.’” Speakers included American
writer Amiri Baraka (the former LeRoi Jones), a North Vietnamese delegation, Pedro Soarez,
“leader of Portugal’s outlawed Communist party, who blamed ‘Portuguese fascists’ for the
Cabral murder,” and a “bearded, heavy-set Portuguese of about 30” who said that the leaders of
the armed struggle inside Portugal “supported Mr. Cabral and opposed ‘fascism.’”652 Thus, while
acknowledging the Soviet and Communist ties of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, Johnson highlights
what Cabral’s mourners identified as their enemy - fascism, possibly the only “ism” that could
have trumped communism for American readers, in Portugal. In fact, he closes with a brief
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paragraph about Guinea, explaining that under Touré, the country “had followed a policy of
‘African scientific socialism’” and even if Guinea had “numerous Chinese and Soviet advisers,”
it also enjoyed “substantial American investment in bauxite-mining operations.”653
Johnson had already contributed to an earlier piece on Cabral in The World section of the
Sunday New York Times. This article included a section carrying C. Gerald Fraser’s byline along
with a map of Africa marking the areas affected by “rebellion” and noting, “Two leaders of antiPortuguese rebellions in Africa … have been assassinated in recent years: Eduardo Mondlane …
and Amilcar Cabral.”654 In the first portion of the article, Johnson describes Cabral as “the small,
soft-spoken Cape Verdean” and reviews some of his achievements, such as “winning about two
thirds of the 13,948 square miles of Guinea-Bissau, as a United Nations observer team has
verified.” Johnson refers to reports that Cabral’s forces had conducted elections, created a
national assembly, and set up 200 primary schools, four hospitals, and 200 clinics.
Generally, the P.A.I.G.C. military operations have left some 10,000 Portuguese troops in
control only of the cities. Recently Mr. Cabral said he would declare the independence of
the areas controlled by his forces and movement sources say he had been promised the
backing of some 70 nations for the move … only history can tell whether Mr. Cabral’s
hope of ousting the Portuguese – or claiming independence – will be set back, or even
ended.655
Johnson explains why the little country of Guinea-Bissau matters: “the assassination has
ramifications beyond the borders of Guinea-Bissau. Portuguese soldiers are also fighting to hold
onto the vast colonies of Angola and Mozambique.” He points out that some organizations
involved in “liberation movements” use “friendly African countries as their bases for making
forays into white-held regions.”656
The second piece of the “Symbol of Hope” article was written by Fraser and begins with
the sub-headline: “He Knew He Was A Marked Man.” Fraser provides details from Cabral’s
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visit to the United States the previous October and characterizes him as fitting in easily to
Western urban life: “Amilcar Cabral sat comfortably in an East Side Manhattan hotel room one
Saturday morning.” This image is consistent with Cabral’s overall profile in mainstream U.S.
media as a sophisticated intellectual. The remainder of the article features Cabral in his own
words, allowing him a measure of self-representation. Cabral recounts an attempt on his life,
explaining that the Portuguese think if they kill him, the fight will be finished. Fraser inserts a
quick background about the assassination of Mondlane of FRELIMO, the Mozambican liberation
movement, before allowing Cabral to continue to express his political ideology.
“The struggle for independence,” he said, “is not only in order to get a flag and an
anthem. Independence means something. In our own case, for us the means to change
radically the economical, social and cultural situation of our African people.”
“We fight against colonialism because colonialism is the first obstacle. We are not
against the Portuguese. We are against the Portuguese colonialism … [because] it means
humiliation, exploitation. Our people were considered … like animals. Through the
Portuguese law, in Guinea 99 per cent of the population were considered ‘indigenous’ –
that is to say without any kind of rights. The Portuguese after 500 years of presence in
our country, of more than 100 years of colonial domination, colonial peace, left us with
99.9 per cent of the [population] illiterate. Only 14 people had passed a superior course –
a university.”657
Taken together with Johnson’s description of the schools, hospitals, and other advances the
PAIGC had made, readers would understand that Guinea-Bissau had achieved more during the
years of its liberation struggle than Portugal had during centuries of colonial domination.
These balanced and approving depictions of Cabral by black reporters Johnson and Fraser
were indicative of the range of New York Times coverage of his death. A short announcement in
“The Major Events of the Day” on January 22, 1973 called him a leader in the struggle “against
white supremacy.”658 A January 24 article titled “Gentle Revolutionary” began, “By dint of
intelligence, industry and luck, Amilcar Cabral” was “sent off to Lisbon for university training
by the white rulers of Portuguese Guinea.” He could have become an assimilado, the article
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explains, however, he chose to work for self-determination and independence for his people and
“launched an armed struggle to liberate his country.”659 He was a “soft-spoken agronomist” who
established schools and hospitals, and despite military successes, he “never gave up hope of
negotiating a peaceful path to independence.” In fact, when he addressed the United Nations in
October 1972, “he listed first among his proposals ‘the immediate start of negotiations’ between
Portugal and the P.A.I.G.C.” The article warns that Cabral’s death may have negative
ramifications for Portugal if the next leader of the PAIGC lacks “residual affection for the
Portuguese” that Cabral possessed.660
5.3

Freedomways: Without Prejudice or Gag
In the early 1960s, following in the tradition of Paul Robeson’s monthly Freedom, some

friends who had been active in the Southern Negro Youth Congress (SNYC) and were now
living in New York City founded the quarterly journal Freedomways, kicking off twenty-five
years of political and literary features from the black left.661 The founders comprised black
activists from the 1940s who “managed to survive the repression of the Cold War … and carried
forth the radical and progressive ideals” of that era.662
In the inaugural issue, Spring 1961, the editors described the goals in forming the
publication:
Conceived of necessity and with impetuous ardour … FREEDOMWAYS is born of the
necessity for a vehicle of communication which will mirror developments in the
diversified and many-sided struggles of the Negro people. It will provide a public forum
for the review, examination, and debate of all problems confronting Negroes in the
United States.663
In addition to highlighting issues facing black Americans, Freedomways always sought to
connect the struggle at home to the global anticolonial and anti-imperialist movement:
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FREEDOMWAYS offers a means of examining experiences and strengthening the
relationship among peoples of African descent in this country, in Latin America, and
wherever there are communities of such people anywhere in the world. It will furnish
accurate information on the liberation movements in Africa itself.
FREEDOMWAYS will explore, without prejudice or gag, and from the viewpoint of the
special interests of American Negroes, as well as the general interest of the nation, the
new forms of economic, political and social systems now existing or emerging in the
world.664
In keeping with this international mindset, contributors included figures like Martin
Luther King, Jr., Alex Haley, Lorraine Hansberry, Alice Walker, Langston Hughes, and James
Baldwin, but also Pablo Neruda, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius K. Nyerere, Agostinho Neto, Jomo
Kenyatta, C.L.R. James, and Cheddi Jagan, as well as global American figures including Paul
Robeson, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Shirley Graham Du Bois. According to founder and managing
editor Esther Cooper Jackson,
When we were starting the journal, Du Bois advised, “Make sure that you show the
relationship of our struggle to people who are struggling all over the world, that we are
not alone. These are out brothers and sisters.” So, from the beginning Freedomways
sought to include articles from people in anticolonial battles in emerging nations … The
pieces written by liberation fighters kept American readers informed about the liberation
struggles in Angola and South African that were encouraged by the newly free nations
like Ghana and Guinea.665
In fact, Thomas Kanza, Lumumba’s representative in the United Nations, was one of the
keynote speakers at Freedomways’ first public meeting. Shirley Graham Du Bois served as
general editor while in Africa and wrote many early editorials; she was associated with the
magazine until her death in 1977. With Robeson’s help – he was living in London after his U.S.
passport was returned in the late 1950s – Freedomways gained an audience that included
subscriptions from foreign universities. “In the 1960s and early 1970s, Freedomways extended
its solidarity coverage with reports on the antiwar movement as it related to blacks,” and was the
first black publication “to take a firm stand against the Vietnam War.”666 Criticized by Harold
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Cruse in The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual for not taking a black nationalist position – he said
the publication had “ become a superfluous trimming for the integration movement” –
Freedomways featured voices of “the entire Negro integrationist elite.”667 Nevertheless, by
linking liberation struggles taking place throughout the world with the freedom struggle in the
United States, the editors “played an essential role in bridging the divide between the civil rights
mainstream and the more radical articulations of international black political and cultural
autonomy that had existed for decades but quantitatively expanded throughout the 1960s and
early 1970s.”668
Freedomways published stories, poems, and reviews of books and music as well as
political writing. Some issues contained illustrations. In the nature of political cartoons, these
renderings often spread across multiple pages in more of a graphic novel style. The journal did
not feature advertising other than promotion of its own offerings – special issues, requests for
donations, or even sets of Freedomways holiday greeting cards. In layout, Freedomways
mimicked a book so that the overall style was unencumbered, and the text meant everything.
Media scholars Olive Vassell and Todd Steven Burroughs assert that Freedomways was
subsidized by the CPUSA, the Soviet Union, and China.669 Esther Jackson’s husband James was
a member as was she, although she pulled back from Party activities as Freedomways launched.
Freedomways did represent a “continuation of the political legacy set out by the founding cadre
from SNYC,” which was often “viewed by its critics as falling within the ideological sphere of
the [Communist Party].” In fact, the FBI called it a Communist publication and kept an eye on
it.670
Having come of “political age in an era of black Popular Front activism” in the 1930s and
1940s, the Freedomways founders “drew upon their experiences in broad multi-racial political
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coalitions comprised of radical leftists and progressive liberals.”671 Jackson “held on to a
Popular Front-style approach, wherein contributors from a broad range of political persuasions
could publish work.”672 In the 1960s, however, this approach was no longer inspired by the
increasingly hidebound CPUSA.673 Jackson’s success with Freedomways “existed outside of the
Communist Party,” thriving on new forces in a tumultuous time.674
Jackson downplayed the journal’s political stance and highlighted its diversity:
On the staff and editorial board of Freedomways were people of various political views.
Many different views were represented in the magazine, including those of communists.
Sometimes we printed views we did not agree with, and we published letters from readers
who took issue with previous articles. That was healthy – to have different points of view
and have people react to them.675
In fact, inward-looking and narrow-minded Party members questioned the way Freedomways
“offered a forum for activists in the black freedom movement who supported nationalism and
other ideas rejected by the Party.”676 As part of its focus on African Americans and the African
diaspora, Freedomways espoused a policy of black editorial control. This was so important to
Jackson that Freedomways alienated Herbert Aptheker, the editor of Political Affairs and literary
executor of Du Bois, by not inviting him onto the editorial board.677
Yet, thanks to connections the founders and editors had to the black political and literary
worlds, Freedomways began with a strong following that grew “as writers and editors came to
the forefront of the burgeoning civil rights activity of the 1960s.”678 The initial 1961 run was
2,000 copies.679 By 1967, paid circulation had risen to 5,000, and by the mid-1970s, it was
approximately 8,000. Perhaps more importantly, 300 U.S. libraries as well as more than a dozen
foreign libraries, held subscriptions. Major universities and institutions like the Bibliothèque
Nationale in Paris “held complete sets of the magazine.”680 What stands out about Freedomways’
coverage of Africa is that it was not just African American driven but African driven. Inclusions
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about Guinea-Bissau’s independence struggle, for example, were often written by members of
the PAIGC or other Africans.
5.3.1

Freedomways Covers the Liberation Struggle of Guinea-Bissau

In its First Quarter 1973 issue, Freedomways managed to include recognition of Amilcar
Cabral’s recent death with a one-page “In Memoriam.” These notices were regular features as
fighters in the struggle for black liberation were lost. For example, Nagi Daifullah and Juan de la
Cruz, farm workers who were murdered in California while defending the right to strike and
organize, were included in the Third Quarter 1973 issue. While Cabral earned an entire page,
other warriors had smaller notices taking up just a partial page. Displaying the editors’ complete
admiration for the PAIGC leader, Cabral’s notice read:
In Memoriam: Amilcar Cabral leader of the revolution in Guinea-Bissau, co-founder of
the Popular Movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA), born 1924, Assassinated
January 20, 1973
ALL WHO REGARD THE STRUGGLE AGAINST RACISM AND COLONIALISM
AS A SACRED OBLIGATION WILL REMEMBER AND BE INSPIRED BY THE
OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION OF THIS GREAT AFRICAN SCIENTIST AND
REVOLUTIONARY681
Including the language about “racism and colonialism” linked the PAIGC’s work in GuineaBissau with the global anticolonial struggle as well as the fight for racial equality at home.
Freedomways featured the poem “In the Memory of Comrade Amilcar Cabral” by
Zimbabwean poet F. T. K. Karimakwenda later that year in the Fourth Quarter issue. The poem
had been read at the Memorial Service held for Cabral in New York City on January 24, 1973. It
is filled with laments for the “Founder and inspiration” who possessed a “smiling, cheerful
face.”682 These somewhat saintly images of Cabral are contrasted with his assassins who were
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“cowardly and horrible,” with “hired bullets” that killed him in “a way terrible,” and “horribly
wrenched” his life away.683
Nevertheless, even though “the tragedy is too great,” Karimakwenda rallies those who are
part of the freedom fight:
Comrades! Comrades! be never dismayed;
The Great Cabral still lives in our very midst;
In each of our hearts which for him yearned
Let us know that always and hold it dear to our hearts …
That living heart now lies alone and cold in a grave
But the soul always’ll be warm and’ll love forever and ever
AND will continue to inspire all of us forever and ever;
That dear warm soul will desert all of us never
As with those dear souls of Lumumba, Mondlane and Nkrumah.684
More than simply eulogizing the fallen leader, Karimakwenda’s poem demands that the
fight against Portuguese colonialism continue, a vital comment considering the Portuguese
thought that decapitating the PAIGC would end its war for liberation. Words from an African
writer on African issues were a common feature in Freedomways, unlike so much earlier
mainstream media coverage of Africa in which Africans were represented by American or
European writers and experts. For liberation struggles in the Portuguese colonies, Freedomways
had already opened up the discursive space to allow members of the struggle to speak for
themselves.
Although a 1967 article “American Investment in Portuguese Africa: A Problem of
‘Democratic’ Colonialism” was written by a New York City-based freelance writer, the subject
of that piece looks more at American involvement in aiding Portugal in maintaining its colonial
possessions and how “Americans have become … ‘democratic imperialists.’”685 As war
continued to rage in the Portuguese colonies, the Third Quarter 1972 issue included articles on
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liberation in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. “The National Liberation Struggle in
Mozambique: A Process of Transformation,” written by Armando Panguene, a representative of
FRELIMO, outlines the tenets of the “national liberation struggle and the people’s war.”686 Like
Freedomways editors, Panguene depicted the fight for the independence of Mozambique as part
of a larger global imperative.
“Guinea-Bissau’s Liberation Struggle Against Portuguese Colonialism” immediately
followed the feature about Mozambique. Again providing direct discursive space to those
involved in the liberation movement, the article was authored by Cruz Pinto, “a representative of
PAIGC.”687 Pinto makes five arguments in the article: liberation, revolution, and social
transformation must be linked (this is Cabral’s overarching liberation premise); the PAIGC’s
armed struggle is justified; the fight against imperialism and racism is a global issue; the United
States is complicit in Portugal’s war to keep Guinea-Bissau colonized; and the PAIGC has
achieved positive results for its liberated zones. While Cabral claimed that the PAIGC’s program
was not narrowly Marxist, Pinto invokes rhetoric from the global culture of communism, such as
referring to Cabral as “Comrade.”
Pinto begins the article by first explaining that independence will not be enough and must
be accompanied by social transformation. “National liberation requires that there be a profound
change in the process of the development of the productive forces, that is to say, it necessarily
corresponds to a revolution … National liberation takes place when all the productive forces
have been freed from every kind of foreign domination.”688
Second, he justifies the war in several ways, pointing out that the world is on their side:
“Today the whole world calls for an end to repression and the use of force against the people
submitted to colonial regimes, and for support to the liberation movements in their legitimate
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struggle to suppress colonialism and all other forms of foreign domination quickly.”689 The U.N.
has recognized the legitimacy of their struggle and with Resolution 1514 (XV) – Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples – insists on self-determination
for all peoples.690 Likewise, “the OAU, the African States and the anti-colonialist forces have
recognized our party as the true and legitimate representative of our people.”691 Portugal has
been making concessions for a “better Guinea,” however, as “Comrade Cabral” told the [UN]
Security Council on Africa, “the claims of Portuguese colonialism regarding the multi-racial
society as well as reforms are nothing but clumsy attempts to perpetuate colonial exploitation of
our people by trying to camouflage a primitive racism which has always characterized the
Portuguese in Africa.”692
Third, Pinto professes a bond with Freedomways readers, claiming that the struggle of
the PAIGC against imperialism and racism is a global one. The “peoples” understand that the
anti-imperialist struggle is common, and there must be a general offensive against
imperialism.693 Drawing parallels between the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau and of the
Americans in Vietnam, Pinto describes the colonists’ use of aerial bombing against the liberated
zones, the burning of harvests and killing of livestock in order to starve the people, and the use of
toxic agents and defoliants supplied by the United States.
Weapons from the United States provide evidence of Pinto’s fourth assertion, which is
that the United States and other NATO allies, are at least partially to blame for the continuation
of the war. He considers Washington’s use of the Azores for a military base and its grant of $436
million in aid. Without economic assistance, Portugal could not continue fighting. American aid
meant that the United States was complicit in the colonial war even if not directly involved
militarily. The real villains were those who invested in these regimes and “who have an interest
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in maintaining racism and racial discrimination.”694 Elsewhere, Pinto specifically blames NATO
members for giving “their protection and support to the Pretoria-Salisburg-[sic]-Lisbon politicomilitary bloc,” and asserts, “All the members of NATO must bear some responsibility for the
continuance of the colonial system.”695
Finally, despite the cooperation of so many powerful countries against the liberation of
Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC, in partnership with the people, has accomplished much. The colonial
economic structures and colonial production relations have been eliminated in the liberated
zones. This is another example of Marxist rhetoric that would have resounded with readers of
Freedomways. The governance of the liberated zones has been restructured politically into
committees, which “are the organs of popular power and are directly elected by the people.”696
The struggle has benefited the masses who previously lived in “slavery and indignity.” Their
success has come from their ability to organize and lead, “a new consciousness and a new man
are being created in this struggle: people who are aware of their rights and their duties, of being
human and African, and who are also keen on implementing fully the objectives of our party.”697
Examples of social transformation include upcoming elections for regional councils and the first
National Assembly of Guinea, increased staple crop (rice) cultivation, development of
cooperative production, and the training of personnel, including 425 people who had already
been sent abroad to become “doctors, engineers, economists, lawyers and various
technicians.”698 Conversely, the more than 500 years Portugal occupied the territory, led to only
fourteen Guinea-Bissauans with higher education and eleven with technical education.
Although Cabral did not live to see independence, Freedomways continued to follow the
story of the PAIGC’s liberation struggle, which culminated in the publication of an article from
“The Editors” on the Third Quarter 1974 announcing victory. Portugal’s belated
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acknowledgement of Guinea-Bissau’s independence, following the lead of no fewer than eighty
U.N. member states, is “a tribute to the heroism and determination of the people of GuineaBissau, the leadership of the PAIGC in this revolution, and a fitting tribute to the martyred
founder of this liberation movement, the great African patriot Amilcar Cabral.”699 According to
the editors, the victory represented an outstanding example of internationalism.
5.4

Ramparts: The Disloyal Opposition
If the design of Freedomways was almost bookish, Ramparts was its antithesis. Covers in

the early 1970s might be anything from a raw picture of Vietnam casualties to a staged photo of
John and Yoko. They were often anti-glamour, anti-photojournalism images that “screamed” at
viewers rather than attracted. Indigenous people, the poor, all kinds of the world’s Others were
shown in stark reality instead of idealized. The layout of the table of contents, titled “Herein,”
changed regularly so that moving from one issue to the next felt somewhat jarring; there was no
sense of knowing what to expect. “It represented what Todd Gitlin called ‘a New Left sensibility
goes Pop’ that helped produce ‘A glamour of rebellion, a rebellion of glamour.’”700
Ramparts first appeared in May 1962, and lasted until 1975. Its genealogy demonstrates
its influence, according to the magazine’s biographer Peter Richardson. For example, two former
Ramparts writers launched Rolling Stone. Many Ramparts editors went on to long careers in
journalism on both the left and the right. Contributors included Noam Chomsky, Bobby Seale,
and Tom Hayden, and the magazine included literary works from Kurt Vonnegut, Gabriel Garcia
Márquez, Ken Kesey, and Erica Jong. “By 1968, the magazine had ... forged links to the Black
Panther Party, exposed illegal CIA activities in America and Vietnam, published the diaries of
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Che Guevara and staff writer Eldridge Cleaver, and boosted its monthly circulation to almost
250,000."701
The San Francisco Bay Area magazine was founded by Edward M. Keating, who
intended it to be a Catholic intellectual publication. A Stanford graduate and adopted son of a
millionaire, Keating had planned to finance the magazine with what was left of his trust fund, but
his wife Helen inherited a large fortune, and he was able to launch it from a much sounder
footing.702 Ramparts followed the opposite trajectory of The New Republic, which began as a
progressive outlet but became decidedly liberal over the years. Ramparts swung from liberal
Catholicism to the far left. The magazine’s initially "idiosyncratic nature" owed a lot to Catholics
like Keating, who opposed racial inequality and supported civil rights but "could be
conservative, even reactionary" on other issues.703 Keating wanted Ramparts to “host serious
discussions between the Catholic clergy and the laity."704 The magazine slowly tackled more
controversial issues such as violence in Mississippi and Harlem. With the October 1964 issue, a
change to saddle-stitch binding, the inclusion of more advertising, and a new look transformed
Ramparts into “a slick” journal.705
Ramparts rejected the Johnson administration’s official line on Vietnam in 1965, and the
staff became increasingly leftist in orientation. The editors included Warren Hinckle III, Robert
Scheer, David Horowitz, Pete Collier, and Adam Hochschild. Keating was eventually removed
once he stopped funding the magazine. When Eldridge Cleaver was released from prison, he
joined the Ramparts staff. "Cleaver’s essays in Ramparts coincided with rising black nationalism
in the Bay Area,” and Ramparts supported the Black Panther Party with coverage. In fact,
Ramparts editors were a major force in generating respectability for the Panthers.706 Harold
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Cruse had once criticized Freedomways for its failure to engage with black nationalism, but the
West Coast Ramparts took up the charge. The magazine also achieved something that Monthly
Review, for all of its concern with workers, seemed unable to do – it reached an economically
varied demographic. In January 1973, a reader whose letter was published described herself as
“being on the poor side;” and explained that she regularly read the magazine at the library.707
Ramparts itself earned plenty of publicity. Editor Scheer appeared on Firing Line, a
television program that featured debates with conservative host William F. Buckley. The
episode’s title was "Is Ramparts magazine un-American?"708 Several of the team were called
before a New York grand jury for burning draft cards on the cover of the December 1967 issue,
and TIME and Esquire wrote about the radical magazine. Ramparts boasted a reach outside its
readership, as mainstream publications picked up its stories and converted them to “news.”709
Despite the magazine’s influence, “when the United States signed a peace treaty with
Vietnam in January 1973, the issue that had catapulted the magazine into the spotlight
disappeared.”710 After Nixon's reelection in 1972, editors had characterized Ramparts as "the
disloyal opposition."711 According to Richardson, the magazine’s downward spiral began when
editor Horowitz became heavily involved with Huey Newton and the Black Panthers. When
Newtown fled to Cuba, he left Elaine Brown in charge of the organization, and Horowitz
recommended Betty Van Patter to work with Brown as a bookkeeper. Following Van Patter’s
death, allegedly at the hands of someone inside the Party, Horowitz and Collier began to criticize
the Black Panthers and the New Left.712 The end came quickly as Ramparts started missing
issues, and subscriptions declined to under 60,000.
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Ramparts’ managing editor at the time of Cabral’s death was Bo Burlingham, who had
been hired to give Horowitz and Collier more time to work on other projects. He came with his
own radical background, having been president of the SDS chapter at Princeton and a member of
the Weathermen. According to Richardson, Burlingham’s time at Ramparts ended late in 1973
when he realized Horowitz and Collier were not actually ready to give up control and as more of
the staff began to question their infatuation with the Panthers.713
5.4.1

Cabral’s Legacy, According to Ramparts

While Ramparts regularly covered the cutting edge of leftist politics, domestic issues
held sway, and much of the foreign affairs coverage in the early 1970s concerned Vietnam or
Israel.714 Nevertheless, stories about Angola, Mozambique, and even Guinea-Bissau appeared in
its pages. Ramparts did not mention Amilcar Cabral when he was alive. It did make passing
references to Guinea-Bissau, in a 1969 article on “Angola: Report from Hanoi II” and a 1972
article on “Apartheid in the New Africa” where it is described as “Portugal’s third colony on the
west coast of Africa.” Given this previous lack of attention, it is significant that Ramparts
memorialized the PAIGC leader with “The Legacy of Amilcar Cabral” in the April 1973 issue.715
Written by Brussels-born, Paris-educated Gerard Chaliand and translated from French,
the laudatory article details Cabral’s death, theories about his assassination, the background of
the territory and people of Guinea-Bissau, the nature of the Portuguese involvement, Cabral’s
education and founding of the PAIGC as well as its links with FRELIMO and MPLA, and the
victories achieved by the PAIGC.716 A reader without any prior knowledge of the situation in
Guinea-Bissau would have found the article informative and comprehensible. Based on his
knowledge, Chaliand proved an excellent choice to pen this tribute to Cabral. At the bottom of
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the article’s first page, a footnote explains that he is a “French author who has written
extensively on national liberation, armed struggle and the problems of socialism in the Third
World.” Chaliand had met Cabral in 1962 and visited liberated Guinea-Bissau in 1966.717
Chaliand had written Armed Struggle in Africa, published by Monthly Review Press in 1969, and
Peasants of North Vietnam in 1970 and The Palestinian Resistance in 1972, both published by
Penguin.
In Ramparts, Chaliand names the guilty party, then reviews the possible motive for the
assassination: "As he stepped from his car, he was shot down by Innocencio [sic] Kani, a
member of his own party."718 Although it was certain Cabral was killed by a member of the
PAIGC, several theories had been advanced to explain Kani’s reason for committing the murder;
it could have been inspired by Portuguese agents, party dissidents, or Guineans who opposed
Sékou Touré.
The portrait of Cabral is positive, even glowing, and Chaliand strives to show what an
important figure he had been.
The world press immediately recognized the significance of Cabral's death. The New
York Times and the Washington Post covered the story on page one. The French daily, Le
Monde, called him an exceptional leader with the stature of a head of state. The United
Nations paid tribute to him, and more than 40 delegations attended his funeral at
Conakry. He was, in fact, probably the most remarkable revolutionary leader that
contemporary Africa has yet produced.719
Chaliand reminisces about Cabral’s "calm and humorous way of speaking, and his poetry
too."720 Nevertheless, he explains that Cabral was "One of the rare theoreticians of the Third
World, as well as a remarkably able political and military leader." Cabral had given a speech at
the Tri-Continental conference in Havana in 1966 titled "Theory as a Weapon," in which he
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analyzed the "role of ideology, the relationships between Marxist theory and the actual
conditions (the level of the productive forces) in African societies. He also discussed the
nationalist petty bourgeoisie as a potentially determining force in the revolutionary struggle."721
Chaliand does not avoid Cabral’s Marxism; he celebrates it. "He lived only to lead his people to
independence: an independence he hoped would be real, without a corrupt and privileged ruling
class, without government ministers, and without a capital city." On the diplomatic front, Cabral
was a "shrewd politician" and upheld his country’s non-aligned status. "With great deftness,
Cabral maintained his objectives without serving the interests of any big power, socialist or
otherwise."722 Cabral was liked throughout the world: he visited the Pope and made several trips
to Scandinavia to secure financial humanitarian aid. He also traveled to the United States, spoke
at the United Nations, and visited Europe, where only France refused him entry.
If any doubt about Cabral’s nature remained, Chaliand explains that he was not a
charismatic or “‘dashing leader’” and that “he preferred patient organizing and carefully
calculated political initiative to earth-shattering declarations and spectacular gestures.”723
Chaliand does not write a negative word about Cabral or the PAIGC, to the point that he even
states that the party has "complete control" of the military.724
While Cabral earns Chaliand’s respect, Portugal by contrast, is depicted as ruled by a
"fascist government" and suffering from “economic backwardness."725 The colonizer had utilized
indirect rule in collaboration with the patriarchal “Moslem” Foulah society, which allowed the
“Portuguese to maintain a low profile at the same time as they engineered the quick and easy
subjugation of the animistic population."726 He writes only of PAIGC victories and Portuguese
dependence on "substantial military assistance from NATO countries."727 Throughout its
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colonial rule, Portugal provided nothing beneficial for Guineans. In fact, Guineans had lived
under apartheid-like conditions.728
For its part, the PAIGC, had achieved successes in politics, education, economic equality,
and women’s rights, all issues the New Left considered important. “Once having liberated
territory, Cabral developed a new kind of political – administrative structure in the zones
controlled by the PAIGC." Chaliand dedicates some space to the promotion of women’s rights as
part of Cabral’s revolutionary program. Committees at the village level consist of three men and
two women who are elected democratically. This new grassroots political system "has not only
allowed the villagers to make their voices heard, but has also noticeably altered the conditions of
women and young people by encouraging them to participate in the struggle and the decisionmaking process."729 Forced marriage has been forbidden and young girls "have joined the party
en masse as nurses and teachers, and sometimes as fighters."730 Additionally, the Portuguese
have been driven out of the economy, and the PAIGC "has established alternative economic
relationships."731 The liberation forces control more than two-thirds of country, and “for the first
time in 400 years … Guinean peasants had a chance to acquire some kind of education."732
Chaliand employs language and images that connect the struggle in Guinea-Bissau to the
Vietnam War, a technique used by several of the radical journalists under review here. He
explains that the Portuguese conduct offensives against liberated zones "following the pattern
used by the US Armed Forces in South Vietnam."733 He compares Cabral to Fidel Castro and Ho
Chi Minh, which would not have been a compliment in mainstream media outlets, but for
Ramparts readers, some of whom might not have been familiar with Cabral, would have elevated
his status and aroused sympathy.
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In fact, in Chaliand’s view, Cabral ought enjoy as much recognition as Fidel and Ho. He
possessed “special genius,” and with “years of political experience and a thorough knowledge of
social conditions in the area, Cabral had prepared the conditions for an armed struggle which was
to become the most significant in Black Africa."734 Like the New York Times writers, Chaliand
raises a question about what will be next for the PAIGC and Guinea-Bissau, stating Cabral's
"political sense, his particular genius for combining intelligence, flexibility, firmness and
imagination, will be hard to replace."735
5.5

The Great Speckled Bird: Subversive, Indeed
Ramparts could have been a local phenomenon, but it reached a nationwide audience,

thanks in part to the publicity it received from mainstream media outlets. During the 1960s and
early 1970s, local underground publications presented another way for Americans to discover
opinions outside the norm and find news that mainstream sources did not deem important.
Taking its name from “the fact that it voiced the opinions of leftist radicals and revolutionaries"
who formed a “seditious underground,” the underground press blossomed during the era.736 This
type of publication has been compared to the “spirit of what social media has become: a tool for
mobilization, a civic rallying cry, a chronicle for news that the mainstream media chooses not to
cover, and, above all, an outlet where anyone can have a voice.”737 By 1970 there were more
than 450 underground publications in the country.738
Published weekly from 1968 until 1976 in Atlanta, Georgia, by the Atlanta Cooperative
News Project, The Great Speckled Bird was launched by a “group of antiwar activists” and
became “one of the longest running and highest quality underground newspapers of the era.”739
The Bird flouted convention with a masthead of “Bird Staff” consisting of several names laid out
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in random fashion without specific titles or comprehensible hierarchy. In fact, The Bird
“functioned as a collective and positions rotated.”740 The paper often included typos, as well as
“lack of respect … for the King's English.”741 The Bird reached a high circulation of 20,000 and
maintained a press run of 13,000 during its heyday.742 It was the largest weekly newspaper in the
state of Georgia.
Launched with an “obituary” of Ralph McGill who would not die until the following
year, The Bird’s inaugural issue declared that it struck at liberalism’s hold on reason, McGill and
the Atlanta Constitution, “enervating plasticity,” and a “depressing lack of meaning.” The
publication would attempt to “offer some alternatives to what some call ‘The American Way of
Life.’”743 Furthermore, “to the gentlemen of HU-AC, we are indeed subversive.”744 The
newspaper’s leftist perspective encompassed civil rights, the anti-war movement, women’s
rights, anti-colonialism, and gay rights. Unlike the editors of Freedomways, who supported
radical involvement in broadly conventional politics, members of the underground were more
likely to distrust politics and also “believed that publishing an underground newspaper could
accomplish more than participating in other, more radical antiwar activities.”745
Staff at The Bird used "street language," and unlike Freedomways, which was carried by
university and public school libraries, The Bird was often charged for obscenity.746 After a wellknown court battle, the paper was dropped by its printer and had to look elsewhere - to Alabama
- for its weekly printing, and Bird staffers were frequently denied press cards by the Atlanta
police. On May 6, 1972, the paper’s office building was firebombed, although rather than
deterring staff, the attack "brought community support to The Speckled Bird as an outraged
response to such an overt attempt at suppression of the paper."747
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Although The Bird did not identify with a particular party “line,” some staffers brought a
sense of history and leftist activism that "kept the Bird politics grounded and tied to real issues –
not mired in specious New Left sectarian diatribes or flying about in utopian 'hippie' lifestyles
nonsense." Many of the staffers had been involved in civil rights efforts, however, The Bird
rarely had black staff members. Nevertheless, it still reported on the black community and the
Black Panthers. "There was a recognition of different fronts but one struggle."748
When compared to coverage of Cabral and Guinea-Bissau’s liberation struggle in The
Great Speckled Bird, Freedomways and Ramparts now appear lukewarm. Writing about Cabral,
PAIGC, MPLA, and FRELIMO in The Bird was not reporting the struggle but taking part in it.
An underground paper, it was not held to the same “objective” standard as The New York Times
nor the highbrow rigor of the Freedomways editorial team. “You could walk into its offices,
manuscript in hand, and have your story, poem, or artwork published.”749 Great Speckled Bird
contributors, often activists or students, freely voiced opinion, and not just in the op-ed column,
because the purpose of the publication was to persuade. In addition to covering news from
around the community and the country, The Bird kept an eye on the world. The paper included
stories that might not receive significant attention in the mainstream outlets it combatted, such as
the Atlanta Constitution. “Global issues were the focus of many of The Bird’s articles, which
were not written by foreign correspondents but still focused on injustices around the world, or
detailed the antiwar or civil rights movements internationally, and included historical context."750
5.5.1

Amilcar Cabral Soars in The Bird

Guinea-Bissau’s liberation struggle earned regular coverage in The Bird, so readers may
have been familiar with Cabral at the time of his death. A 1969 article featured an interview with
an anonymous MPLA leader.751 On the same page, the article “Portugal” explained that the
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election in Portugal might not usher in change, but it could lead to attention for some issues,
including liberation of the African colonies.752 The September 1970 “African Guerrillas”
discussed a conference to “further the growth of international solidarity” with the PAIGC,
MPLA, and FRELIMO. As in Ramparts, the wars in Portuguese Africa were equated with the
war in Vietnam. “Here, in the ‘Vietnam’ of West Africa, the Portuguese have been forced into
cities and ‘Strategic hamlets,’ just as the American invaders have been in Southeast Asia.”753
Later that year, The Bird covered the invasion of Guinea (Conakry) by the Portuguese, who
failed in their attempt to capture Cabral and free Portuguese agents held there.754
An in-depth look at the PAIGC’s efforts appeared in The Bird in May 1972. “Armed
Struggle in Guinea-Bissau” was published in advance of the worldwide African Liberation Day
and explains the background of the embattled situation in Guinea-Bissau, quoting some
information from Basil Davidson’s The Liberation of Guinea. While the article contains much of
the same summary of the PAIGC found in other publications under review, it makes a point of
considering the attitudes of the Portuguese – not the political and military leaders, but the
citizens who were suffering at the behest of their country, much in the same way Americans
were damaged by the war in Vietnam. Portuguese youth and students were unhappy about their
country’s draft, and the forces in Africa experienced desertions. Comparing the number of troops
to the country’s small population, the ratio would have been like having 2.5 million U.S. troops
fighting in Vietnam. The Bird article reminds readers that Portugal could only continue the war
and maintain its hold on Guinea-Bissau through its alliances with NATO countries.755
References to Vietnam, such as “the character of Portugal’s attempts to control its
African colonies – strikingly like the US involvement in Vietnam,” are combined with Marxist
language that would have resonated with leftist and countercultural readers.756 The writer
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revealed the PAIGC belief that “national liberation means more than formal independence,”
further explaining that Cabral “defined national liberation as the right to regain and continue
Guinea’s own history, which can only be done by ‘liberating the means and process of
development of its own productive forces.’”757
With its weekly format, The Great Speckled Bird was able to quickly announce news of
Cabral's death. "Cabral Murdered," stated the headline in the February 1, 1973 issue, Cabral’s
credentials deemed unnecessary in the title because the newspaper’s readership had encountered
the Guinean leader’s name several times before in their publication. "One of Africa's and the
world's greatest leaders died on January 20 ... Cabral, more than any other single person,
symbolized, spoke for, and carried forward the struggle against white supremacy in Africa," the
article began, positioning his life’s work as much bigger than liberating the small country of
Guinea-Bissau. Cabral stood for the battle against white supremacy throughout the continent,
now turning to the bastions of South Africa and Rhodesia.758 This article was culled from the
Liberation News Service, a wire service used by leftist and underground publications, but there is
no byline, and the two photos of Cabral appear without photo caption. The lack of authorship is
slightly disconcerting because some of the article is written in first person, “Traveling in Guinea
(Bissau), as I did a little over two years ago,” the writer details the singing that s/he heard, stating
that Cabral’s name figured in many songs.759 This positivity develops in the writer’s description
of Cabral:
Amilcar Cabral will long be remembered and mourned. Among other things he will be
remembered as a man who was far too wise to desire for himself any more power or
esteem than he served as part of the whole, far greater than himself. The people of his
country held great love and respect for him, but hardly a blind adoration and
dependence.760
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Unlike Ramparts and The New York Times, which voiced concerns about the future of the
PAIGC, the goal of liberation seems assured: “Somehow, it seems particularly sad that Amilcar
Cabral should have been killed at a time when his cause is nearing victory… For the time has
long since passed when the death of any one man could check the styrggle [sic] for independence
in Guinea and Cape Verde."761
The Bird’s coverage of Cabral continued even after his death. While Cabral more or less
disappeared from even the other leftist publications under review, The Bird included a February
1974 review of his book Revolution in Guinea, which was published by Monthly Review Press.
It begins by stating that Guinea-Bissau was liberated “last year,” which means that The Bird
subscribed to Guinea-Bissau’s proclaimed independence date (rather than the one Portugal later
acknowledged – at the time The Bird printed this article, the Carnation Revolution of April 1974
had not yet occurred).762 The reviewer states that the book is an important tool in understanding
African nationalism and anticolonialism and it "details the class and tribal contradictions in
Guinea and how the party tries to resolve them … Revolution in Guinea helps our understanding
of how the fight in imperialist countries unite with the fight of the Third World."763 It is unclear
why this book review was included in February 1973; Monthly Review Press had released the
book in1969. Regardless, it kept Cabral and the anticolonial struggle alive for The Bird’s readers.
A final vision of Amilcar Cabral appeared in the February 13, 1975 edition of The Great
Speckled Bird, and its purpose could plainly be understood from the article’s title “Cabral
Remembered.”764 Bylined with the Atlanta Regional Venceremos Brigade, a Cuba solidarity
organization, the article makes clear that the success of the PAIGC has continued despite the loss
of Cabral.765 "The leadership of the PAIGC guarantees the success of their struggle by never
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falsely attributing the total strength of the people to one person… Thus when Cabral was
murdered, his death did not destroy the movement, but increased its determination."766
The article expounds on achievements after Cabral's death, such as the Declaration of
Independence by the National People's assembly of Guinea-Bissau on September 26, 1973;
suffrage for all those fifteen or older; equal rights for women; outlawing of tribal privileges and
discrimination; and the right to work and be educated. Special attention in this article is paid to
women's rights, for example, the writer mentions that polygamy had existed throughout the
country, but “now, polygamy is declining.” Additionally,
The PAIGC has authorized village tribunals to grant divorces and to insure that no
woman is forced to remain with a husband against her will. Many women are in positions
of leadership within the PAIGC. Others were trained in the use of automatic weapons so
they could participate in local militias. Some are nurses and health workers while some
participate in the regular military units.767
In the newspaper’s final article concerning Amilcar Cabral – The Great Speckled Bird ceased
publication with its October 1976 issue – the writer emphasizes the importance of women’s
equality to Cabral, the PAIGC, and the Guinea-Bissauan liberation struggle.768 Other
publications had sometimes mentioned women’s role in the revolution in passing, even though
for Cabral, transforming society necessitated liberation of and participation by women.
5.6

Writer Stephanie Urdang Asks: How Are Women Faring in Guina-Bissau?
As the liberation struggle continued following Cabral’s death, the PAIGC strove to

maintain its fundamental goal of social transformation. While U.S. media coverage, including
articles in radical outlets, provided minimal review of women’s liberation as a fundamental
concern of the PAIGC program, writer and activist Stephanie Urdang traveled to Guinea-Bissau
in April 1974 and June 1976 to find out how women’s liberation was put into practice. “[P]rior to
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my visit I had little concrete information about the role of women: a published interview here, a
statement there, a comment in a speech of a leader.”769 Originally from South Africa, Urdang had
left her country in 1967 out of “opposition to the bitter oppression and brutality of the apartheid
regime” and was working with Southern Africa liberation support groups in New York when she
heard Cabral speak at a meeting in 1969, increasing her interest in Guinea-Bissau. Her book
Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau, which details her trips to Guinea-Bissau,
was published in 1979. Although the printing occurred outside the timeframe under review here,
the book highlights as aspect of the revolution that was important to Cabral, but which was not
often on the agenda of U.S. media reporting. Urdang writes that the book is “an analysis which
grew out of the recognition that women suffer a dual oppression, expressed in Guinea-Bissau as
the need for women to ‘fight two colonialisms – the one of the Portuguese and the other of
men.’”770 For Urdang, women’s liberation can only take place in a non-capitalist society. “Unless
socialism is achieved, the liberation of women cannot be realized.”771 Thus, the book offers two
tenets, gender equality and socialism. “The revolutionary Third World society that GuineaBissau envisions … has no historically vested interest in sexism; it does not need divisions
among the workers, it does not need unemployment. Rather, it needs the unified effort of all, and
egalitarianism.”772
Urdang features the personal stories of the many women she meets. Some appear more
fortunate than others and deal with situations easily understood by American readers. For
example, Maria explained that she and her husband both worked and had two children and a
daytime paid caregiver, although they could not afford one at night. “It was expected, then, that
Maria stay home to look after the children, whereas her husband, without thinking it might be
unfair, was free to go and visit friends, take in a movie, or go out for a beer.”773 Maria stated that
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education and employment opportunities would enable women to become “economically
independent, and then emotionally independent. This in turn would bring respect from men.”774
Other women Urdang interviewed faced issues that, while culturally removed from Western
readers’ lives, would still have been understood in many ways:
“We women really suffer,” she began. “First it is the women who pound, it is the women
who go to fish, it is the women who cook for the men … In addition to all of this, if his
clothes are dirty, it is we women who must wash them … Once the men have tilled the
land and the rice begins to grow we are then responsible for everything after that. The
women alone harvest the rice and we have to transport it without their help to the village.
This, I tell you, is how all women are suffering.”775
Understanding the issues of women’s “suffering,” the PAIGC focused on adjusting the
sexual division of labor. Breaking from traditions of forced marriage and denial of divorce rights
for women, as well as polygyny, the PAIGC began a process of political education directed
toward the goal of social transformation. Moving slowly allowed them to keep the people from
turning against the PAIGC and the liberation effort. Unfortunately, independent Guinea-Bissau
entered the world economy in a weak position, so the process of transformations was far from
complete when Urdang returned after independence. Nevertheless, even as early as the fight for
liberation, changes could be seen: soldiers grew their own food, which set the example of men
doing agricultural work; efforts were made to equalize the numbers of boys and girls in school
(Urdang reports this at about three to one); and the government was working to allocate a
number of jobs to women. Still, other changes must take root in the village structure, Urdang
admits. Women need political power and men need to be integrated into agricultural work.
Despite the unfinished project of women’s equality, Urdang states, “In Guinea-Bissau I found
what I had hoped to find: that the liberation of women is an explicit and integral part of the
overall revolution.”776
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5.7

Conclusion
In the early 1970s, radical publications provided deeper coverage of the life and death of

PAIGC leader Amilcar Cabral than did the mainstream U.S. media. Each publication viewed
Guinea-Bissau’s war of liberation through the lens of what it deemed important. For
Freedomways, Cabral and Guinea-Bissau represented the battle against racism, which was part
of the global anti-imperialist struggle; in Ramparts, relating events in Portuguese Africa to
Vietnam was key as the magazine promoted a strong antiwar agenda; The Great Speckled Bird
broke the barrier between journalism and activism by often featuring articles that made calls to
action, even guiding readers on how to affect global events locally; and writer Urdang, who was
disappointed by the lack of coverage of women’s liberation as part of the PAIGC strategy, went
to Guinea-Bissau twice to see for herself what progress had been made. Despite these
differences, commonalities run through the publications. Some of these became evident in the
mainstream media as well with growing diversity in their staffs.
Reviewing articles about Cabral’s death as well as others about him or the PAIGC from
1972 to 1975, all sources offered positive descriptions of him that were not based on colonial
tropes or the rhetoric used to represent leaders discussed in earlier chapters. Adjectives,
characteristics, and titles applied to Cabral from The New York Times to The Great Speckled Bird
include: agronomist; gentle; small; successful; modern; sophisticated; soft-spoken; and an
inspiration. He was determined to be more thoughtful than charismatic and was an able political
and military leader, something that had not been – and often still is not – applied to African
leaders (Nelson Mandela excepted). Even Cabral’s Marxist rhetoric did not lead these writers to
critique him, and for some, it was a point to celebrate.
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In the radical press, and in The New York Times as well, images of Portugal and the
Portuguese government included fascist, cowardly, backward, poor, ineffective, and dependent
on NATO. Only The Great Speckled Bird considered the people of Portugal who were forced to
live under a repressive government and fight in colonial wars many did not believe in. By putting
the African colonial wars in these terms, The Bird drew a comparison to America’s involvement
in Vietnam and the millions of Americans who had turned against the war. This use of language
related to Vietnam could also be seen in coverage in Freedomways and Ramparts and served as a
vital way to rally support for the African liberation fighters.
While women’s liberation formed an important aspect of the PAIGC’s plan to transform
society, this topic earned less coverage than war statistics or descriptions of Cabral. Urdang’s
late-1970s book delved into the subject, showing the struggles women in Guinea-Bissau faced
before and after independence while advocating socialism as a necessary ingredient of the
remedy. The Bird mentioned women’s liberation only in its 1975 article, and Chaliand’s piece in
Ramparts reviewed some of the changes the PAIGC worked to make to improve the lives of
Guinea-Bissauan women. Presumably given the opportunity to write his own article for
Freedomways, the PAIGC representative Pinto did not choose to include women’s liberation in
his review of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism. By contrast, he masculinized the effort
stating, “A new consciousness and a new man are being created in this struggle,” and “Our
people expect the fraternal assistance of independent African people and help from socialist
countries.”777 Despite the gains of acceptability made by antiracism, anticolonialism, and
Marxism, for the most part, even within radical U.S. press of the early 1970s, women’s liberation
did not rank high on the agenda.
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6

CONCLUSION: RECOVERING AFRICA

After Throughout the long global Sixties, Americans looked to the press as well as radio
and television news to learn about decolonizing Africa. Of course, the age of African
independence coincided with the Cold War. Rather than illuminating news from the continent in
terms of worldwide political and social unrest, mainstream print media coverage often focused
on newly independent African states’ perceived position in the East-West conflict and used Cold
War rhetoric to define leaders in simplified terms of good or evil, friend or enemy. Indeed, the
media employed African leaders as metonyms for their countries and sometimes for the
continent as a whole, relying on colonial and racial tropes to frame Africa and Africans for
American audiences. In setting the agenda for what would be considered newsworthy about
African nations, the media all too often resorted to the topics of death, disease, and
underdevelopment.
Many scholars have analyzed the negative or reductive nature of Africa’s media image,
both historical and contemporary. While this kind of coverage has proven enduring, it is not in
fact pervasive or inevitable. My dissertation tracks the coverage of Africa in a select but diverse
set of U.S. print media outlets from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. I have used several major
stories of decolonization, more or less personified by leaders in five different countries in West
and Central Africa, to follow the construction of a media image of Africa and its peoples and to
examine the increasingly complex, contradictory, and contested nature of this image in a time
when mainstream U.S. journalism’s authority was coming into question and its perspectives and
narratives were beginning to face challenges from alternative outlets. There is no denying the
prestige and influence of The New York Times or TIME, but establishment accounts did not
exhaust what readers could learn about Africa. When we expand the range of media sources
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under review, we recover a rather more intricate, composite image of Africa that American
readers had access to during the global Sixties. By adding African American, liberal, left-wing,
and “underground” outlets to the sources of U.S. print media coverage, we recover a variety of
often forgotten voices as well as views on Africa. Some of these voices tell us about interest and
opinion around Africa in sectors of society that had been marginalized, like the black community
or the “old” left. Other voices suggest emerging sectors, like the “new” left or “second wave”
feminism. And of course some are simply fresh, original voices in the changing mainstream of
journalism, like Renata Adler’s.
Historians have demonstrated the importance of movements and developments in the
Third World during the long global Sixties. They have shown that Third World peoples and
states were not mere objects in the Cold War confrontation, but actors striving to gain political
independence, economic development, and cultural recognition despite global power imbalances
that disadvantaged them. Just as media coverage of Africa today informs Western publics and
policy makers and helps to shape such things as foreign investment, military intervention, and
humanitarian aid, so did coverage forty or sixty years ago at crucial moments when decolonizing
peoples and newly independent countries were trying to write their own stories and determine
their own destinies.
My dissertation seeks to make three contributions to historical scholarship on American
journalism, Africa and the United States, and the long global Sixties. First, this dissertation seeks
to fill a gap in studies of U.S. foreign reporting by inserting Africa into this field of historical
research. As journalist Asgede Hagos has found, neglect in media coverage translates into
neglect in foreign interest. Concerning Africa, we can extend Hagos’s claim to neglect in
scholarly attention. In his otherwise comprehensive study, Journalism’s Roving Eye: A History
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of American Foreign Reporting, John Maxwell Hamilton only mentions Africa twice.778 As we
have seen, however, African news earned front-page coverage even in the mainstream press
during the age of independence. Reporters such as The New York Times’s Thomas A. Johnson
were stationed in African cities to check the daily pulse of events, while others, like The New
Yorker’s Renata Adler, made special trips to produce in-depth accounts of the African scene.
We need to pay attention to coverage of Africa, past as well as present.
Second, by consulting a broader range of sources, my study challenges the absolute
power of agenda setting usually attributed to powerful media agencies. It goes on to establish
that writers and editors could reframe independent Africa in novel or critical ways. Whether it
was championing Ahmed Sékou Touré’s challenge to Charles de Gaulle, or questioning the
forces behind Patrice Lumumba’s death, or, in the case of the underground Atlanta newspaper
The Great Speckled Bird, continuing to appreciate the significance of Amilcar Cabral’s
revolutionary strategy rather than burying the man and his ideas as “old news” after his death,
different facets of Africa and Africans came into view as a result.779 Indeed, in its final article
about Cabral, The Bird included details of his plan for women’s liberation as well, something
that had not been on the agenda previously and received little notice elsewhere. My approach
does not merely replace mainstream and elite sources with dissenting, minority, and radical
sources. Instead, it is interactive. When TIME used colonial and racial language to describe
Sékou Touré as traditional, savage, and prone to communism, the Chicago Defender offered a
contrasting image by depicting him as a leader who enjoyed the support of his people and
represented the promise of modern Africa. In some cases, this reframing came through the words
of Africans themselves as coverage gave leaders and others access to the journalistic discursive
space. Thus Foreign Affairs featured articles by Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Nigeria’s
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Nnamdi Azikiwe as well as by Western observers. When Adler penned her long essay about
Biafra, she included the voices of a variety of Biafrans, from General Odumegwu Ojukwu to
novelist Chinua Achebe to Miss Etuk, who received her doctorate from Columbia University. A
skilled writer with a good ear as well as eye, Adler recorded and shared the musings and
opinions of her hosts and in this way enabled her readers to feel that they too had seen and heard
the Biafrans she met and spoke with. By 1973, mainstream media was offering Africans some
opportunities to represent themselves, as The New York Times did in C. Gerald Fraser’s article on
Cabral, which quoted him at length from an interview done not long before his death. Voices of
Africans could be heard if an American reader knew where and when to listen.
Third, the in-depth coverage offered by writers like Adler and the essays, interviews,
speeches, and statements from African leaders, writers, and activists that appeared in the press
reveal the availability of multiple representations of Africa. These more positive or complex
depictions of events and situations, leaders and peoples, may not have directly affected U.S.
public opinion or altered U.S. foreign policy at the time. There is no question that Foreign
Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong’s analysis of the Congo crisis held more weight with
U.S. policy makers than did that of Monthly Review editors Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman.
However, even when these publications were fleeting – The Bird published for only eight years –
or circumscribed – Political Affairs was not stocked in many newsstands or bookstores – they
sometimes offered accounts that later proved prophetic or at least plausible. Ramparts stopped
publication in 1975, but its former staff members went on to found media outlets such as Mother
Jones that carried on its spirit and style of critical journalism. Stories of Africa from these
publications provide evidence of a diverse American public and trouble the notion that
mainstream media always set the agenda. Indeed, it would be more accurate to argue that media
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set the agendas, plural. When it came to coverage of Africa, writers, reporters, and editors varied
in both what they covered and how they covered it. This wider spectrum of reporting always
exists, whether or not we recognize it, which makes inclusion of dissenting, minority, or radical
sources so vital for journalism history and media studies.
This dissertation envisions new avenues of research. A multitude of publications and
reporters produced news coverage of Africa during the Cold War and the long global Sixties.
Scholars may build on this work to recover still more voices and views concerned with newly
independent nations elsewhere in of the Global South. While my study deals with a handful of
African countries, there are other countries and continents in the non-aligned and third worlds
whose media images in the United States deserve scrutiny. As we consider media today in all of
its diversity, and as online and social media have changed the boundaries of access to discursive
space, it is important to remember that there have long existed those journalists who endeavored
to set new agendas by widening the discourse about foreign affairs, reframing the understanding
of what was once the colonial world and is now widely known as the Global South, and
sometimes even making space in newspaper columns and magazine pages for the voices of
people – ordinary people as well as writers and leaders – from these regions.
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